Political Science Quarterly

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, New York 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $17.50 a year. Three years, $46.00. Students, $13.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $24.00 a year. Foreign postage, $2.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 94 Number 3 Fall 1979.

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Political Science Quarterly

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Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, N.Y. 10025. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, N.Y. 10025.

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York, 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $4.50. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. One copy, $3.00. Additional copies, $.50 each. Complete issue, $.08 per page.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Volume 94
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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF analyzes Soviet views on the complementary roles of diplomacy and military strategy, using materials from a heretofore unavailable Soviet General Staff journal as well as other sources.

MICHAEL J. ROBINSON and KEVIN R. APPEL examine network television news coverage of the House and Senate. Among other findings, Robinson and Appel show that while most coverage about Congress is neutral, when the stories are not neutral, they are always negative.

ROBERT D. THOMAS analyzes how federal aid programs to localities are adapted to local circumstances through a complex intergovernmental policy process. He concludes that national political officials allow local authorities to negotiate for their set of priorities and mold national program objectives to their diverse local conditions.

DONALD F. KETTL uses the experiences of four Connecticut cities participating in the Community Development Block Grant program to explore the implications of increased local discretion in the use of federal grants. He finds that these cities attacked small-scale neighborhood-based problems but proved unable to deal with problems of broader scope.

SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT argues that the pursuit of rapid growth in the twentieth century has led to the denial of many political and social rights for the citizens of the Third World. She finds that contemporary tradeoffs between growth and equity are likely to be deeper and longer lasting than those typical of the original industrial revolution.

HUGH DE SANTIS analyzes the conflicting images of the Soviet Union formed by American Foreign Service officers posted in the Balkans and in the State Department between 1944 and 1946. He argues that differing experiences gave rise initially to perceptions of ideological confrontation in the field and of ideological cooperation in Washington. By the winter of 1945–46, however, diplomats in the Department similarly concluded that the United States and Russia were locked in a global struggle of irreconcilable ideologies and endorsed the policy of containment.

SHLOMO SLONIM traces the initial imposition of America's 1948 embargo on arms for Palestine to State Department officials intent on minimizing any American role in implementing the partition plan earlier endorsed by President Truman. Even after Truman reversed State Department policy by his immediate recognition of Israel, the embargo was maintained intact throughout 1948. This was primarily in order to avoid a split with Britain over Middle East policy at the height of the cold war.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM's review essay of Herman Wouk's two historical novels of World War II reflects on the aspects of that war that seem most important forty years after it began.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Soviet Views on the Interrelation of Diplomacy and Military Strategy

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

The close interrelationship between politics and war, between state policy and the employment of military means, is generally well recognized. Soviet leaders, beginning with Lenin's careful study of Clausewitz and enthusiastic endorsement of the famous maxim that "war is a continuation of politics only by other means" (injecting his own concept of "politics"), have been especially aware of the interconnection. This is important, although few maxims are so oft quoted and so little understood as this one of Clausewitz—in American usage, in Soviet usage, and in much of the American commentary on the Soviet view.[1]

Over the past decade, the usually dreary and pedestrian Soviet discussion of political-military problems has been enlivened by the appearance of a number of sophisticated, high-caliber analytical studies, exemplified by such collaborative works as *Military Power and International Relations* and *International Conflicts* by political and military analysts of the Academy of Sciences Institutes studying international politics.[2] The main source for the present discussion,

[1] For a striking example of the latter category, see Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 34; and the refutations by Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security* 2 (Spring 1978): 72-73; Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Military Doctrine: Views on Nuclear War," *Arms Control Today* 8 (October 1978): 1-2; and Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 3 (Summer 1978): 114-24.

[2] See for example [Colonel] V. M. Kulish, ed., *Voyennaya sila i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [Military power and international relations] (Moscow: Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1972); V. V. Zhurkin and Ye. M. Primakov,

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF is currently United States Ambassador to Bulgaria. He is the author of several books, including *Soviet Military Policy* and *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, as well as a contributor to many other books and journals.

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however, is the General Staff organ *Military Thought*, in which a number of articles in the latter 1960s and early 1970s have dealt with aspects of the relationship between diplomacy and military strategy, including one article in 1971 specifically devoted to that subject. These discussions in *Military Thought* are of particular importance not only because they deal with an important subject seldom addressed, but also because they are written for the senior Soviet military echelons under the auspices of the General Staff, in an organ not publicly available and not intended for the general Soviet public—or for foreign readers. These discussions often build upon discussions in the open military press, but are sometimes more frank in addressing some matters.

State Policy, Military Strategy, and Diplomacy

In the Soviet conception, "the dependence of military strategy on politics," as stated in Marshal Sokolovsky's standard treatise, *Military Strategy*, "affects the determination of overall and specific strategic aims, the general character of the strategy of a state, and the selection of methods and forms of conducting war."[3] As noted in the principal article in *Military Thought*, "both diplomacy and strategy are included in the broader concept of *state policy* and are subordinate to it.[4] The tasks of military strategy are described as planning for possible future military operations, including estimating the capabilities of possible enemies. These tasks are resolved "in close coordination with other means of internal and foreign policy, among which not least is diplomacy."[5]

Many statements attest to the Soviet recognition that not only in peacetime, but also during hostilities, military strategy and diplomacy have essential complementary continuing roles to play.

> The concepts "diplomacy" and "military strategy" encompass such different aspects of state activity that at first glance it would seem difficult to speak of their interrelationship and complementarity. But only at first glance. Although there is a saying that when the cannon speak the diplomats fall silent, a scientific approach to a study of diplomatic activity and military strategy reveals in them many common features and points of contact, and leads to the conclusion that success in one area can create the precondition for success in the other, and vice versa.[6]

Mezhdunarodnye konflikty [International conflicts] (Moscow: Institute of World Economics and International Relations and the Institute of USA Studies, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1972); V. V. Zhurkin, *SShA i mezhdunarodno-politicheskie krizisy* [The USA and international political crises] (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); *"Doktrina Niksona"* ["The Nixon doctrine"] (Moscow: Institute of USA Studies, Nauka, 1972); and G.A. Trofimenko, *SShA: politika, voina, ideologiya* [The USA: politics, war, ideology] (Moscow: Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Mysl', 1976).

[3] Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, ed., *Voyennaya strategiya*, 3d ed. [Military strategy] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), p. 26, and see pp. 26-29.

[4] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," *Voyennaya mysl'* 7 (Moscow 1971):40.

[5] Ibid., p. 50.

[6] Ibid., p. 40.

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In a number of other articles in *Military Thought*, we read statements such as: "During the course of a war, armed conflict is always closely interwoven with other forms of conflict—economic, ideological, and diplomatic. Only on the foundation of their combination are class and political aims achieved in contemporary war."[7] And, "diplomacy and military strategy are correct, effective, and produce positive results only when they are closely interlocked in direction, content, ultimate missions and objectives."[8]

The Soviets are very attentive to the reciprocal active roles both of military strategy and of diplomacy in supporting and advancing one another and the overall objectives of state policy. Again, as stated in *Military Strategy:*

> State policy usually not only establishes strategic aims, but also strives to create conditions favorable to the realization of those aims. . . . For the successful accomplishment of assigned objectives, the armed forces need the creation of favorable diplomatic, economic and morale-political conditions. The state prepares for war in all these areas. . . . A vast range of activity is opened for diplomacy, which in endeavoring for a strengthening of the international position of a state constantly takes into account its security interests, reflecting the requirements of military strategy.[9]

We shall discuss later the role that military strategy, in turn, is seen as able to play in wartime in serving diplomacy.

Deterrence

Most Soviet discussions, especially since the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, stress the cardinal importance of preventing war. The *Military Thought* article includes such reference, and states that "Soviet diplomacy and strategy accomplish a single mission—to secure peace."[10]

In a recent study, I have examined available materials on Soviet political and military views on mutual deterrence and strategic arms limitation, including important discussions in *Military Thought*.[11] From that analysis, it is clear that Soviet writers have attributed an important contributing role to diplomacy in negotiating the ABM Treaty concluded in 1972, and more generally in the SALT negotiations. Unfortunately, few issues of *Military Thought* are available for this analysis for the seven years since the SALT I agreements were concluded. There

[7] Major General N. Sushko and Captain 2nd Rank V. Puzik, "The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Cognition and Its Significance for Soviet Military Science and Practice," *Voyennaya mysl'* 1 (1966): 22; see also Major General V. Zemskov, "Problems of the History and Theory of Military Science," *Voyennaya mysl'* 4 (1971):19; Colonel General N. A. Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," *Voyennaya mysl'* 1 (1966): 3; and Colonel V. Morozov, "Categories of Content and Form in War," *Voyennaya mysl'* 2 (1966):19 and 20.

[8] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," pp. 42–43.

[9] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 29.

[10] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," p. 49.

[11] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 3 (Summer 1978):112–47.

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is, however, a relevant and interesting article from 1973 by Major General Cherednichenko, a leading Soviet authority on military doctrine. In addition to restating the existence of mutual deterrence, he notes that "definite successes have been achieved in the strategic arms limitation negotiations," and he ascribes "a certain role" in the major success of Soviet foreign policy (including but not limited to the SALT agreements) to military strategy—in achieving mutual deterrence and thus forcing the United States to face up to the need for negotiating restraints on strategic arms.[12] Of course the many references by Brezhnev and other political and military leaders to Soviet military power as a deterrent and to the need to maintain military parity indicate a more general appreciation of military strategy as serving state policy, but specific references to diplomacy (for example, in SALT) as serving military strategy (and vice versa) in this context are rare.

Dmitriyev, in his article discussing diplomacy as a handmaiden of military strategy written prior to the SALT I accords, refers in general terms to disarmament negotiations, and to scientific, cultural, and other nontraditional forms of diplomatic activity. He also refers to "summit diplomacy," and to the "hot lines" (in the Russian, "red lines") between the Kremlin and the White House, Whitehall, and the Elysee Palace, especially noting their potential role for crisis consultations.[13] Later discussions would include the 1971 agreement with the United States seeking to prevent the outbreak of war by accident or miscalculation and the 1973 Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

Outbreak of War

Clearly, diplomacy has a particular role in crisis confrontations. This is keenly appreciated by the Soviets, and the fact that some of the most outstanding studies by the Soviet "think tank" institutes deal precisely with this subject is, as the Soviets would say, no accident.

Marshal Sokolovsky's basic work on *Military Strategy* gives due attention to this subject: "Foreign policy preparation for [the contingency of] war includes such measures as the conclusion of alliances, the formation of coalitions of states, securing the neutrality of neighboring states, and others."[14] Soviet political and military analysis relies heavily on historical data and empirical approaches, especially in discussions dealing with the present subject. The civilian institute analysts, and the military contributors to the Sokolovsky treatise and to *Military Thought*, all think in terms of and cite historical parallels

[12] Major General M. I. Cherednichenko, "Military Strategy and Military Technology," *Voyennaya mysl'* 4 (1973): 42. See also Anatoly Gromyko, "American Theoreticians between 'Total War' and Peace," *Voyennaya mysl'* 4 (1969):91–92.

[13] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," pp. 49–50.

[14] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 29.

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and examples (especially, but not only, from Russian and Soviet experience). Thus, *Military Strategy* addresses the question of initiation of war as follows:

> Politics, proceeding from an evaluation of the military-political situation, selects the most propitious moment to start a war, taking into account strategic considerations. One can judge how important the selection of the timing of the initiation of a war is by noting that in those cases where it was well selected strategy usually achieved great military results and politics gained the greatest advantages from these results.[15]

As examples, Bismarck's opening of war against Austria in 1866 is lauded: the Prussian army was then strong, Italy was a strong ally, and Austria had not yet recovered from the unsuccessful Italian campaign of 1859; moreover, Austria was in the throes of implementing an uncompleted military reform, and the internal Austrian situation was rather unstable owing to an upsurge of Hungarian separatism. "All these circumstances enabled her [Prussia] to achieve victory thanks to the favorable timing of the moment." A negative example cited is the Russian failure to go to war with Turkey in the autumn of 1876: Turkey was tied down by a war with Serbia and Montenegro and urgently needed to reform its army; Great Britain was less well able to aid Turkey; and the weather would have aided Russian naval movements against Turkey. When Russia finally did go to war in April of 1877, all of these conditions were less to her advantage. Subsequently, even though Russia emerged militarily victorious in 1878, she was unable to achieve her main aims.[16] The German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 is also cited as having been "extremely unfavorable" for the Soviet Union.[17]

Other discussions, including Dmitriyev's in *Military Thought*, deal with the still sensitive case of pre-World War II Soviet diplomacy. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 is cited as "an example of the flexibility of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy." The author frankly acknowledges that "it took a great deal of courage to explain to the peoples of the Soviet Union and to the entire world why the USSR had to conclude a nonaggression pact with such a country as fascist Germany, which by 1939 had demonstrated itself to be an aggressive imperialist power." Nonetheless, since the Western powers were allegedly "lulling the vigilance of the Soviet people with distracting diplomatic actions and attempts to resolve inter-imperialist tensions at the expense of the USSR," it is said to have been the correct Soviet move. "Today, in retrospect, the interrelation of imperialist military strategy and diplomacy and its anti-Soviet thrust [in 1939] has become even more clear." Accordingly, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was "not only an important victory for Soviet diplomacy but also a great strategic success, since it secured peace for our country for almost two years and enabled us to strengthen our nation's defense."[18]

[15] Ibid., p. 33.
[16] Ibid., pp. 33 and 34.
[17] Ibid., p. 34.
[18] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," pp. 43–45.

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Soviet military and political analyses distinguish a special "period of threat" or danger, which in almost all cases precedes a war. In fact, in the Soviet view, a "general period of threat" usually occurs, followed by an "immediate threatening period" which, in turn, has "concealed" and then "open" phases. For example, the general period of threat for World War I is said to have begun in 1912, and the immediate period of threat on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of Crown Prince Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary. The German seizure of Austria in March 1938 is said to have opened the general period of threat for World War II.[19] At the present time, while neither a surprise nuclear attack nor a war by accident is entirely ruled out, in the Soviet view it remains probable that there would be a "period of threat" with diplomatic, political, economic, and possibly limited military moves. It is, of course, recognized that "the military-political nature and the duration of the period of threat always have depended on specific historical conditions," and would continue to do so.[20] General Zemskov, a leading military theoretician and editor of *Military Thought*, notes that in case of a general nuclear war the "open" phase of the period of threat may be very brief or even absent, but there would still be an active preparatory period.

> Under all conditions, a period of threat will evidently be filled with a considerable complex of various measures along diplomatic, political, economic and military lines carried out by both sides. In the diplomatic sphere, for example, there can be various types of diplomatic warnings and declarations, applications of diplomatic pressure on certain states, breaking-off relations, and the establishment or confirmation of treaty obligations.[21]

Military measures in the period of threat include intensification of reconnaissance and intelligence, bringing military forces to higher readiness, possible mobilization (initially perhaps secretly), deployment of reinforcements to the theater of military operations, and possible partial evacuation of populations from cities.[22]

Crisis diplomacy is of major importance, including above all direct high-level communication and negotiation. The one instance since World War II identified by Soviet analysts as a "period of threat" of war was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (which the Soviets call "the Caribbean crisis").[23] The October 1973 confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Suez cease-fire may also rank as a period of threat of Soviet-American war, although it has not been officially so described in the available Soviet literature.

[19] Major General V. Zemskov, "Wars of the Contemporary Era," *Voyennaya mysl'* 5 (1969):61.
[20] Ibid., pp. 60–62.
[21] Ibid., p. 62.
[22] Ibid.
[23] The most careful and instructive Soviet account has been prepared by Anatoly Gromyko, a leading Soviet expert on American affairs, in *Mezhdunarodnye konflikty*, pp. 70–95.

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Alliances and Coalitions

Soviet writing on the role of diplomacy in relation to military strategy (and to war in general) places particular emphasis on the expected coalition nature of the contending sides in a general war. General Zemskov stressed in 1967 in *Red Star* that "a nuclear-missile war will be a war of coalitions. Complex tasks concerning the establishment of the proper mutual relations both with allies and with neutral countries will arise for each of the contending sides."[24] In a later article in *Military Thought* he was more explicit. Armed conflict, he noted, is "supported" by other forms of conflict and other instruments of policy, in particular economic, ideological, and diplomatic. In turning specifically to diplomacy, he states:

> Diplomatic conflict will also have specific features. During the period of an intensive exchange of nuclear strikes by both sides, the sphere of utilization of this form of conflict will undoubtedly decrease, owing to the exceptionally complex situation which can be complicated in this period by the possible disruption of the system of state control, insufficient time, and other factors. Nonetheless, despite this fact, each of the sides will seek to do everything possible in order under prevailing conditions to use diplomatic means as effectively as possible against its opponent. Subsequently, the role of diplomacy will increase sharply. The point of diplomatic conflict will obviously be directed toward weakening the hostile coalition in every way possible, by means of separating individual states from it, and depriving the main enemy of his international ties and support from allied, dependent and neutral states.[25]

The theme of diplomatic efforts to break down a hostile coalition is given particular attention. Again, historical cases are examined and cited. Marshal Sokolovsky's treatise on *Military Strategy* concisely states and illustrates Soviet thinking not only on breaking countries away from a hostile coalition, but when possible coopting them onto one's own side. Diplomacy, he notes, "directing all its efforts to facilitating the achievement of strategic objectives, may arrange an alliance with a country which had until that time been in the enemy camp." This he describes as "undoubtedly an important factor for military strategy in accomplishing its missions." As examples, Sokolovsky cites successes of Soviet diplomacy in concluding agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania in the fall of 1944, "which placed the German fascist army in a very difficult position" on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. This situation, of course, developed only after the defeat of the German and Rumanian armies in Rumania. And Sokolovsky acknowledges that it was only after the military successes of the Red Army that these diplomatic successes could be attained. Accordingly, in his words, "only as the result of the mutual efforts of Soviet strategy and diplomacy were these successes achieved. This was a striking example of the

[24] Major General V. Zemskov, "An Important Factor for Victory in War," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), January 5, 1967.

[25] Zemskov, "Wars of the Contemporary Era," p. 55.

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complete coordination of action between diplomacy and strategy, unified by a single aim."[26]

Dmitriyev also gives greatest importance to military operations, although he places a little more stress on the role and contribution of diplomacy than does the Sokolovsky volume. In both cases, the mutually supportive action, and need for coordination, of diplomacy and military strategy is clearly stated. He observes that the truce agreements with Italy, Finland, and Rumania deprived Germany of allies "and of many tens of divisions operating against the armies of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain. The conclusion of these agreements thus resolved tasks of a military-strategic nature." He stresses that these agreements were only possible owing "above all to the historic victories of the Soviet armed forces" from Stalingrad on through 1944. "In other words, the victories of Soviet troops were the cause and the foundation for successful diplomatic actions, and the latter in turn formalized cessation of combat operations not only by the above-mentioned countries of the Hitlerite coalition, actually participating in combat, but also by others which could have taken part on given strategic sectors."[27]

In looking to a possible future war between the socialist coalition led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist coalition, General Lomov has remarked: "It is clear that in the course of a war one of the main political tasks of the socialist coalition will be to attract onto its side the peoples of non-socialist countries."[28]

In addition to discussions of the role of diplomacy in seeking to break down hostile coalitions, there is evident concern over an enemy's attempts to disrupt the Soviet-led coalition. Public discussions usually address this matter only indirectly, attesting to the strength of the socialist coalition, including the protestations of unity of political and military strategic concepts as well as of the interests and aims of the members.[29] But in *Military Thought* there are clearer indications, and occasionally even a specific statement, of concern that "the imperialists'" arsenal of political-ideological and diplomatic means include "the attempt to break up the socialist community and to separate individual countries from its ranks."[30] No doubt leaders in Moscow believe that apart from normal peacetime economic ties and political propaganda by the Western powers (and diplomatic maneuvers by China both in East Asia and Eastern Europe), in the event of a "period of threat" there might be more direct attempts to cajole members of the socialist coalition to "defect" into neutrality or even to the other side.

Soviet studies of "coalition diplomacy" also include extensive research, in particular on the two world wars, including the Soviet-Western coalition alliance against Nazi Germany.[31]

[26] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 31.
[27] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," p. 48.
[28] Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," p. 10.
[29] See Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 37.
[30] Zemskov, "Wars of the Contemporary Era," p. 55.
[31] See Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," p. 9. Also, for the major

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Neutralization of Potential Enemies

Neutrals are not merely those left when opposing alliance coalitions are formed. Just as members of alliances may change, so may neutrals. And diplomacy, in the interests of both political and military strategy, must seek to move members of hostile coalitions toward neutrality, to secure the neutrality of potential enemies, and to influence sympathetic or fearful neutrals toward alignment on one's own side.

As noted in Sokolovsky's *Military Strategy:* "It is important to military strategy to assure the neutrality of a number of states or of particular states, and this is an obligation of diplomacy."[32] As one example, he notes the success of Prussian diplomacy in securing Russian neutrality prior to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, which not only avoided a two-front war but permitted concentrating all forces on the French front, save for one division in the deep rear.

Military Strategy also draws attention to the fact that in World War II "Soviet diplomacy devoted considerable effort to securing the neutrality of Japan, which to a considerable degree enabled the Soviet High Command to redeploy part of its forces from the Far East and to concentrate them on the Soviet-German front." It refers to this case as an illustration of how "the creation of favorable conditions on the foreign policy front plays an extremely important role for military strategy."[33]

A similar example often cited is the Soviet diplomatic role in securing the neutrality of Turkey in World War II.[34] A Soviet text on diplomacy, used in training officers for the diplomatic service, incidentally uses this case to illustrate the importance of correct judgment, assumption of weighty responsibility by an ambassador, and forthright expression of that estimate. Ambassador Sergei Aleksandrovich Vinogradov, it states, was summoned to the Kremlin in late 1942 and asked if "the country to which he was accredited" would join Hitler in the war; he replied that it would not, and with that assurance the decision was made to move troops to the German front.[35] (The text is curiously veiled, not mentioning that "the country to which he was accredited" was Turkey—although that fact is of course in the public historical record. Similarly, no reference is made to Stalin, only "the Kremlin" where Vinogradov "was asked," permitting the unnamed interlocutor to decide to transfer the troops.)

Military Thought emphasizes the role that Soviet military successes against Germany (in particular at Stalingrad) played in facilitating these diplomatic

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recent work, see G. F. Vorontsov, *Voyennye koalitsii i koalitsionnye voiny* [Military coalitions and coalition wars](Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976).

[32] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 30; see also Morozov, "Categories of Content and Form in War," p. 19.

[33] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 30.

[34] For example, see Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," p. 48, and Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," p. 4.

[35] A. N. Kovalev, *Azbuka diplomatii* [The ABC's of diplomacy] 3d ed. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1977), p. 223.

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successes vis-à-vis both Japan and Turkey, which in turn served Soviet military interests.

> The strategic successes of the Soviet Army on the Soviet-German front enabled Soviet diplomacy to obtain additional guarantees from the governments of states which had been conducting a "cold war" (although this term was invented much later) against the Soviet Union. Here we have in mind such states as Turkey, which was preparing to attack our southern flank, and Japan, which was waiting for a suitable moment to attack the USSR in the Far East. These examples provide fresh evidence that diplomacy does not cease to function when a war begins; on the contrary, diplomacy frequently becomes even more active, influencing the course and even the character of military operations.[36]

General Lomov, in an interesting discussion of diplomacy and military interests, notes a different kind of case. He contends that an unpublicized "sharp declaration" by the Soviet government to Nazi Germany in 1940 after the German occupation of Denmark and Norway "that the neutrality of Sweden must remain inviolable" was responsible for preserving that neutrality, and cites an official declaration by the Swedish foreign minister in 1945 in "confirmation."[37]

General Lomov also argues that in war the aims of the socialist countries must be "most clear, convincing and as with all just aims undoubtedly will be supported by the people of those countries. These aims must also be so clear and convincing for the peoples of neutral countries that they meet with their approval, for under the conditions of nuclear war they cannot count on safe isolation. Each state inevitably implements even a neutral policy in either a benevolent or hostile way in relation to the belligerents."[38]

Roles of the Political and Military Leadership

"All leadership of the country and of the armed forces during wartime," *Military Strategy* notes, "will be accomplished by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the possible organization of a supreme organ of leadership of the country and the armed forces."[39] Such an organ would be based on the World War II State Defense Committee and on the current Defense Council. All Soviet accounts take as self-evident (and as proven by experience) that there must be a single integrated leadership, with the political leadership dominant but with an essential role also for military strategists. "The political leadership determines war aims and hence the limits to which war is to be waged; it defines the nature of the participation of the state in a war, . . . what strategy is to be pursued, what mutual relations should be maintained with other countries, and so forth."[40] As this last statement indicates,

[36] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," p. 48.
[37] Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," p. 10.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 434.
[40] Zemskov, "An Important Factor for Victory in War."

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the supreme state defense body (under whatever name) decides wartime "problems of foreign policy and diplomatic action";[41] "it is absolutely clear that the solution of these [wartime diplomatic] tasks falls completely within the competence of the political leaders."[42] Soviet accounts often noted that above all in a nuclear war, the role of the political leadership would be even more important than ever before.[43] (Also, incidentally, it is occasionally explicitly acknowledged that nuclear weapons are so uniquely dangerous "that the political leadership cannot let them escape its control.")[44] In addition, a general nuclear war is assumed to be an all-out decisive clash of the socialist and capitalist systems, as represented by the two coalitions led by the United States and the Soviet Union.[45]

From time to time there are interesting nuances of difference over the specific role of the military leaders. General Zemskov, in a striking article in the open military press, balanced statements affirming a role of growing importance for the political leaders with this statement: "Of course this does not mean that the role of the military leadership in a war has now decreased. On the contrary, the role of the military command in the achievement of victory has also increased substantially." Nonetheless, he later adds—after praising Soviet military leaders "shaped by the Communist Party"—that "Marxist-Leninists do not assign the role of generals absolute importance."[46]

Some other accounts in *Military Thought*, however, place greater stress on the importance of military advice and "responsibility" in aiding the political leadership to make militarily sound judgments. General Lomov, for example, commented: "The Supreme Military Command is the highly qualified adviser of the Government on military matters, whose recommendations cannot be ignored by the deciding political levels."[47] And, in the principal discussion of diplomacy and military strategy, we read: "The increase in the role of the political leadership in making decisions of a military-strategic nature, and in carrying out diplomatic actions, in no way reduces the importance of military science and military strategy."[48]

Balancing Diplomatic and Strategic Objectives and Capabilities

The Soviet literature both on military strategy and on foreign policy and diplomacy shows keen awareness of the need to gear aims and objectives to resources and capabilities. As *Military Strategy* puts it, "politics considers the

[41] Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," p. 6.
[42] Zemskov, "An Important Factor for Victory in War."
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] For example, ibid; see also, Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War," pp. 10, 12.
[46] Zemskov, "An Important Factor for Victory in War."
[47] Lomov, "Some Problems of Command in Contemporary War, p. 8.
[48] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," p. 50.

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requirements and considerations of strategy, as well as the capabilities of the state, seeking to make the aims commensurate with available forces and means."[49] Similarly, a contributor to *Military Thought* stated: "The art of political and military leadership consists in particular of assuring the working-out of strategic plans which conform, on the one hand, to the political aims of the state, and on the other to its military, economic, morale-political, and scientific-technical capabilities."[50] And more specifically in terms of the interrelation of strategy and diplomacy, we read:

> Military strategy, just as military science as a whole, is strong and correct only when it is built on careful consideration of all objective factors, in strict conformity with the tasks and capabilities of the foreign and domestic policy of a state. Disregard of objective laws or underestimation of important factors as a rule leads to military-political setbacks. Although diplomacy as a means of foreign policy usually comes to one's aid in such cases, it is not always able completely to neutralize the consequences of military-strategic miscalculations.[51]

As an example of such military-strategic miscalculation, and the "difficult" task for diplomacy in making amends, the author cites the unsuccessful Soviet offensive against Warsaw in 1920 (which he notes "was executed without sufficiently comprehensive consideration of the capabilities of the Red Army, which was exhausted from continuous combat and had a strong force of Wrangel's White Guard troops on its southern flank, in the rear.")[52] As further illustration of the peacetime role of diplomacy in serving strategic interests at a time of general weakness, the article discusses the conclusion of peace treaties with a number of countries on the western and southern borders of Soviet Russia in 1920 and 1921, and the Rapallo Treaty with Germany in 1922.[53] And, in another interesting illustration of self-criticism, the ill-starred attempt in the "peace talks" with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 to declare "neither war nor peace" caused a serious adverse military situation followed by a more disadvantageous (if short-lived) peace treaty; "A discrepancy between political actions and the military capability of the country was manifested in a most clear-cut form."[54]

While generally avoiding generalizations about the relative roles of military strategy and diplomacy, the discussions in *Military Thought* do stress the military element in war, especially a possible general nuclear war. This is stated most categorically in the following passage.

> The character of diplomatic activity and its role in time of war differ substantially from peacetime diplomacy; its interrelation with strategy also changes. The accomplish-

[49] Sokolovsky, *Voyennaya strategiya*, p. 29.
[50] Morozov, "Categories of Content and Form in War," p. 21.
[51] Dmitriyev, "Diplomacy and Military Strategy," p. 45.
[52] Ibid., p. 45.
[53] Ibid., pp. 46–47.
[54] Ibid., p. 43.

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ment of military-strategic missions during war is advanced to the forefront, while diplomacy deals "auxiliary strikes." . . . In spite of the fact that diplomacy accomplishes specific missions by its own special means, successful attainment of the aims assigned to it by the state *in the final analysis depends on the successful accomplishment of military-strategic missions.*[55]

Concluding Observations

The relationship of diplomacy with military strategy in the context of general war is not a major theme in Soviet military theoretical or political writing. On the other hand, even the modest attention given to the subject is probably more than one finds in our own writing. This does not mean that the Soviets expect a general nuclear war, but they do think more about military—and even diplomatic—problems if deterrence were to fail and war to come. It also reflects the greater and more encompassing attention the Soviets give to military theory. (For example, the principal discussion on "Diplomacy and Military Strategy" in *Military Thought* was one of a series of articles also covering "Politics and Military Strategy," "Military Strategy and Economics," "Military Strategy and the Political-Morale Factor," and "Military Strategy and Military Technology," all appearing from 1970 through 1973.) Nor does the fact that the sources cited in this review date mostly from the late 1960s and early 1970s have particular significance. The passages from *Military Strategy*, taken from the third and last (1968) edition do not differ materially from the first edition in 1962. Nor can one conclude that there has been any sharp tapering off of interest. With respect to the related subject of crisis diplomacy, on the other hand, as noted early in this discussion, there has clearly been a step-up in extent and sophistication of discussion in the 1970s.

One methodological comment perhaps worth noting in these concluding remarks is the strong Soviet penchant for historical analysis (and analogy), especially with reference to Soviet—and prerevolutionary Russian—historical experience. While recognizing that nuclear war would be unprecedented and unparalleled, the Soviets see even such a possible cataclysmic event as occurring in a historical continuum in which "historical laws" continue to operate and therefore in which historical antecedent and the lessons of history have a contemporary meaning.

The Soviet military discussions of a period of threat (or danger) preceding almost all wars, and reaffirmation of the validity of such a concept for the future, are also of considerable interest. These views coincide with the general, but not universal, Western view. The Soviet writers appreciate the especially important role of diplomacy in such a period.

Of particular salience is the attention given to contending coalitions and to prewar and wartime efforts to gain and hold allies where possible, to secure

[55] Ibid., p. 47 (emphasis in the original).

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neutrality where desirable and feasible, and to chip away at the hostile alliance. This, undoubtedly, is seen as a matter of extreme importance. What is less clear is whether the Soviet leaders are more sanguine about the prospects for their own success in this respect or more concerned about vulnerabilities on their side. Ideological predispositions lead them to expect—indeed to *believe* in—favorable trends. Yet experience has shown peacetime defections from Moscow's leadership of even such socialist allies as China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Cambodia, and to one or another degree North Korea and Rumania. Moreover, with real reluctance (though eventually with direct force) Soviet leaders felt compelled to intervene militarily in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in order to keep those countries in the Soviet-led alliance. The cases of alignment with the Soviet Union and massive military and economic aid to other Third World states that subsequently realigned are too numerous to mention, but Moscow cannot forget them.

There are hints that the Soviets believe that the presence of foreign bases and troops may prevent such things as sudden defection of an ally to neutrality. In the event of sudden impending nuclear war, an ultimatum—and offer—of exemption from nuclear attack for neutrality could be very tempting to any country, an offer they could not refuse. And the presence or absence of theretofore "allied" troops could be a decisive factor in whether such an offer were ever made, or could be accepted. This may then be one reason, along with others, leading to the constant Soviet campaigns against American military bases abroad. It may even also be a secondary but contributing factor in Soviet desire to maintain its own direct military presence in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (including the pressures to station troops in Czechoslovakia in 1967 and 1968, as well as actual stationing since that time), and perhaps regret now that Soviet troops were withdrawn from Rumania in 1958.

The Soviet military writings, not unreasonably, ascribe key importance in a nuclear war to military operations. At the same time they recognize and affirm a continuing role for diplomacy. There is virtually no reference even in abstract terms to how a war would be terminated. If Soviet theoreticians have thought much about this subject, they have not written about it even in the confidential military journal. In all likelihood, it has not been given attention. Soviet accounts of "victory" in a general nuclear clash of the two coalitions usually speak only of the inability of the capitalist system to survive because "the peoples" will cast it off. Nothing is said of surrenders, if only because there is a vague expectation that capitalist rule will expire and therefore be unable to surrender; and if "the peoples" assume power, they would not continue the war and the question of surrender would not arise. Our own expectations on the conclusion of a general nuclear war are probably no better formed, though less weighted by ideological presumptions of an abstract "victory" for our "system."

More generally, in the Soviet view diplomacy and military strategy have complementary and reciprocally supporting roles, both in peacetime and in

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war. The Party political leadership has the coordinating and directing responsibility, but military leaders are reassured (and reminded) that they share a responsibility for advising the state leadership on military requirements, and capabilities, in order to assure neither over nor underestimation in making strategic policy decisions.

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Network News Coverage of Congress

MICHAEL J. ROBINSON
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During the last decade, social scientists, pollsters, and journalists have attributed to network news coverage of Congress a remarkable assortment of political maladies. Among those things for which television has been "blamed" are: the increasing domination by the Senate of the presidential recruitment process;[1] the decline in public trust and respect for the Congress as a whole;[2] the growing reliance upon the Senate for providing policy innovation in Congress;[3] the weakening of congressional leadership;[4] and the trivialization of committee hearings.[5]

What makes this collection of allegations more remarkable is the fact that the networks still cannot televise Congress from the floor, either during deliberation or voting. All these alleged "effects" are the presumed consequences of the attention given Congress on the network evening news.[6]

Perhaps the most striking aspect concerning television and Congress, however,

[1] Robert Peabody, Norman Ornstein, and David Rhode, "The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator: Many Are Called but Few Are Chosen," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Summer 1976): 237–258.

[2] Michael J. Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of the Selling of the Pentagon," *American Political Science Review* 70 (June 1976): 409–432.

[3] Nelson Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency*, 2d. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 67–70.

[4] Nelson Polsby, "Goodbye to the Inner Club," *Washington Monthly*, August 1969, pp. 30–34.

[5] Daniel Schorr, *Clearing the Air* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 287.

[6] We do *not* deal here with the opposite problem—what the relative *inattention* of network news means for Congress, especially in relationship to the president. For a detailed look at that issue, see Newton Minow, John Martin, and Lee Mitchell, *Presidential Television* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

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is the paucity of hard research data that either measure the effect or even rigorously describe the content of network news coverage of the House and Senate.[7]

Ultimate questions, of course, involve effects. But before demonstrating what, if any, impact television has had on Congress as an institution, it seems reasonable to start from scratch and find out what network news has been saying about the legislative branch. That is our mission in this article.

Methodology

Using printed abstracts provided by the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, we isolated all weekday network evening news stories that focused predominantly on Congress or congresspeople during the five weeks beginning January 19, and ending February 20, 1976. This was the first month of the second session of the Ninety-fourth Congress.

Having identified our population of Congress stories, we then obtained videotapes of all those stories through two separate tape libraries, one at Vanderbilt, the other in the National Archives in Washington.

We coded each Congress story on nine dimensions: *network, date, length* (in seconds), *position* in newscast, degree of news *hardness, topic, focus* (House or Senate), *committee type,* and *slant* (positive, neutral, negative).

For logistical reasons, one of us worked from printed summaries, the other worked from tape. Independently, we reached agreement on over 90 percent of our coding decisions and we found no meaningful pattern in our disagreements. Most disagreements involved decisions as to where one story stopped and another story began. In disagreement we opted for the code established from tape, because tape seemed the more trustworthy, and complete, record of what the story had actually been.

While we feel more than secure about our coding, we feel less secure about our sample of days. We cannot argue that this "legislative month" is necessarily representative of all, or even other, months. By definition it was an unusual month, coinciding as it did with the beginning of the presidential primary campaign of 1976. The month was also unique in that the Pike Committee, the House Committee investigating CIA abuses in Chile and elsewhere, was unusually active during this period. Daniel Schorr chose this month to pass internal committee documents about the CIA to the *Village Voice* in New York.

However, it is also true that at least half the months in which an even-numbered Congress is in session can be considered presidential campaign months. And the Pike Committee was, in many respects, just one more

[7] The only study we have found that looks directly and quantitatively at the news coverage of Congress on network television is Robert Frank, *Message Dimensions of Television News* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973). See also William Adams and Paul Ferber, "Television Interview Shows: The Politics of Visibility," *Journal of Broadcasting* 21, no. 2 (1977):141–151.

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committee probing into the abuses of executive power of one sort or another—the type of special committee work that has come to be the rule during the last three Congresses at least.

Finally, by conducting our anlaysis two ways—*with* and *without* campaign stories—we believe that we have taken into account the most serious problem that exists concerning the representativeness of our data.

As in most content analysis, we began less with formal hypotheses than hunches. Borrowing from the literature about television news and from our own earlier research we expected to find that: the Senate would receive substantially more coverage than the House;[8] both houses would be covered principally as a series of committee hearings;[9] ABC would cover Congress more as theater than the other two networks;[10] the bulk of the coverage would be film coverage; the majority of the stories would place the Congress in neither a positive nor a negative light—Congress would be covered neutrally;[11] and, when not covered neutrally, Congress would receive more negative treatment than positive treatment, regardless of the network or the news source.[12]

Findings

Seventy-five news programs yielded 263 news items about Congress or congresspeople during the twenty-five days we chose for analysis. ABC accounted for 74 stories (28 percent); CBS provided 95 stories (36 percent); NBC contributed 94 stories (36 percent).

These stories totaled approximately 22,000 news seconds. Assuming a twenty-three minute program, on average, Congress (broadly defined) attracted just over 20 percent of all the news time on network news—a surprisingly high percentage. However, a substantial chunk of this coverage was essentially campaign news—news in which one or more members of the House or Senate were featured running for the presidency.[13]

We counted 53 such items. Removing them from the rest left 210 congressional

[8] Michael J. Robinson, "A Twentieth Century Medium in a Nineteenth Century Legislature: The Effects of Television on the American Congress," in *Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform*, ed. Norman Ornstein (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 240–261. Also Michael Green, "Nobody Covers the House," *Washington Monthly*, June 1970, 62–70.

[9] Edward J. Epstein, *News From Nowhere* (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 251–52.

[10] This was a presumption on our part, based in conventional wisdom. In fact most hard research has not found ABC to behave much differently from the other networks. See Thomas Patterson and Robert McClare, *The Unseeing Eye* (New York: Putnam, 1976), especially chapters 1 and 2.

[11] This theme can be found throughout C. Richard Hofstetter, *Bias in the News* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976).

[12] Hofstetter finds this pattern recurring throughout his analysis of the 1972 campaign presented on network news—most stories about institutions were neutral, but among the "non-neutral" stories the balance was negative.

[13] The Senate had eight "candidates"—Jackson, Bayh, Muskie, Humphrey, Mathias, Bentsen, Church, Byrd—in the news. The House had one—Udall.

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news stories accounting for just over 16,000 news seconds—approximately 15 percent of all the news time available during these five weeks.

Whatever complaints Congress might have with network television they should *not* include complaints about being ignored. Congress represents an unexpectedly high percentage of evening news time.

Senate and House Coverage

When compared with the House, the Senate clearly dominates network news. The ratio of Senate stories to House stories is almost 2 to 1. The House attracted only 70 stories; the Senate attracted 133 stories. (Sixty stories dealt with both about equally.) When examining news time, the Senate accounted for approximately 9600 news seconds on network news; the House accounted for about 5800 news seconds.

Even without stories about congressional presidential candidates—stories which the Senate dominated in 1976—network coverage focuses disproportionately on the upper house. The ratio here is 5 to 3 when using number of stories as a base, and 4 to 3 when using news seconds.

For all three networks, whether using all stories or noncampaign stories only, there was more news about the Senate than about the House. And, if one were to exclude all the items about leaks in and from the Pike Committee, the House would have fallen away to much greater obscurity.

TABLE 1

Types of Stories Included in Network Coverage of Congress, January 19–February 21, 1976.

Type	All Stories Number	Percentage	Noncampaign Stories Number	Percentage
Convention-adjournment	1	.4%	1	.5%
Scandal	8	3.1%	8	3.8%
Junket	1	.4%	1	.5%
Floor Action	37	14.1%	37	17.6%
Veto Override Vote	11	4.2%	11	5.2%
Committee Action	93	35.4%	93	44.3%
Executive Relations with Congress	22	8.4%	22	10.5%
Judicial Relations with Congress	5	1.9%	5	2.4%
Foreign Relations in Congress	9	3.4%	9	4.3%
Constituency Relations	1	.4%	1	.5%
Presidential Campaign	53	20.2%		
Press Release (Statement)	13	4.9%	13	6.2%
Budget	5	1.9%	5	2.4%
Other	4	1.5%	4	1.9%
	263	100.1%	210	100.1%

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TABLE 2

Relative Attention Given Various Forms of "Committee Action" Stories in Network Coverage of Congress, January 19–February 21, 1976

Form	Frequency	Percentage	News Seconds	Percentage
Committee Testimony, on Film	30	32%	3,735	46%
Committee Testimony, on Film, with "Fight"	11	12%	1,290	16%
Committee Testimony, from Studio	13	14%	470	6%
Committee Vote, on Film	2	2%	280	3%
Committee Vote, from Studio	13	14%	370	5%
Committee Report, on Film	3	3%	430	6%
Committee Report, from Studio	12	13%	920	11%
Other	10	11%	520	6%
	94	101%*	8,015	99%

* Due to rounding tables do not sum to 100 percent.

Type of Story

Without doubt, the most frequent type of coverage involves "committee action" of one sort or another—committee reports, committee votes, and above all, committee hearings. Committee action accounted for 35 percent of all stories and a full 44 percent of the noncampaign stories about Congress (Table 1). And because committee stories tend to be longer than other types of reports, committee action represented even higher percentages of news time. The number of committee stories was, to our surprise, almost twice as large as the number of campaign stories. Epstein had led us to expect a strong dose of "committee on TV,"[14] but the emphasis was greater than we had anticipated.

Perhaps we should not have been too surprised. Committee action still represents the heart of the congressional process. And, just as important, committee action *can* be covered by camera and film, whereas floor action still remains outside the legal limits of network television. Thus, committee action really does seem to be a "good" place for networks to concentrate—for reasons having to do with both form and substance.

So struck were we with the emphasis on committees, we recoded all "committee action" stories to get some insight into what was actually going on in this category. Table 2 divides committee stories into eight subtypes and suggests that networks cover committee testimony at hearings with an especially great enthusiasm. In fact, almost 60 percent of the items coded as committee action were testimony—usually vivid testimony—before congressional committees.

A substantial proportion of those committee stories with testimony (20

[14] Epstein, *News From Nowhere*, pp. 251–52.

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percent) were "fights," fights between congressmen and bureaucrats or between congressmen and corporate executives. But the most "representative" network news story takes place on film, in a Senate committee hearing room, where senators and testifiers talked back and forth on some policy issue. As expected, the network coverage of Congress was generally based in film, especially in its committee coverage. Almost three-quarters of the news time dealing with committee action was film reportage. One interesting "non-finding" was the relative paucity of news about scandals or news about junkets (eight stories).

Networks, of course, do not invent scandals, and the fact is that no real scandals broke during our sampling period. Thus, news about scandals was practically absent from network coverage. However, "mini-scandals," such as Mrs. Jacob Javits's controversial new career as public relations consultant for Iran National Airlines, were generally reported on by all three networks.

The lack of junket coverage was also not terribly surprising, given that our sampled stories came during the first month of the session—a conspicuously inappropriate and difficult time for junketeering. Nevertheless, the overwhelming bulk of the coverage focused on the *institution* and not on personalities or individuals. To a surprising degree, Congress was covered as a collectivity. Only campaign stories emphasized individuals.

Slant

As expected, most items dealing with Congress treated the topic with "objectivity," *if* we define objectivity as neutrality. A full 86 percent of the stories and 84 percent of the news seconds were coded as "neutral," either toward the institution or toward the membership.

However, as with virtually all other analyses of network news, the majority of those stories not coded as "neutral" were negative.[15] In fact, in our study negativity was unanimous! There were thirty-six negative stories and not one positive story. Within the stories coded negative, we found total news time to be 3470 seconds, or approximately fifty-eight minutes. Obviously this does not mean that all the sentences or ideas contained within each story were negative, but that news time included in the negative stories, taken as a unit, was approximately fifty-eight minutes.

There were four basic types of negative news stories: news *commentary* in which a network commentator directly criticized the institution as a basis of his remarks; news *analysis* in which a reporter, in a news item, criticized Congress but the criticism was tangential to his or her remarks; "hard-news" stories about indictments, investigations of impropriety or unethical behavior;

[15] For example, see Hofstetter, *Bias in the News*, pp. 85–89. Hofstetter demonstrates that in 1972 stories dealing with issues were treated negatively by the networks approximately 11 percent of the time; 3 percent were treated positively. Negative to positive ratio was almost 4 to 1.

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and filmed attacks made on Congress by other major political leaders or by members of Congress itself. Table 3 contains a summary of these findings.

TABLE 3
Negative News Stories about Congress, January 19–February 21, 1976.

Type	*Frequency*	*Percentage of News Seconds*
Network Commentary	4	12%
Network News Analysis	3	8%
Hard News (Convictions, Improprieties, Investigations of Criminal or Unethical Behavior)	9	6%
Attacks on Congress by Political Leaders (Executive, Legislative Branch)	20	75%
	36	101%

The greatest number of negative stories emanated from political leaders, either the president, the secretary of state, the present or past director of the CIA, the director of the FBI, or congressmen themselves. It is not unusual to see a president, or a secretary, chastising Congress for "cowardice" or "irresponsibility." However, the fact that no political leaders were quoted in praise of Congress, at a time when Congress was trying to reemerge as a serious voice in policymaking, is noteworthy. And whenever the networks expressed their own opinions, the remarks were also invariably critical.

David Brinkley and Howard K. Smith each criticized Congress explicitly in two instances—during their "commentaries." Brinkley's criticisms were sharp but less than substantial, attacking Congress as an afterthought in both cases. Smith's remarks went to the very heart of the congressional system.

For example, while assessing the then recent Supreme Court decision in *Buckley* v. *Valeo*, Brinkley noted that the Supreme Court considered the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) to have been formulated unconstitutionally. The Court, said Brinkley, had given Congress "thirty days to straighten out" the problem. Brinkley then said that "it is widely believed in Washington that it would take Congress thirty days to make instant coffee," and ended his piece less than certain that FEC would survive.[16]

Smith, in his comment on the opening of the second session of the Ninety-fourth Congress, said that he wished to offer "a bit of political science that may be regarded as heresy in our present mood." But he offered his political science by saying:

> We're supposed to be governed by three branches with equal powers. In fact, the system works only when the executive in some degree preponderates. . . . A committee of 535 geared to local, more than national, interests cannot [lead].

[16] "NBC Nightly News," February 3, 1976.

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> All our great successes in history were under strong presidents. . . . Even Congress works better when there's a strong president.
>
> When Congress dominates, it's a mess, as after the Civil War when it created regional hatreds that are dying only now. The past year the Congress has been mostly in the saddle and among the results—a tax reform that didn't reform, an energy act that in no way meets the fuel crisis. . . .
>
> Granted, recent presidents have abused power and have had to be checked. Still, we shan't see effective government again till the pendulum swings back to give the executive more leverage.[17]

We note again that most criticism of Congress was *not* commentary or analysis, but came from "interested parties" in the government, or from "hard" news. But it is also of interest that no comment or analysis, from any source, placed Congress in an unambiguously positive light. On network news, even the Congress—in its one clear self-assessment—was negative in its comments about Congress.[18]

Network Variations

The networks showed much greater similarity in their treatment of Congress than dissimilarity. The three major networks gave more attention to the Senate than to the House; focused more on committee work than anything else; were overwhelmingly "neutral" in their coverage of Congress; and were consensually "negative" among those stories that were not coded as neutral. Despite the similarities, we found some expected contrasts.

As anticipated, ABC was, among all the networks, the most enamored with the Senate. In news seconds, the ratio of Senate news to House news approached 2.5 to 1 on ABC. Neither CBS nor NBC approached a ratio of 2 to 1. ABC also provided the greatest attention to campaign news, to fights in committee hearings, and to film. ABC had twice as much commentary as either of the other two networks. On balance, ABC's coverage of Congress demonstrated a predilection for greater hoopla and for the siren call of the Senate. According to these data, ABC proved itself to be a unique network, distinct from CBS and NBC, in terms of its more theatrical approach to news.

IMPLICATIONS

Content analysis invariably leads to two questions: *why* is the content as it is, and what are the *consequences* of it being that way? As for the "why" question in our study of congressional coverage, the answers range from fairly clear to merely speculative.

[17] "ABC Evening News," January 19, 1976.

[18] Members of the House Government Operations Committee blamed Congress then themselves for not having checked closely enough on banks and bank regulators, leading to the failure in this case of the Franklin National Bank of New York in 1974.

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This first case is simple. The Senate gets more coverage than the House because it is more *newsworthy*; and the Senate is more newsworthy than the House precisely because the Senate contains fewer heads. In fact, it is the limited size of the membership, and not its unique constitutional prerogatives (of which there are precious few), that makes the Senate more interesting to news sources. And, for television, which likes to deal in—and to create—familiar political faces, the size of the Senate makes it an especially good focus for news. We believe, in fact, that the greater the visual quality of the medium, the more important the personal—facial—quality becomes in determining newsworthiness. We suspect that television, therefore, is the most "senatorial" of all media in its news play. After Richard Nixon's resignation, Sam Donaldson was heard telling an aide to the House impeachment inquiry, "since impeachment's over we're going back to the Senate, where the news is." For television, the Senate is where the news is.[19]

As for our other principal findings, we think it not too surprising that Epstein was right when he argued that committee hearings are the *sine qua non* of network news coverage of Congress. Committees *are* important, often more important than the floor in most instances. Equally relevant, committee hearings are *scheduled* news events that are technically easy to plan for and cover. And, of course, committees permit coverage by network television, while Congress as an entity still prohibits it.

Why the networks are so "unpositive" toward Congress seems somewhat more problematic. Obviously, part of the answer lies in the American definition of news—what is wrong today in politics? One recent study of print news coverage during the 1974 election indicated that in a national sample of newspapers negative news about politics outdistanced positive news by more than 5 to 1.[20]

Part of the negativity of television coverage of Congress can also be explained by the fact that network news is generally considered more negative in its content and tone than is print.[21] But part may also lie in the fact that *legislatures in liberal, secular societies abound in philosophical contradictions, intense political bargaining, and what some might call the amorality of democracy.* This makes for "bad" news, which is, of course, "good" copy.

One other factor that might explain the bad press Congress gets on television is the uniquely vulnerable position of Congress as a political institution contrasted with the presidency or the Supreme Court. In most circumstances the president is covered too personally, too directly, to be maligned by the networks day to day. The networks need the president, and *generally* they cultivate him. Congress is less personal and hence more subject to attack. Congress, as an institution, requires less cultivation and, subsequently, gets more constant panning than the president.

The Supreme Court carries its own mantle of respectability, and it can usually

[19] Personal conversation, Washington, D.C., August 1974.

[20] Arthur Miller, Edie Goldenberg, and Lutz Erbring, "Type-Set Politics: Impact of Newspapers on Public Confidence," *American Political Science Review* 73 (June 1979): 69.

[21] Michael J. Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise," p. 428.

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suggest, if not argue, that it is above the political wheeling and dealing of partisan, legislative politics. And the Court keeps network news out, something Congress could never do completely. The Court, more than Congress, is able to control its own press coverage.

Congress, thus, is uniquely suited for bad press. *This is more a function of Congress's unique vulnerability to criticism rather than of television's special nature.* In fact, data from the 1974 Survey Research Center (SRC) election study show precisely that. During that year American newspapers treated the Congress less favorably than the president, and the president less favorably than the Supreme Court. Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring found that while the Court received negative treatment in 10 percent of its coverage, the presidency received 39 percent negative coverage. And the Congress "led" in negative coverage with 42 percent.[22]

It is also interesting that the networks choose to cover Congress as an institution and not as a set of personalities. It may be easier to criticize an entire organization than its individual members. Indeed, congresspeople do precisely that, complain about Congress and praise themselves, as individuals.

We can also guess as to why ABC news coverage differs slightly from CBS and NBC. ABC's coverage of Congress fits almost too well with its conventional image. In fact, ABC did show an appreciable commitment to stories that were filmable, topical, and sensational—although not to a degree its critics might like to see. In most instances the differences among networks were marginal. According to our data, television news is television news is television news.

Although we feel somewhat secure in explaining why the content was as we found it, we can only speculate about the ultimate questions—what the consequences of all this are for Congress, the public, and the policymaking process.

For the most part our intuitions fit with the literature. We can appreciate the charge that television news—America's first source of national news—has played a substantial role in converting the Senate into a presidential stable and in converting the House into a farm team for the increasingly more visible Senate. And, although it would be hard to ignore the structural and historical factors, one might imagine that the growing animosity and lack of cooperation between the two houses in the last few Congresses has been exacerbated by a network propensity for Senate news and senators, at the expense of the lower house.

Another major intuition about impact, given our findings on content, is that television, by going where it is allowed or where it likes to be, goes more and more to committee hearings, especially for dramatic clashes between senators and bureaucrats, senators and business executives, senators and bankers, and so on. Again we have the problem of senators preempting House members, but just as importantly, we have the specter of Congress shifting its incentive

[22] Miller et al., "Type-Set Politics," Figure 2, p. 71.

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structure even farther away from legislation or legislative hearings and moving more and more toward media-dominated, investigative hearings. If this means better oversight by Congress, that must be considered a beneficial shift in the incentive structure. If this means only more pandering and breast-beating against unpopular political interests or hapless bureaucrats, that, obviously, is something else again.

As for impact beyond the institution, we find some indications in the recent public opinion polls to support Epstein's notion that television news may be affecting public attitudes about what Congress is, and what Congress does. Epstein implies that television portrays Congress so often as an investigative agency—as a committee in investigation—that the public's perception has been warped to fit that coverage. Interestingly enough, polls do indicate that the public is increasingly more likely to know who is *in* Congress than what Congress does or has the power to do. One recent poll shows that 54 percent of American high-school students do not know Congress has "the right to pass a law that every adult . . . has to double the amount of income tax paid to the government." The same poll revealed that 78 percent of our high-school seniors did not know that Congress has legislative authority to stop the president's decision to fight a war.[23] All this fits Epstein's notion that a network-televised Congress is an institution that is visible, but not necessarily preceived to be important in making law.

Our most important finding—when speculating about effects beyond the legislature—is the negative message that the networks give us about Congress and its members. Although the bulk of the network stories about Congress "took no position"—were neutral—not a single story on any network during our entire month placed Congress in a positive light. And this was the first post-Watergate Congress, where one might have expected a favorable press—or at least a less unfavorable press.

It is difficult not to wonder about the impact on the public of denigrating news that goes so much unanswered. And, there is at least some literature that links directly television news watching to public distrust of Congress. Robinson's analysis of national survey data from the late sixties indicates that the greater the reliance upon television for monitoring politics, the greater one's cynicism toward Congress.[24]

But there is one thing about which we need not wonder at all, given the totally "unpositive" coverage of Congress in network news. We now understand why congressional leaders adamantly refuse to give the networks control of the television cameras that have recently been installed in the House of

[23] *Education for Citizenship: A Bicentennial Survey* (Denver, Colo.: National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1976), pp. 26–27.

[24] Michael J. Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise," pp. 420–421. Robinson's secondary analysis of SRC data from 1968 shows that respondents relying solely on television for news were 23 percent more likely to believe that congressmen quickly lose touch with constituents than respondents who rely on media other than television.

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Representatives and will, before long, be placed in the Senate galleries as well. Congressional leaders insist that control of the cameras will stay in their hands. Given what we know about network treatment of Congress and what we have known about elected officials in Congress, we are not surprised by the leadership's decision. Were we in their situation, we might well decide the same way.*

* This paper was originally presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association Convention, Tarrytown, New York, November 1978.

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Implementing Federal Programs at the Local Level

ROBERT D. THOMAS

The major urban policies enacted by Congress in recent years, and those currently under consideration, define problems such as community development, private sector jobs loss, and physical deterioration as national in scope. A central issue confronting policymakers in the design of these programs, thus, is how to make a concerted nationwide attack on urban needs that are endemic to all metropolitan areas and still account for diverse local conditions. The resolution of this dilemma is central to program implementation. However, little is known about how national policy is applied at the local level or how intergovernmental political processes affect this application.

Political scientists are not of much assistance in offering conceptually precise insights into policy implementation processes, or the influence of these processes on national program saliency in local areas.[1] We have, nonetheless, worked around the edges of this issue. For example, a number of studies have described the political, socioeconomic, and administrative setting of American federalism.[2] In academic publications, government reports, and popular media,

[1] One exception is Carl E. Van Horn and Donald S. Van Meter, "The Implementation of Intergovernmental Policy," in *Public Policy Making in a Federal System*, eds. Charles O. Jones and Robert D. Thomas (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 39–62. In this article, the authors also discuss the growing policy implementation literature.

[2] See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar's work *The American Partnership* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); idem., *Cities of the Prairie* (New York: Basic Books, 1970); and idem., *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1972).

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we have a vivid description of a fragmented national political apparatus (both congressional and bureaucratic) that influences the application of national programs.[3] There is also a substantial body of literature about grants-in-aid and revenue sharing as they influence the fiscal, administrative, and structural capacities of state and local governments.[4]

One conclusion that emerges from this literature is that federal programs are not uniformly applied, even when the problems to be solved such as pollution control or unemployment are endemic to local communities across the nation. The effectiveness of a federal program varies from one local community to another. In one community (or state) local officials may actively seek assistance, and implement the federal program without any apparent controversy about its provisions. Yet, in another community, those involved with implementing the program may disagree about the program's objectives and, as a result, the program has no apparent substantive impact.

Why the difference? Why is a federal program given a high priority in one locality and not in another? Why is it acceptable to policy participants in one area and put to use by them, but in another jurisdiction, local interests resist the program and get entangled in controversy over it, locally and intergovernmentally? The major argument set forth in the following pages is that to understand how federal programs attain priority on the local policy agenda, implementation must be conceptualized as a developmental process. Since federal programs do not have uniform consequences for diverse local conditions, they cannot be uniformly applied even when the intent is that they will be. Federal programs are adapted to local circumstances through a complex policy process that operates to insure local integrity and participation in the application of federal programs. The purpose of this essay is to offer some thoughts about how a developmental process operates to influence federal program implementation at the local level and why local governments and their representatives are important political partners in this process. The factors discussed are the intergovernmental setting; the propensity of local officials to make federal programs effective by accepting their conditions and applying them to diverse local situations; the necessity of consensus building both across levels of governments and within units of government to insure intergovernmental coordination; and, the balancing of federal incentives (usually dollars) with program requirements.

It is important to determine how federal programs attain priority on the local

[3] See, especially, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment and Proposed Policies*, report A-53, *Improving Federal Grant Management* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

[4] For an extensive documentation of the impact of federal grants on state and local governments, see Earl M. Baker et al., *Federal Grants, The National Interest and State Response: A Review of Theory and Research* (Philadelphia: Temple University, Center for the Study of Federalism, March, 1974). The bibliography of the recent spate of books, articles, and government reports on revenue sharing is found in Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, *Revenue Sharing: The Second Round* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977).

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policy agenda for both discipline (scientific) and policy relevancy (professional) reasons. Generalizations about political processes surrounding policy implementation are at best incomplete. We simply need more insight into this important aspect of public policy. Furthermore, public officials formulate and implement policies without a blueprint of the intergovernmental infrastructure through which policies must be carried out; consequently, policy implementation is trial and error: finding acceptable processes that will balance national needs with diverse local circumstances.

Intergovernmental Setting for Policy Implementation

The relations of states to the federal government, characterized some years ago by Woodrow Wilson as the cardinal question of our constitutional system, is predicted on the seemingly contradictory principles of union and independence. How these principles are reconciled, in practice, goes to the very heart of the operations of the American political system: V.O. Key, Jr., as so often was his habit, concisely stated the problem: "A perennial problem in the American federal system has been to make the most appropriate assignments of jurisdiction to the states and the national government. The question whether a given function should be undertaken by the federal or by the state governments recurs constantly."[5] Thus, appropriate assignment of jurisdiction and authority among diverse territorial units of local government is a central element of the policy implementation process.

Territorial Democracy

To provide the closest approximation of democracy in the United States and to have elected officials as responsive as possible to their constituents, democratic principles are expressed territorially. State and local governments are organized around geographic units so that the mass of people can enjoy strong individual powers and rights and exercise control over their representatives. In this way, citizens are allowed to erect barriers against direct popular control of the national political apparatus and are provided maximum participation in decision making at both the state and national levels. They are also insured that local interests share in decision making at both the state and national levels.[6]

Daniel J. Elazar explains the consequences of territorial democracy for political representation in the United States.

> The basic pattern of political organization in the United States is territorial. That is to say, American politics is formally organized around units of territory rather than

[5] V.O. Key, Jr., *The Administration of Federal Grants to States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1937), p. 381.

[6] Elazar, *American Federalism*, p. 35.

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economic or ethnic groups, social class, or the like. This means that people and their interests gain formal representation in the councils of government through the location of various interests in particular places and their ability to capture political control of territorial political units. In many ways this is the most neutral kind of representation. As soon as one interest declines in importance and a new one arises, it can gain some voice in the system because the people who reflect that interest are located in some particular political subdivision and can vote there. This neutrality of territory has reenforced the notion of territorial democracy so that it remains the fundamental basis for political representation even in the highly urbanized American society of today.[7]

Samuel H. Beer argues that territorial democracy was part of the original design for federalism, and serving an important representative function today, it allows state and local governments to exert a direct influence on the federal government, even in programs that appear to centralize authority at the national level.

My thesis is that more important than any shifts of power or function between levels of government has been the emergence of new arenas of mutual influence among levels of government. Within the field of intergovernmental relations a new and powerful system of representation has arisen, as the federal government has made a vast new use of state and local governments and these governments in turn have asserted a new direct influence on the federal government. What is interesting about American federalism today is not its particular allocation of functions or powers between levels of government, but rather what it is adding to our national system of representation.

Moreover, I should say that these developments, while new, are in harmony with the original design of the federal system.[8]

The representation of interests in Congress is well documented and, although less information exists, it has been shown that various interests at all three levels of government and society participate in bureaucratic decision making. Theodore J. Lowi, for example, sees a process of representation increasing in bureaucracy as the legislature, in his opinion, delegates too much responsibility and discretion to administrators. Like Beer, he argues that a new concept of representation is occurring. Unlike Beer, Lowi emphasizes the adverse consequences of this process.

Traditional, progressivistic expansions of representation are predicted on the assumption that law is authoritative and that therefore one must seek to expand participation in the making of laws. The "new representation" extends the principle of representation over into administration, since it is predicated on the assumption that lawmaking bodies and conventional procedures cannot and ought not make law.[9]

Lowi concludes that this development "tends to derange almost all established relations and expectations in the democratic system."[10] There is no doubt that

[7] Ibid., p. 135.

[8] Samuel H. Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," *American Political Science Review 72 (March 1978):9.*

[9] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 96.

[10] Ibid.

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this shifts areas of concentration for those who seek representation of their interests; but, this shift is very much in keeping with the traditional concept of federalism as discussed by Elazar and Beer in describing territorial representation. Traditional avenues of seeking representation are still open to state and local interests through legislative and judicial channels that are utilized to offset abuses of administrative discretion.[11]

The form of territorial representation referred to by Elazar and Beer softens bureaucratic clout in the implementation of federal programs. Through their ability to organize and structure their activities (with state constitutional and statutory provisions establishing the parameters), local officials are insulated against direct federal control both administratively and politically. Federal administrators, to achieve national objectives within diverse local settings, must rely upon the initiative, the ability, and in many cases the willingness of local officials. They simply do not have the time or resources to carry out program requirements under different legal, political, and socioeconomic conditions that exist at the local level.

Ironically, the problem appears to be more pronounced on programs where Congress specifies that agencies will establish stringent conditions on the recipient governments. Agencies are faced with additional pressures to carry out objectives according to more narrowly defined congressional mandates; and under these conditions, the program will be more disruptive to localities thus engendering more resistance from local officials. The important point is that state and local interests have processes of representation open to them through bureaucratic channels, court actions, and Congress itself to place pressure on federal agencies to modify the intensity of program implementation.

Regardless of what the congressional mandate is, some of the general difficulties of implementing programs in an intergovernmental context operate against centralized administrative discretion. Solutions to national problems do not neatly fit all local situations. Congress necessarily legislates in generalities, and leaves it to federal administrators to apply broad policy directives. But, federal administrators do not have sufficient data on causes and effects or reactions and consequences; therefore, they define problems and subsequently formulate rules and regulations in averages. Of course, averages do not evenly fit all local situations. Where they may be appropriate in some cases and have the intended results, in other areas they may have unintended consequences and be entirely inappropriate; nonetheless, the intent of the law may compel administrators to apply the solution in both cases. Thus, federal administrators are placed in the unenviable position of molding program objectives to accommodate jurisdictions with divergent patterns of authority; diverse local situations; different abilities (expertise), capabilities (resources), and political acceptance. In some cases, federal administrators may assume that they can standar-

[11] For an analysis of how this operates in air and water pollution programs see Robert D. Thomas, "Intergovernmental Coordination in the Implementation of National Air and Water Pollution Policies," in Jones and Thomas, *Public Policy Making*, pp. 129–148.

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dize programs regardless of local circumstances, but quickly learn that this approach creates undue resistance, and they return to a more compromising posture.

Interdependency and Diversity

In recent years, paradoxical trends that make program administration more difficult have been developing in the nation. On the one hand, the various levels of government in the United States are continuously becoming more *interdependent*: economically, socially, and institutionally. The impact of federal economic policies ripples throughout the nation. Technology has increased social mobility, the efficiency of communications, and awareness. And, in the intergovernmental arena there is a trend toward more integration of federal, state, and local activities in the formulation and implementation of public policy. While this amalgamation has developed, another trend—increased fragmentation—has occurred simultaneously. For example, the gulf between the needs of central cities and suburbs grows each year; and, the social and governmental structures of each reflect widely divergent characteristics. Frostbelt areas are facing a far different set of problems than Sunbelt areas, and many are demanding that federal programs reflect these differences. Furthermore, lately, an attitude has developed that more local control is needed as well as more administrative simplification, and the way to accomplish these objectives is through decentralizing national programs. The response has been revenue sharing and block grants.

David B. Walker, an astute observer of intergovernmental relations for a number of years, places in perspective the enigmatic state of intergovernmental relations today, particularly as manifested through fiscal trends. Walker argues that recent occurrences, especially the "extradordinary growth of federal aid as a proportion of state/local revenues," reflect an "overriding tendency" toward centralization. He is quick to point out, however, that "the apparent centralization" is mitigated by another tendency. He explains:

> The federal bureaucracy . . . has grown at a glacial pace—frequently resembling a big head with no body. Supervision, monitoring, and assessment of aid programs frequently becomes less stringent in practice than in principle. The Administration and Congressional tendency to institute grant conditions and then to constrain or cut agency manpower is as strong today as it ever was. And, to this must be added a new behavioral trait on the part of national policy makers: an eagerness to legislate high moral principles, on the one hand, and an abiding capacity to tolerate a wide gap between these principles and actual practice, on the other.
>
> Above all, perhaps, is the kind of program and fiscal discretion that recipients acquire as a result of participating in a range of federal aid programs. This benefit, of course, does not flow to all recipient jurisdictions, yet, nearly all of the larger ones reap this reward. Few in Washington have pondered this noncentralizing effect of the new aid system, because most deal with separate programs and not the cumulative impact on single jurisdictions of the whole aid package. If this were done, many of the outer signs

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> of centralization—program constraints, skewing of recipient priorities, fiscal stimulation, etc.—would all be put in a questionable light. A de facto noncentralizing tendency, then, is still very much a byproduct of the intricacies of current intergovernmental relations to those who probe the fiscal impact of current aid programs.[12]

Interdependency and diversity are most pronounced in the metropolitan areas of the nation, and this is where attaining federal program objectives is most difficult. Territorial democracy, therefore, comes into the most direct conflict with what federal programs attempt to accomplish in metropolitan areas. Territorial democracy, as noted above, emphasizes local self-government and can best be retained and increased by maintaining the authority and autonomy of officials of general-purpose local governments: cities and counties. Thus, to protect territorial democracy, federal programs should emphasize more, not less, discretion for local officials. In recent years, however, the bulk of federal programs have emphasized conditions that work at cross-purposes with local authority: comprehensive planning, regional integration of programs, and administrative simplification and consolidation. Furthermore, federal programs in such diverse areas as pollution control, housing, flood control, water development, transportation, and health care have stimulated the creation of numerous special-purpose districts. Again, these units of government reflect, institutionally, interdependency (for one of their purposes is to override the boundaries of general-purpose governments to provide service usually in one functional area) and diversity (because they are designed to meet specific needs without overturning the autonomy of cities and counties).

Current public problems complicate program implementation. In the administration of national programs, federal policymakers must find acceptable means for accomplishing national program objectives without damaging local integrity. Walker draws some disturbing conclusions about how well we are presently dealing with this issue.

> The centralizing and noncentralizing tendencies in the present pattern of intergovernmental relations now combine to produce a non- or feebly functioning federalism, despite massive funding. More and more officials at all planes including the President as well as some academicians and the public-at-large, single out various facets of this basic dysfunction in the system for criticism or cynical comment.[13]

Walker, thus, calls for a better understanding of the operation of the intergovernmental system to offset what he dubs "galloping intergovernmentalization." What is needed, he argues, is

> a principled investigation of the legal, fiscal, and functional roles of the three traditional governmental planes, with a view toward clearly assessing the various factors that constrain and enhance the power position of each. This writer's view is that any such assessment would indicate that ours is still a recognizably federal system—not a

[12] David B. Walker, "A New Intergovernmental System in 1977," *Publius* 8 (Winter 1978): 112–113.
[13] Ibid., pp. 114–115.

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quasi-unitary one—and that various factors (legal, political, bureaucratic, and attitudinal) continue to check the emergence of one hierarchical system.[14]

My purpose in the remainder of this article is to nibble away at the edges of this issue from a conceptual perspective, attempting to develop some insight into the intergovernmental processes at work and what future lines of research are suggested for political scientists interested in intergovernmental policy implementation. My argument is that the "power position" of the "three traditional governmental planes" is very much a matter of developing an intergovernmental consensus to persuade local officials to make programs work. This process, to be successful insofar as program effectiveness, depends on local propensity to accept a program, how skillfully federal incentives are blended with federal conditions, and how the issue itself develops. How, then, do federal programs attain priority in local areas? What are the circumstances surrounding federal program acceptability? Following Key's notion that the process is dynamic, what is the developmental ethos surrounding federal program implementation?

Program Priority

The ultimate goal that policymakers seek to attain in the implementation process is the effective application of public policy decisions.[15] Effectiveness would not be such an illusive goal if precise policy prescriptions were ascertainable. If objectives were clearly articulated in detail when they were decided upon, it would be a relatively simple task to use them as criteria to assess how well they are being put into practice. However, a norm of public policymaking—one that few, if any, would take exception to—is that policy instructions to executive agencies seldom, if ever, provide a definitive or complete definition of the objectives to be accomplished. Congress, for example, is typically unable or unwilling to indicate with any exactness how an agency should attempt to solve or cope with a problem. According to Kenneth S. Davis, Congress frequently says to administrators: "Here is the problem: deal with it." He claims, perhaps hyperbolically, that since the mid-sixties Congress has dealt agencies a more difficult task by saying: "We the Congress don't know what the problems are; [you in administration] find them and deal with them."[16]

Walter Williams tells us that putting stated policy goals into action is the crux of implementation.

[14] Ibid., p. 115.

[15] Walter Williams, for example, contends that a study of implementation "seeks to determine whether an organization can bring together men and material in a cohesive organizational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the organization's stated objectives." Williams, *Social Policy Research and Analysis: The Experience in the Federal Social Agencies* (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), p. 144. Also, see Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. xv.

[16] Kenneth S. Davis, *Administrative Law* (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1965), p. 30.

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> The most pressing implementation problem is that of moving from a decision to operations in such a way that what is put into place bears a reasonable resemblance to the decisions and is functioning well in its institutional environment. The past contains few clearer messages than that of the difficulty of bridging the gap between policy decisions and workable field operations.[17]

To determine what is a satisfactory course of action within the broad parameters established by the legislature, an entire governmental apparatus (organizations, policies, procedures) must be established within bureaucracy to decide what is or is not effective and how to accomplish this goal. Policy implementation, therefore, is very much dependent upon the various participants coming to an agreement as to how a particular program will effectively deal with problems they perceive as important. This process will necessarily involve state and local interests and officials in the agreement process. How they determine whether or not a federal program will be given priority in states and their local communities is an integral part of the policy implementation process.

Depending upon their propensity to utilize a program in their jurisdictions, state and local officials can make or break a program insofar as its effectiveness for a local community. This does not mean that state and local officials cannot be compelled to take actions they may not desire. Rather, they have the ability to negotiate for their priorities, even on programs where the federal government takes a preemptive regulatory role, and this negotiation is very much a part of the policy implementation process to accomplish a definition and agreement about what is or is not effective in a public program.

For example, although Charles O. Jones characterizes the implementation of air pollution legislation as centrally directed sharing, he is quick to point out the nuances involved in central direction.

> The 1970 [Clean Air Act] gives the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency authority to prescribe national ambient air quality standards. Each state must then adopt "a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air quality control region . . . within each State." Certainly this is a type of sharing, just as Professor Grodzins has told us to expect, but it is *centrally directed sharing*. States and local governments exercise their authority within the context of federal direction. That does not mean there is no room for negotiation between agencies at different levels, but it does signify that such mediation will take place within certain limits which did not previously exist.[18]

Jones also implies that states and their localities influence central direction and that federal agencies are very much dependent upon their support in implementing a program.

> Central direction of sharing cannot be expected to occur overnight, particularly in the face of an existing pattern of sharing which permits considerable state-local

[17] Walter Williams, "Special Issue on Implementation: Editor's Comments," *Policy Analysis* 1 (Summer 1975): 45.

[18] Charles O. Jones, *Clean Air: The Politics of Pollution Control* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p. 212.

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> autonomy; as noted, federal air pollution policy sought to build a national regulation system from the bottom up. Further, if state and local agencies antedate the federal agency . . . central direction is very much a matter of political negotiation. Finally, a major increase in authority at any level is subject to interpretation when that authority is implemented. Thus centrally directed sharing is itself a process of development in which a weak and reorganized federal agency is obviously dependent on others for support.[19]

State and local officials do not necessarily accept federal programs with open arms once they are implemented. Even those who enthusiastically supported the enactment of a program may cast jaundice eyes upon it when it is implemented. The assumption is that the effective application of federal programs in metropolitan areas is dependent upon whether state and local officials are willing to adapt these programs to their jurisdiction. Thus, for a federal program to attain priority on a local policy agenda, state and local officials must determine that the program will be effective in dealing with problems, as they perceive them, without usurping their authority. Two key variables are involved in priority: effectiveness and problem severity.

Determining Priority

How an official responds to a public problem is generally dependent upon his assessment of the severity of that problem vis à vis other problems. Problem severity in this regard is a surrogate for both substantive problem concerns and political considerations. A public official may consider two problems equally severe from the standpoint of substantive impact on the community but elevate one to a higher severity category because of the political situation. However, an official's attitude about problem severity, in and of itself, does not tell us much about his predisposition toward the effectiveness of a federal program for his community. He may consider a problem severe, but he may be certain that the federal program will not effectively address the problems in his community. On the other hand, an official may consider a program effective, but not for his specific problematic situation. This official, other things being equal, would be reluctant to set a high priority for a federal program if he believed that the program would be ineffective or detrimental to his community or to his political situation regardless of problem severity.

Federal program priority may be conceptualized as the relationship between officials' attitudes about the severity of a problem and their attitudes about the effectiveness of a federal program to deal with that severity. Thus, for an official to consider a federal program to be a high-priority item, he must perceive that it will be *effective* in dealing with problems that he considers severe. An official may consider a problem severe, but the federal program designed to deal with this problem to be ineffective; or he may consider the program

[19] Ibid.

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effective but the problem not severe. In either case, it is highly unlikely the program will be salient for the community insofar as he is concerned.

Developing Priority

This conceptualization suggests that the priority given to a federal program by state and local officials is not static. If certain problems are outside the high-priority category, state and local officials may be convinced over a period of time that federal program measures will be effective; that the problems are severe and the program will deal with that severity; or, they may never change their position. For example, a problem may be so severe that a program will be considered effective by state and local officials no matter what its provisions. Conversely, severity may be so great that officials feel that there is no solution no matter what the program purports to do. How a program attains priority on the local policy agenda is, of course, a matter for empirical verification.

We can assume, however, that in the initial phases of implementation state and local officials will generally be skeptical about a federal program. This skepticism stems from the set of circumstances that appear to be most prevalent at the outset of program implementation. These may be stated, in an oversimplified form, as follows:

—The federal commitment is not well established. Generally, from the point of view of state and local officials, neither the federal dollars promised nor the congressional and bureaucratic long-term concern for the program is as extensive as it should be.

—Federal conditions are ill-defined for many local communities.

—Intergovernmental jurisdiction and authority are not determined. There is a general lack of consensus (agreement) among national, state, and local officials about how responsibilities should be assumed for carrying out the objectives of the program.

—An atmosphere of uncertainty prevails at the local level about what the program promises, what the local community must itself do to carry out the program, and the program's consequences (financial, structural, and political) for the local community.

In the face of uncertainty, local officials are more likely to be reticent about a federal program that might potentially disrupt their territorial integrity and their ability to operate independently. As a general rule, therefore, we might expect—in the early stages of implementation—less enthusiasm for the program and thus lower priority on the local policy agenda. Under these conditions several key tasks must be accomplished in program implementation to gain priority for the program. A balance must be found between "promises" and "conditions." Second, a consensus must be established about jurisdiction and authority and it must be maintained to achieve intergovernmental coordination.

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Program Coordination: The Elusive Goal

Scholars and policymakers both place program coordination at the apex of activities to strengthen the ability of institutions to bring about better management of government affairs. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), in a recent assessment of the intergovernmental grant system, characterized coordination as the "elusive goal."[20] Harold Seidman, in describing the centrality of the concept in the administration of public programs, says the standard fare is: "If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent."[21] In their recommendations for a national urban policy, for example, President Carter's Urban and Regional Policy Group (URPG) appear to hold these sentiments exactly. Two of the principal objectives of a "comprehensive" urban policy, they said, should be to coordinate federal activities, and to blend federal objectives with state and local needs and priorities.[22]

There is considerable disagreement currently about how coordination should and can be achieved. The concept was given prominance by the president's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937. The committee's report not only drew upon but also stimulated a body of administrative theory that emphasized that coordination could and should be achieved through stronger executive leadership.[23] From an intergovernmental perspective, this calls for more centralized control and direction. More recently, however, academicians and policymakers have called into question the degree to which coordination can be imposed "from the top."[24]

This controversy demonstrates the importance scholars and policymakers place on coordination and their concern with what this concept teaches about the process through which federal programs are implemented in metropolitan areas. According to Seidman, "coordination describes both a process, the act of coordinating, and a goal: the bringing together of diverse elements into a harmonious relationship in support of common objectives."[25] The process, in other words, is necessary to attain the goal: if only the coordinating processes are adequate, then everyone would work harmoniously together without any

[20] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Improving Federal Grant Management*, pp. 146–161.

[21] Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 190.

[22] The President's Urban and Regional Policy Group, *A National Urban Policy: A Partnership to Conserve America's Communities* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1978), pp. II-1 to III-42.

[23] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Improving Federal Grant Management*, pp. 146–150.

[24] Ibid., pp. 155–161.

[25] Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, p. 195.

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conflict and federal policy would achieve priority on the local policy agenda. The question of concern here is: What is central to the process to accomplish effective application of federal programs in an intergovernmental setting where territorial integrity and interdependency are competing values?

Traditional administrative theory points to two basic solutions to the problem of coordination. The first—coordination by organization—is defined by Luther Gulick as establishing and perfecting "the structure of authority" within administration to enable the chief executive "to coordinate and energize all the subdivisions of work so that the major objective may be achieved efficiently."[26] The second—coordination by an idea—places a premium on the cooperation of individuals, groups, and agencies to pursue a shared, common objective. In practice both are part of the policy process, and both necessitate working out agreements within organizations and between agencies intergovernmentally.

Consensus Building

Embodied in coordination either by organization or by an idea is consensus building: achieving an agreement among the various participants about what objectives should be attained and what means to use. Both Seidman and James Sundquist, for example, suggest to achieve coordination in public policy implementation, agreements (consensus) must be worked out at several places in the policy process. According to Seidman, "coordination has come to be identified primarily with the formal processes by which we attempt to adjudicate disagreements among agencies."[27] Sundquist, referring to the process of coordination, tells us the word means "almost any changes in organizations, relationships, policies, practices, projects, or programs that will solve whatever conflict or hiatus . . . the user of the term may happen to be concerned with." Sundquist says coordination also refers to the results of the changes: "[It] means consistency, harmony, mutual reinforcement, the absence of conflict and duplication."[28] The ultimate purpose of coordination is summarized by Seidman. To accomplish any semblance of problem solving, he tells us, agencies "must share at least some community of interests and compatible objectives."[29] These definitions provide clues for policymakers (what they must do to coordinate policy efforts) and for academicians interested in policy implementation (what should be a key point of interest to them). Consensus building (finding agreement about objectives) is a necessary and sufficient condition to attain policy saliency in implementation.

[26] Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, eds. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (New York: Columbia University, 1937), pp. 1–45.

[27] Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, p. 195.

[28] James Sundquist, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), pp. 12–13.

[29] Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, p. 194.

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Consensus building is a continuous process throughout policymaking. The consensus reached to bring about a favorable policy decision to enact legislation is oftentimes ephemeral, cast from a different mold than what is necessary in implementation. As Robert Dahl explains, this results from the fact that "on matters of specific policy, the majority rarely rules." Rather, he explains, "specific policies tend to be products of 'minority rule.'"[30] State and local interests, intense about a particular issue, can come together at the national level and achieve decisions favorable to them. But, national legislators can also play both ends from the middle. They respond to the demands of these interests because they are strong enough to draw Congress to their cause. However, since it is in Congress (particularly the House) "where federalism and representation meet," national legislators must also be sensitive to other state and local interests that may not be supportive of the issue.[31] Congress, therefore, may "bite-the-bullet" but only halfway through. As explained by Martha Derthick, Congress will "commit itself to serving very broad national purposes . . . without assuming the burden of making all the political choices it would have to make in a unitary system. The difficult choices may be left to other governments."[32]

In many cases, individuals and groups who fight the initial battles to create favorable policy decisions are unable or unwilling to continue their efforts to insure that these decisions are applied. Consequently, policy implementation is carried forward by politicians and administrators who, at best, may be less enthusiastic about the decisions than the initial supporters or, at worse, opposed to them. Important state and local officials may be excluded from the initial consensus; however, since they are important in implementation, a renewed effort must be made to convince them that the national program fits their priorities. Furthermore, opponents are given another opportunity to delay or work against the program.

Before policy is made operational, agreement must be reached about questions of jurisdiction and authority—within agencies and intergovernmentally. Initially, agencies must determine within the mandate given to them by legislation what implementation strategy they will pursue. (Of course, this may occur through actual implementation experience rather than by design.) After agencies determine what they can and cannot do, their strategies have to be meshed with state and local authorities. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program offered funds to cities and counties that did not have the requisite state authority to operate the program in their jurisdictions.[33] Without basic changes in state

[30] Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[31] Heinz Eulau, "Polarity in Representational Federalism: A Negative Theme of Political Theory," *Publius* 3 (Fall 1973) :153–171.

[32] Martha Derthick, *The Influence of Federal Grants* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 196.

[33] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment and Proposed Policies*, report A-57, *Community Development: The Working of a Federal-Local Block Grant* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 38–39.

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authority, many local governments simply were incapable of implementing the CDBG program.

Once a consensus is reached within agencies and intergovernmentally, there is a continuous process of maintaining that consensus. The focus is not on basic questions of jurisdiction and authority, but on routine administrative issues. This is a very important process because its ultimate purpose is to avoid letting disagreements about routine administrative questions lead to disagreements over more serious questions of jurisdiction and authority. The assumption here is that before a federal program can attain priority on the local policy agenda and have any positive substantive impacts it must reach this stage of policy implementation. So long as basic issues of jurisdiction and authority are being worked out, the program will not attain priority on the local policy agenda.

An important variable influencing the development of a consensus in policy implementation is the relationship between "promises" and "conditions": that is, dollars to program requirements. The promise of money may compel state and local governments to accept federal program conditions and make needed legal, structural, or administrative changes necessary to participate in the program. The ACIR, in analyzing the implementation of the CDBG program, gives us an example of how this works.

> The CDBG program was structured to increase the powers of local government, but in many cases the legislation offered local governments funds to perform tasks that they were not legally empowered to perform. To reverse a widespread practice of using special authorities, the act essentially subjugated those state and local housing, urban renewal, and other special authorities which were dependent upon Federal funding to the rule of local government. State governments were faced with a difficult policy choice: either augment the powers of local government or deny these localities power and, with that decision, Federal funding. Many states acquiesced to the subtle but real Federal-local pressure, often despite the fact that some of the same powers had previously been sought by localities and denied. But this state action can hardly be called voluntary. The fact that the Federal funding carrot was dangled in front of eager and financially strained local governments can not be overlooked.[34]

Dollar incentives along with congressional authority are the major tools at the disposal of federal administrators to encourage state and local compliance with federal program conditions. Both, however, are subject to fluctuations. Congressional authority may, in fact, be a two-edged sword. It may allow federal agencies to intercede in local areas; however, if they are too authoritative, Congress can be lobbied to exercise oversight to have agencies relax their efforts. Furthermore, Congress is most of the time longer on promises than on dollars provided. Authorizations often do not match appropriations. Thus, agencies are deprived of one of the major tools to achieve state and local cooperation.

Arriving at a consensus is a developmental process. States move slowly, if at all, to change legally, structurally, or administratively to get in line with federal conditions. By the same token, they rarely move in unison. Basic con-

[34] Ibid., p. 39.

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stitutional issues may be raised if the federal government attempts to force states to make changes. In effect, the process of implementation—reaching the point of consensus—is very much a matter of negotiation between federal, state, and local interests. It is a pragmatic process, but one designed to insure that if state and local changes occur, their interests are well represented as to what changes are made. State and local interests have a reservoir of legal, structural, and fiscal authorities to control the implementation of federal programs within their jurisdictions. Policy implementation, thus, is not only a matter of intergovernmental negotiation but also of intrastate political negotiation as to how a program will be implemented in a particular state.

Conclusions

There is no question that the scope of problems addressed and the nature of their solutions have changed drastically since the design of the American federal system. Almost all public problems in some form cut across local political boundaries. Policies previously debated and established almost solely at the local level are now dealt with by national political institutions. One consequence, for example, of the onslaught of numerous federal domestic programs in recent years is a change in the scope of political debate. For individual local governments, this puts their policy priorities in a different context.

In spite of this "nationalization" of problems, developmental processes in policy implementation that establish a consensus about jurisdiction and authority and match federal incentives with program conditions operate to protect the basic tenets of American federalism. The federal system was designed to unite an heterogeneous society without overturning local integrity in the process. The national government's involvement in domestic problem solving goes far beyond what was envisioned by the nation's architects. However, the design and application of national programs is still very much the experimental process Alexander Hamilton described when he quoted from Hume's *Essays* in *The Federalist Papers:* "To balance a large state or society [says Hume] is a work of so great difficulty that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they *inevitably* fall into in their first trials and experiments."[35]

A central assumption that guided my analysis in the preceding pages is that coordinating the various diverse interests in the American federal system is still very much an experiment—one designed to protect territorial democracy in the context of twentieth-century problems. As such, state and local interests remain important political partners in this process. They still hold many of the trump

[35] *The Federalist Papers*, no. 85 (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 526–27.

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cards in federal program implementation. Their diversity gives them strength, and the national political apparatus is designed to allow state and local authorities to use this strength to negotiate for their set of priorities by molding national programs to fit this diversity.*

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York, New York. I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Bruce I. Oppenheimer and Edward J. Harpham. Of course, final responsibility for the article rests with the author.

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Can the Cities be Trusted? The Community Development Experience

DONALD F. KETTL

Federal programs to aid the cities have for decades faced a double dilemma. On the political side, efforts to pursue national policy goals have clashed with demands for local autonomy. Mayors have protested the constraints imposed by the irresistible lure of federal money (although few cities have sent the money back). Yet both elected and appointed officials at the federal level have distrusted the cities' commitment to national goals. On the administrative side, doubts about the ability of the federal government to distribute money free of excessive costs, particularly those caused by inflexibility and red tape, have encountered concerns about the ability of the cities to spend federal money effectively and efficiently.

By the late 1960s the nation's mayors were complaining that federal grant programs had produced a dangerous mix of these political and administrative problems: too much federal control over local policy accompanied by too many regulations, too little flexibility, and too little coordination among programs. The solution of the seventies was the block grant, a strategy conceived in the mid-sixties but advanced on a broad scale by Richard Nixon's New Federalism. The block grants would improve the delivery of aid to the cities, Nixon said, by distributing aid according to a formula measuring "need" (instead of having cities compete for project grants), by vesting responsibility for the grants in elected officials (instead of administrative officials who dominated the categoricals at the local level), and by allowing the cities to use the money over

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a broad functional area largely at their own discretion (instead of narrow functional categories).

A fundamental premise guided the growth of the block grants: national policy objectives could best be achieved by greater decentralization of authority—both for planning and administration—to local governments. Block grants grew from 1 percent ($371 million) of all federal grants-in-aid in fiscal year 1972 to an estimated 10 percent ($8.1 billion) for fiscal year 1979.

Not all observers of the intergovernmental system shared Nixon's confidence in local political and administrative capacity. They had nagging concerns about the cities: local governments were said to be fragmented, inept, unresponsive, undemocratic, and sometimes corrupt.

The dispute left a basic question: can the cities be trusted? Do local governments have the political and administrative capacity to handle these increased responsibilities? Are they responsive to the needs of their citizens? Do they have the administrative expertise to plan the use of their money? A review of the experiences of a sample of city governments in the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program may help answer these inquiries.

How Did Cities Decide?

The CDBG program, enacted by Congress in 1974, consolidated seven of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) categorical grant programs into a single block grant program.[1] In the categorical programs, cities competed through project applications for a limited supply of federal funds. HUD had the ultimate say over which cities received how much money for which projects. The CDBG program changed the rules: cities could select their own projects within broad eligibility standards. Furthermore, instead of forcing cities to compete for the money, the program guaranteed cities with a population of more than 50,000 an annual entitlement based on a "need" formula counting population, the overcrowding of a city's housing stock, and the extent of poverty (counted twice).[2]

CDBGs provided funds for two types of activities. Physical development projects were the core of the program, assisting cities with: acquisition of dilapidated housing; construction of neighborhood improvements such as parks

[1] The seven programs are: urban renewal, model cities, water and sewer facilities, open space, neighborhood facilities, rehabilitation loans, and public facilities loans.

[2] Under the 1974 formula, aging cities of the Northeast and Midwest would have begun in 1977 to receive smaller amounts of funds than they had been receiving from the original categorical programs. These Frostbelt cities waged a successful campaign during the program's 1977 reauthorization, however, for an additional formula that was more favorable to them. This second formula weighed the age of a city's housing (counted 2.5 times), the extent of poverty (counted 1.5 times), and the city's lag in population growth (counted once). Cities could choose whichever formula gave them the larger grant.

Also entitled to grants are counties with a population of more than 200,000. Smaller communities can compete for discretionary funds.

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and street lights; housing code enforcement; projects to remove architectural barriers to the handicapped; and other similar projects to develop "viable urban communities," according to the legislation. Cities could also use a portion of their entitlements for social service projects including child care, health, education, and recreation projects.

To draw a picture of local decision making in the program, we will probe the experiences of four Connecticut cities in the CDBG program. The sample of cities is matched to provide substantial variation on two variables likely to affect local performance—size, and past experience with HUD's categorical programs—while controlling for potential confounding effects of other variables. Bridgeport and New Haven are relatively large cities compared with New London and Norwich. On the other hand, New Haven and New London were much more active in HUD's categorical programs than were Bridgeport and Norwich (see Table 1).

We will examine the four cities during the first three years of the CDBG program, from August 1974 to August 1977. Conclusions are based on a total of sixty-five interviews with the key public officials in each of the cities as well as with HUD officials at the area, regional, and central office levels. The study also draws on an examination of the written records: files maintained on each city by HUD; locally prepared documents submitted to HUD in compliance with CDBG requirements; local files on the program; and local newspaper stories on the program.

We will explore three dimensions of local performance: how local governments decided to allocate their CDBG entitlements; what outcomes their decisions produced; and what implications these questions have for intergovernmental policy.

TABLE 1

Characteristics of the Cities

	Bridgeport	*New Haven*	*New London*	*Norwich*
Population (1970)	156,542	137,707	31,630	41,433
Median Family Income (1970)	$9,849	$9,031	$9,657	$9,768
Categorical Grant Program Experience (fiscal 1968–1972) (amounts in millions of dollars)				
Urban Renewal*	$6.7	$55.5	$24.7	$5.7
Model Cities	4.2	3.7	$2.9	0
All others**	0.5	2.4	0.4	1.7
CDBG Entitlement: fiscal 1975–1977 (amounts in millions of dollars)	$12.0	$54.5	$19.4	$4.4

*Including neighborhood development program.

**Water and sewer facilities, open space, neighborhood facilities, rehabilitation loans, and public facilities loans.

Source: U.S., Bureau of Census, *Census of Population and Housing: 1970 hr;* and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development files.

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Although the details of the process varied by city, each city went through three identifiable phases in allocating its CDBG funds: setting the decision-making agenda; narrowing the choices; and hearing the appeals.

Setting the Agenda

The executive—mayor or city manager[3]—asked city agencies to propose ideas for funding, and the agencies returned with long shopping lists. Some agencies proposed ideas that had rested on a planner's shelf for years; others, projects that had been denied funding from other sources. The redevelopment agencies sought large grants not only to complete existing urban renewal projects (which the program required as a first priority) but also to begin large new projects for which the CDBG program was the only source of funds.

The New London Public Works Department, for example, proposed to improve the city's water system with an $8 million new reservoir (the city's entitlement was only $6 million). New Haven's Redevelopment Agency listed its incomplete projects for which, they said, the agency needed $150 million (compared with the city's annual entitlement of $18 million). The projects proposed by city agencies, not surprisingly, were large and self-aggrandizing.

All four cities also collected extensive citizen suggestions for projects. Unlike earlier urban renewal project area committees and model cities boards, which limited participation to residents of target areas, CDBG extended the scope of formal citizen involvement from the neighborhood to the city. At one time or another during the first three years of the program, each city had a citywide board of citizens charged with recommending projects to meet local needs. Each city also held a series of public hearings. The result was a significantly expanded citizen participation process that generated a large number of project proposals.

In fact, if any single fact characterized the agenda-setting process, it was that each city had far more demands for projects than there was money available. According to one New London official, "it was like a pot of gold had showed up." During the first year of the program, for example, New London officials faced $40 million in demands for $6.1 million in CDBG funds.

The character of these demands varied with the city's previous experience with similar programs. In the more experienced cities, the demands were more numerous, more vocal, and more dominated by organizations: redevelopment agencies, city departments, neighborhood antipoverty agencies, and local public service groups. Compared with the less experienced cities, the more experienced cities also had more demands for social service projects. Model cities agencies expected to continue their projects and new agencies also sought a share of the largesse. The more experienced cities also had participated more actively in the federal antipoverty programs of the 1960s; in an era of declining

[3] Bridgeport and New Haven had mayors; New London and Norwich had city managers.

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federal support for these programs, local antipoverty agencies in these cities looked to CDBG as a way to secure a continuing source of income.

The nature of these demands, furthermore, tended to vary within the cities by neighborhood. Residents of higher-income neighborhoods came to public hearings with requests for physical improvements of their neighborhoods, principally parks and public works projects. Residents of lower-income neighborhoods, on the other hand, favored social service projects, usually neighborhood-based projects such as day care and health services. Some lower-income residents, particularly from several New Haven neighborhoods, demanded projects to rehabilitate their housing, but demands for social services from lower-income neighborhoods were far more numerous and vocal.

The demands of higher-income residents are not hard to understand. But why should lower-income families, often living in deteriorating neighborhoods and in housing of low quality, ask predominantly for social services instead of improvements in housing?

The answer is threefold. Lower-income families rarely owned their own houses. A New Haven official commented:

> People in poor neighborhoods tend not to own their own homes, they tend to rent, so their concern with . . . upgrading these residences tends to be minimal—not that they wouldn't like to have better housing, it's just that they have no direct control over providing it.

Moreover, social service problems tended to be more immediate than long-range housing conditions. Another New Haven official said, "I think their social service problems are more immediate to them: 'What do I do with my kid who is on drugs?'" Finally, and perhaps most importantly, social service projects meant jobs in poor neighborhoods. The costs of these projects were largely salaries, and employees came mainly from the neighborhoods. Simply put by one New Haven official, "public service projects are generally interpreted to mean jobs."

The mayors also often made proposals of their own. John Mandanici of Bridgeport proposed a new waterfront park to remove decaying industrial facilities from the city's waterfront and transform it into a park. New Haven's Frank Logue advocated a neighborhood preservation project to rehabilitate deteriorating housing in several city neighborhoods.

The result was a complex set of demands from city agencies for projects to foster their own growth and demands from citizens for projects to improve their neighborhoods. But most importantly, demands for projects far exceeded available funds.

Narrowing the Choices

Officials in the cities relied on what one local staff member called the "nifty-idea-I'm-for-that" approach to planning: "A housing rehabilitation project? That's a nifty idea! I'm for that." The projects that received funding were those sufficiently attractive to build necessary political support.

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A more comprehensive approach to planning the use of CDBG funds never materialized. A New London official described his city's approach as "a big grab bag." In Bridgeport, one official explained that the city dealt "with fragments of the program." Norwich was "just responding to immediate needs," one planner conceded; and the lack of planning in New Haven, according to one administrator, "illustrates the severe weakness that we have in the management process. . . . There is no assurance that [the CDBG program] will be tied together in a unified way."

It would probably have been impossible for anyone, even with unlimited resources, to construct a comprehensive plan for the optimal use of a city's CDBG funds. The needs were so great, the amount of funds available so small, and the objective criteria so vague as to make rational planning an unrealistic dream. Furthermore, the resources were hardly unlimited. Skilled planners were scarce, and they were occupied with the complex administrative details of the program. Decision makers also found that the city's regular business left little time for a comprehensive examination of CDBG proposals.

Chief executives, citizens, and administrators played key roles in finally narrowing the choices.

Chief executives. In the cities with mayors (Bridgeport and New Haven), the mayor's role was potentially as large as he chose to make it. The mayors, however, chose to make that role relatively small because of the potential risks: with so many demands for projects, they risked creating many enemies for every friend they made through a CDBG project grant. They limited themselves to setting broad goals and choosing pet projects. With other pressing city business, the political volatility of the CDBG program, and the program's enormous complexity (with nearly 100 projects per year in several of the cities), one New Haven official said of the mayor, "he can't do more than establish general priorities."

Mayors thus decided that often the best decision was not to decide at all. Instead, they exhibited symptoms of what Anthony Downs called the "shrinking violet syndrome"[4] and Jeffrey L. Pressman labeled "conflict avoidance."[5] One consultant to several cities in the program explained: "Most mayors don't like to make these decisions about where to spend this money." A New Haven official added, "political types don't like to make these decisions. As soon as you start making decisions, you automatically start alienating people."

The mayors set a general strategy for the funds and reviewed the political impact of each proposed project. But their concerns lay more with their own favorite projects than with the program as a whole.

The city managers (in New London and Norwich) played a broader role in

[4] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 217.

[5] Jeffrey L. Pressman, *Federal Programs and City Politics: The Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975), p. 40. See also Matthew Holden, Jr., "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review* 60 (December 1966): 945.

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helping to structure the CDBG allocation. They put together a set of recommendations, but because they lacked the political standing of a mayor they had less influence on individual parts of the program. Their influence lay in a knowledge of the program's details, of individual projects, and of predictable reactions of the members of the city council. As a Norwich official said of the city manager, "he knows what the city council wants and he goes in that direction."

Citizens. The citizen participation committees had substantial influence on the content of the CDBG applications. A member of New London's citizen advisory committee claimed the city council "did listen to us" and rated the committee's influence "very good." A Bridgeport administrator called the city's citizen advisory committee "very well organized and very effective. They keep us honest. They have gotten sophisticated enough that they know what the law calls for." Public hearings in the other cities generated ideas that eventually found their way into applications.

The citizen participation committees, however, were guaranteed frustration. They had position without authority: local officials had established the committees to meet the law's requirements for citizen participation and to formalize citizen input into the process. There was never a promise that the citizens' recommendations would be followed, and although the citizens scored major successes (such as a major parks improvement project in Bridgeport), the citizens often felt ignored. One city council member in Bridgeport explained, "they sometimes forget that they are an advisory group. They want to become part of management."

The further cities moved into the program, however, the more citizen influence decreased, for the continuation of ongoing projects took most of each city's entitlement. Turnout at both the public hearings and the meetings of the citizen committees declined. In preparing for the third-year application in New Haven, the hearings often had more representatives of the city government present than citizens. In Bridgeport, rapid turnover on the citizen advisory committee crippled the organization; it became difficult to get a quorum and to school the new members in the intricacies of the program.

Administrators. As a result of the shift in control of the funds to local elected officials, administrators associated with the former categorical programs lost much of their independence. Nevertheless, the administrators who provided staff assistance for the CDBG program had significant influence over the allocation of funds. They understood the program's changing regulations and had friends in HUD to explain the agency's latest interpretations. They had knowledge of each of the large number of projects included in each application. They prepared the application itself and the required supporting documents. In short, they alone had command of the details of the program.

These administrators significantly influenced the content of the applications. They drew together the demands for projects from citizens, other agencies, and politicians into a single document. Their knowledge of the program's

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intricacies, especially of the eligibility requirements for projects, put them in a powerful position to choose some projects and eliminate others for technical reasons, objective knowledge, and subjective judgment. This knowledge also put them in an excellent position to suggest projects of their own and to marshal evidence to support them.

The administrators in the end actually drafted the applications. They drew together a list of recommended projects in consultation with the executive to insure that his pet projects were included and that none of the projects violated the executive's general priorities. They also often exercised their own political judgments to assemble a collection of projects that the city council would accept. The draft application then went to the council for review and final approval.

Appeals

The city council in all four cities had a far broader role in the CDBG program than in the earlier categorical programs. Previously, the council had routinely approved the plans submitted by the categorical agencies. In the CDBG program, however, the council played a far more active role. Some council members pursued their own pet projects or serviced the needs and wants of their constituents. Moreover, in the council-manager cities (New London and Norwich), the councilors had final authority over the program. But in all four cities, the council served primarily as a board of appeals and the court of last resort.

The council members routinely approved most of the items in the draft applications submitted to them, but as the last point of review before the city sent the application to HUD, public hearings held by the council often became a major battleground. Organizations that had earlier received funds fought to keep their allocation. Other organizations that had lost the earlier rounds struggled to win a share of the money. Constituents deluged council members with requests; as one Bridgeport councilor explained: "Everybody would like a little bit. Your constituents call and ask you how a particular district can get a . . . community service center and we can't even get a basketball court." He continued:

> In all the districts, [the council members'] constituents are calling and asking them to bring back at least a small portion of the money. Most of them are resigned to the fact that they cannot get a large portion of the money because of the nature of the program. But they do like to see something in return for their tax dollars.

Public interest in the CDBG program, furthermore, was far stronger than in the local general fund budget. Citizens perceived the general fund budget as constrained by the need to continue municipal services such as education, fire protection, and police services. On the other hand, citizens perceived the CDBG entitlement (incorrectly) as a no-strings grant that local officials could distribute entirely at their own discretion. This perception attracted far greater citizen attention to the CDBG budget than to the cities' regular budgets.

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During the hearings for New Haven's third-year application, for example, 200 people came to argue over the $4 million earmarked for social services out of the $17.5 million entitlement. That same evening, only two speakers appeared at a public hearing to discuss the city's $94 million general fund budget.

Citizen interest grew into conflict as the more experienced cities allocated the social service portion of the entitlement. The council not only faced large demands from many organizations but a long tradition of strife between city hall and the neighborhoods. Proponents of the projects brought busloads of supporters to the council chambers to demonstrate their support. Other agencies brought clients to testify to the value of the services. Council members supported their constituents' demands and the result, according to one New Haven councilor, was that the council "dealt with individual [projects] like little baubles on a Christmas tree."[6] A New London newspaper called the city council's public hearings "New London's Theater of the Absurd" and concluded: "The result of all this is more of a grab bag than a plan, a loose collection of unrelated ways to spend money rather than a unified approach to solving the city's most acute problems."[7]

Competition of Interests

In the end, it was bargaining—among elected officials, citizens, city bureaus, and neighborhood agencies—that was the most prominent feature of local decision making. No one individual or group cared very deeply about the local CDBG program as a whole, but a large number of interests fought very hard for individual projects. For elected officials, it was usually a highly visible community improvement project for which they hoped to take credit. For city bureaus, it was a project to maintain or expand their mission. For citizens and neighborhood agencies, it was a project to maintain or expand city services in their area. For all, it was only a portion of the CDBG entitlement—the money they hoped to win for themselves—that held importance.

How successful each interest was depended on two things: how forcefully it stated its case as the administrators and citizen groups consolidated the agenda of proposed projects into a draft application; and how strongly it defended itself before the city council as other groups struggled for a share of the funds. The strategies varied widely. Mayors explained how their pet projects would attack key city problems. Redevelopment agencies cited long-standing commitments to completing their projects. Neighborhood organizations marshaled clients to demonstrate public support for their services.

It was a situation that encouraged logrolling by both function and area. City councilors attempted to balance the competing demands among functional areas—the physical development requests of the redevelopment agency with the social service demands of the neighborhoods, for example. They also tried to

[6] New Haven *Advocate*, April 20, 1977.
[7] *New London Day*, January 31, 1976.

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TABLE 2

Allocation of Money by Function

Function	*City*			
	Bridgeport	*New Haven*	*New London*	*Norwich*
Downtown Renewal	2%	2%	24%	0%
Municipal Services and Equipment	0	0	12	2
Urban Renewal	35	32	10	53
Housing Rehabilitation	15	15	14	12
Neighborhood Parks and Facilities	16	4	6	2
Neighborhood Public Works	1	6	3	20
Social Services	15	17	20	3
Planning and Administration	12	17	9	3
Other	4	7	1	5
Total*	100%	100%	99%	100%
Amount (millions of dollars)	$12.0	$54.5	$19.4	$4.4

*Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.
Source: Derived from proposed activities in local applications.

balance demands for projects among the neighborhoods—for example, by distributing park development money around the cities. It was a city manifestation of Lowi's interest group liberalism.[8]

The Results of Local Decisions

Over the first three years of the program, as Table 2 shows, the cities spent most of their money on completing existing urban renewal projects and on housing rehabilitation, social services, and planning and administration. Along with the similarities are some striking differences: Bridgeport's park improvement projects; New London's substantial effort to rebuild its downtown area; and Norwich's extensive urban renewal and public works projects. Norwich also spent far less than the other cities for social services.

The bargaining process produced scattered, short-term, neighborhood-based projects.

Scattered Projects

Compared with the geographically concentrated projects of the urban renewal and model cities programs, the CDBG program significantly increased the number of areas receiving funds. One Bridgeport official explained, "everybody wants a piece of the pie, so you can't concentrate in a single area."

[8] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

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Decision making in the CDBG program, according to New Haven Mayor Frank Logue, was "programing by area." In Bridgeport, for example, a park improvement project advocated by the city's citizen advisory committee gave a new park to every member's district. In New Haven, Mayor Bart Guida distributed money to each of the city's neighborhood corporations, whose support he sought to strengthen, shortly before his party's mayoral primary (which he lost to Frank Logue). Other projects, one Bridgeport official explained, were "appeasements—done to appease a certain group" in return for their support. The result, according to one New Haven city official, was a "crazy" collection of projects "sprinkled" around the city. In each city, at least two-thirds of the census tracts had projects: 68 percent in Bridgeport; 69 percent in New Haven; 93 percent in New London; and 77 percent in Norwich.[9]

Short-Term Projects

With the CDBG program came the end of ten-year urban renewal projects. CDBG's neighborhood-based projects were short-term, small-scale projects such as rehabilitation of individual houses within a neighborhood or public service projects funded for a single year.

Part of the reason was the unstable, annual nature of the program. Cities had to submit a new application for funds each year and HUD sometimes changed its eligibility requirements from year to year. As a result, the cities could not be sure for which projects they would have money. Furthermore, since Congress originally had authorized the program for only three years, none of the cities knew with certainty how much money they would have in the future. The results, according to a New Haven planner, is that officials said to themselves, "I better pick things which are visible, things which are certain to occur."

Part of the reason was also the biennial elections that constantly faced elected officials. One New London official explained:

> The program subjects itself to yearly citizen participation and political pressure. The governing body is political and it is influenced by its constituency. [Constituents] want immediate things . . . visible things. The politicians want a program before the next election.

New Haven's mayor, an aide explained, "takes the rap for what goes wrong and is lauded for what goes right." The result was strong pressure for quick results.

Neighborhood-Based Projects

The focus of CDBG projects was the neighborhood. After accounting for planning and administrative costs and for the required completion of urban

[9] Each project's location was identified by census tract. The average annual entitlement that

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TABLE 3

Location of Projects by Income of Neighborhood (dollar amounts in thousands)

*Income of Neighborhood**	*Projects*			
	Housing Rehabilitation	*Neighborhood Parks and Facilities*	*Neighborhood Public Works*	*Social Services*
Bridgeport	$1,762	$1,906	$75	$1,793
Lower income	80%	8%	0%	96%
Upper income	20%	92%	100%	4%
New Haven	$8,161	$2,087	$3,056	$9,408
Lower income	99%	53%	38%	81%
Upper income	1%	47%	62%	19%
New London	$2,620	$1,243	$664	$3,922
Lower income	25%	71%	36%	87%
Upper income	75%	29%	64%	13%
Norwich	$530	$75	$868	$147
Lower income	9%	67%	0%	0%
Upper income	91%	33%	100%	100%
All cities	$13,073	$5,311	$4,663	$15,270
Lower income	78%	42%	30%	84%
Upper income	22%	58%	70%	16%

*Lower-income neighborhoods are those composed predominantly of census tracts with median incomes lower than 80% of the city median income. Upper-income neighborhoods are composed predominantly of census tracts with median incomes higher than 80% of the city median income. Median income is taken from the 1970 Census.

Source: Derived from proposed activities in local applications.

renewal projects, the cities spent nearly all of their remaining money on neighborhood-based services: housing rehabilitation, parks and facilities, public works, and social services. For the physical development projects, the money produced visible signs of the program's activity. For the social service projects, the money usually produced jobs for neighborhood residents. The key element uniting all these projects was an identifiable neighborhood stake in the CDBG program.

In the functional areas over which city officials had the most leeway, the cities' planned use of the money reflected citizen demands for neighborhood projects. (Money in the other functional categories either did not directly affect the neighborhoods or, in the case of urban renewal, represented the required completion of projects begun under the categorical programs.) Of the money allocated to parks and public works, the cities decided to spend most of

could thus be identified in each city was: Bridgeport, 84 percent; New Haven, 37 percent (because of a large number of citywide social service and housing rehabilitation projects); New London, 77 percent; and Norwich, 93 percent. Planning, administration, and "other" costs account for most of the remaining money.

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the money in upper-income areas. On the other hand, most of the money for housing rehabilitation and especially for social services went to lower-income neighborhoods.

Table 3 shows the allocation of CDBG money by the four functional areas and by the income of the neighborhood in which the projects are located. In the neighborhood parks and facilities projects, the cities earmarked 58 percent of the money for upper-income neighborhoods; of neighborhood public works funds, upper-income neighborhoods received 70 percent of the total. (Upper-income neighborhoods are those composed predominantly of census tracts with median incomes higher than 80 percent of the city median income.) On the other hand, 78 percent of housing rehabilitation money and an even larger 84 percent of social services funds went to lower-income neighborhoods (those composed predominantly of census tracts with median incomes lower than 80 percent of the city median income).

It should not be assumed that these figures represent the allocation of program benefits. Rather, they indicate the *location* of projects; some projects (such as social services) located in upper-income neighborhoods may nevertheless benefit lower-income people living in poverty pockets, and some projects located in lower-income neighborhoods (for example, a golf course acquisition) may predominantly benefit upper-income residents. But the figures do demonstrate the fragmented character of the program and the ability of city officials to link particular projects with identifiable constituencies—and to respond to citizen demands. The large share of park and public works projects for upper-income neighborhoods is particularly significant in light of HUD's continued efforts to force the cities to concentrate their CDBG funds in lower-income areas, as Richard P. Nathan and Paul R. Dommel have described in this journal.[10] The upper-income areas traded in the currency of physical improvements; lower-income neighborhoods took most of the money for housing rehabilitation and social services.

Can the Cities Be Trusted?

The question of whether the cities can be trusted has two possible answers.

On one hand, it can be argued that the cities performed well. Each city made substantial commitments to major projects addressing what citizens and local officials perceived as its worst problems: New Haven had a major housing rehabilitation project; Bridgeport, a waterfront development project; New London and Norwich, downtown revitalization projects. Most of the remaining money met legitimate community development needs. Some of the money funded some functions that were ineligible under earlier federal assistance pro-

[10] "Federal-Local Relations Under Block Grants," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Fall 1978): 421–442. For a review of the early days of the program, see Nathan et al., "Monitoring the Block Grant Program for Community Development," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Summer 1977): 219–244.

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grams. Some of the money went for projects in neighborhoods outside the narrow geographic boundaries of the categorical programs. Some of the money went for short-term municipal service needs (like street repair) that the cities could not have met with local tax revenues. The cities' needs were so great, in fact, that it was almost (but only almost) impossible to spend the money badly.

Local decisions, furthermore, were responsive to the needs citizens described. No federal program in recent history has given individual citizens greater potential to influence the distribution of such large sums of money. And as we have seen, the influence of citizens, both individually and organized in groups, on the allocation of funds was substantial. Despite the protests by citizen committee members that decision makers were ignoring them and despite the shrillness that often accompanied their demands, CDBG allocations showed a close correspondence with the demands articulated for the funds. There were important qualifications to the openness of the process: the organizational resources of some city agencies gave them an advantage in the competition for funds; and city officials were often unsure exactly whom the so-called neighborhood spokesmen actually represented. But local CDBG allocations, it could be argued, were on the whole both reasonable and responsive.

On the other hand four criticisms can be made about their decisions.

—Some of the money went to "buy off" some citizens and neighborhoods with tennis courts, parks, and sidewalks. These projects were the political price paid for other projects.

—The cities gave little recognition to problems above the neighborhood level. In funding neighborhood-based projects, the cities made little attempt to grapple with problems that spanned the neighborhoods. And the cities made no attempt to use their CDBG entitlements to deal with problems they shared with neighboring cities.

—Even within the neighborhoods the cities made no attempt to coordinate CDBG projects. The unspoken demand hidden in each fund request was for autonomy, and successful applicants expected to be able to follow their own agendas—not to have other agencies' agendas forced on them. Local officials made few attempts to gain control over individual projects or to establish potential links between projects. The local CDBG application was no more than a fragmented collection of individual projects.

—The cities made a few attempts to identify their most important needs or to compare the relative advantages of competing projects. Even limited planning to identify key features of projects—often including their likely costs—did not occur. And if it was hard to spend money badly, it was important to spend it well. The cities never conducted the planning needed to separate the good from the better project proposals.

These criticisms are not specific to these four cities. A host of monitoring reports has found similar problems in the CDBG program across the country.

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These reports have particularly attacked the cities for their failure to use the money for the needs of the poor.[11] Other block grant programs, especially the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, have also been attacked for inadequate planning and for failure to spend the money in accordance with national goals.[12]

How can we reconcile these conflicting interpretations of local performance? Can the cities be trusted with great discretion over large sums of money? Or does prudent management demand close federal supervision of local governments? Our examination of these four cities leads to no definitive answer.

Perhaps the better question is: with what can the cities be trusted? To that question we have a much clearer answer. The cities spent their money on projects that were important at least to those elected officials making the decisions. Elected officials, furthermore, matched the projects to the demands of their citizens. They were also able to use the money flexibly to tackle short-term problems that might otherwise have gone unsolved. But these results did not come without costs. Local planning was nearly nonexistent. Selection of projects instead depended on the "nifty-idea-I'm-for-that" approach that in turn relied on developing projects with immediate appeals for identifiable constituencies. The local "plan" consequently was no more than a collection of individual projects that took little account of national program objectives.

The cities appear politically equipped to deal with scattered, short-term, neighborhood-based problems. Hence, it makes sense to trust the cities with the discretion to deal flexibly with the widely varying community development problems that threaten many of the nation's cities. But other problems, particularly those that demand longer commitments (for example, long-term economic development), redistribution of income to the poor, or concentration of funds in a narrow functional area (like housing), lie beyond local political capacity. The time horizon of local officials is too short and the demand for widespread distribution of benefits is too great to allow local governments to launch a concerted attack on these problems. Attacking national problems through federal grants demands greater federal control over local decisions.*

[11] For several examples, see Center for Community Change et al., "Community Development Block Grants," Washington, D.C., 1976, mimeographed; Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, "Community Development and the Model Cities Legacy," Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University, November 1976; and Raymond Brown with Ann Coil and Carol Rose, *A Time for Accounting: The Housing and Community Development Act in the South* (Atlanta, Ga.: Southern Regional Council, 1976).

[12] For a summary view of all the block grant programs, see the U.S., Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

* Research for this paper was financed by a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development whose support is gratefully acknowledged. I also want to thank James Fesler, Douglas Yates, Garry Brewer, and Stanley Greenberg who contributed valuable suggestions after reading earlier versions of this paper.

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Human Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in Historical Perspective

SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT

The contemporary debate on the issue of human rights in the Third World has generated more heat than light because it has failed to recognize the massive economic costs of more humane policies. There is no natural affinity among economic growth, political freedom, and social justice in development processes.[1] Nothing shows this more clearly than the recent economic performance of the Third World. The high growth rates typical of the last three decades in many developing nations[2] have done little to relieve the miserable poverty that is the lot of the vast majority of citizens in these countries, and have gone hand in hand with authoritarian and repressive political regimes.[3]

[1] For the purposes of this paper, I define political freedom as encompassing: civil liberty—equality in the eyes of the law, habeas corpus, freedom of speech, of religion, of the press, of assembly; individual integrity—freedom from government violation of the person through torture, arbitrary arrest, or imprisonment; and political participation—the right to vote, to form political parties, to organize independent trade unions, and to take part in government. Social justice is defined as the elimination of the more desperate states of poverty and a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor. Both sets of rights have been given a certain international legal status through such declaratory acts as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the three human rights covenants passed in 1946 and 1966 respectively. See Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents in International Law*, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 144-86.

[2] In the postwar period underdeveloped countries have experienced an unprecedented degree of economic growth, for example, real income rose by 75 percent in the 1950-70 period. This is more growth in real income per person than during the previous twenty centuries.

[3] See, for example, Irman Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973); and Montek S.

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The persistence of poverty and repression in developing nations raises a number of extremely important questions. Are social and political accompaniments of modern economic development functional or coincidental? In other words, were the high growth rates of the recent period dependent upon massive poverty and political repression, or could this economic performance have been possible under democratic governments with more egalitarian sets of economic policies? Subsidiary questions revolve around issues of degree and longevity. For example, if a successful capitalist growth strategy is contingent upon massive poverty, it is crucial to know how much? Must the government of a rapidly developing economy suppress wage rates and rule out the possibility of decent health care for the masses to control inflation or discipline its labor force? Or, is one of these items discretionary, representing a welfare goal that could be pursued concurrently with the growth strategy if the government of the day so desired? One can examine the issue of political rights in a similar vein. Does resolving a balance of payments crisis or balancing the budget necessitate the suspension of elections and the imposition of torture or are some elements of many authoritarian systems merely the voluntary preference of a specific military regime? In short, how much social injustice or political repression is functional to an economic strategy, and how much is the caprice of a particular elite in power.

A second dimension of the costs-of-growth issue in the underdeveloped world is the longevity of these social and political tradeoffs into the future. Many theorists, particularly economists, advocate uninhibited capitalist growth in the short run—whatever the costs—on the assumption that this is the most efficient and perhaps the only way to acquire a bigger economic base, which can and will be more equitably divided up at some point in the future. This begs all sorts of questions as to the structural, institutional, and political impediments to growth that may be created by the developmental process itself. For example, who determines when and how economic gains are going to be divided up? Presumably, there would be no compelling reason for a military dictatorship in a labor surplus economy to divide up spontaneously the spoils of economic growth.

Historical Perspective

The origins and persistence of the conventional wisdom that the costs of growth are short term are rooted in the specific historical experience of advanced nations.

The industrial revolution in Western Europe and North America was a painful process. Writers of the period provide vivid images of the misery wrought by industrialization. Dickens describes London as being full of "pale and pinched up faces hovering about the windows where there was tempting food."[4] Engels

Ahluwalia, "Inequality, Poverty and Development," *Journal of Development Economics* 34 (1976): 307–42.

[4] Charles Dickens's *Nicholas Nickleby* quoted in Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester and the Working Class* (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 151.

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details "the filth and the stagnant pools in the working class quarters of the great cities."[5]

The lower echelons of British society suffered in both absolute and relative terms. The standard of living of the working class (measured in terms of the purchasing power of wages) deteriorated during the last half of the eighteenth century. The trend in absolute income levels during the first several decades of the nineteenth century is the subject of some dispute, but there is no doubt that throughout this period of industrial take-off, the gap between the rich and the poor increased sharply.[6] In short, the abysmal living conditions of the poor were rendered even less tolerable by a bourgeoise class dripping with "excess capital, to be wildly invested in railways and spent on the bulging opulent household furnishings displayed at the Great Exhibition of 1851."[7]

There is little doubt that the laboring classes paid a heavy price for British industrialization. Yet appalling as these social costs were, they proved to be temporary; after 1850 the workers' standard of living began to improve. The capitalist class, although enriched by the fruits of past growth, was driven toward concessions as the increasingly organized urban working class gained both political and economic muscle. During the twentieth century, increasingly powerful trade unionism, periodic labor scarcity, the end of mass unemployment (by 1946), and government welfare measures enhanced the share of national product going to workers. Although there has been some variation in the details of the process, a similar strengthening of working class economic and political bargaining power followed the early phases of industrial development in most advanced capitalist nations. Kuznets accurately describes the secular income trends in today's rich countries as constituting a long swing "widening in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases."[8]

Thus, before the exhaustion of excess rural labor and the advent of effective collective bargaining, and before the implementation of governmental welfare measures, industrialization did exacerbate income inequality and poverty in the currently developed nations. It is interesting to note that Kuznets's third phase of narrowing income differentials has not been cumulative. Despite convictions about the strongly egalitarian effects of social and economic policies pursued by most Western European and North American governments since World War II, trends have been rather ambiguous. For example, in Britain and the United

[5] Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 110. For another indictment of the conditions of the period, see Thomas Carlyle, *Past and Present* (London: Dent, 1967), chap. 1.

[6] Kuznets finds that the years 1780–1850 marked the period of increasing inequality in the United Kingdom. See Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45 (March 1955): 18–19.

[7] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain since 1770* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 72.

[8] Kuznets, "Economic Growth," p. 18.

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States the very wealthy have indeed suffered a relative decline in their income shares, but the beneficiaries have been the middle classes rather than those at the bottom of the heap.[9] However, even allowing for these refinements, it is undoubtedly true that the lower-income groups in the advanced industrial nations have enormously increased their absolute living standards and greatly improved their relative living standards over the course of the last two centuries. But to go from this specific set of circumstances to a generalized expectation that economic growth, in all contexts and at all times, will enhance earnings opportunities across the board is unwarranted.[10] Kuznets, himself careful to emphasize that his findings are specific to the advanced industrial countries, warns of the dangers of simple analogies and poses the question:

> How can either the institutional or political framework of the underdeveloped societies or the processes of economic growth and industrialization be modified to favor a sustained rise to higher levels of economic performance and yet avoid the fatally simple remedy of an authoritarian regime that would use the population as cannon-fodder in the fight for economic achievement?[11]

This proved an ominous premonition of what was to occur subsequently in many capitalist underdeveloped nations.

In order to demonstrate how misleading it is to extrapolate from the experiences of the advanced nations, it is necessary to examine the nature of the interaction between growth and equity in the now affluent countries of Western Europe and North America. This will make it possible to see the ways in which conditions in the contemporary underdeveloped world diverge fundamentally from the historical circumstances of the advanced democracies.

An essential consideration is the conventional rationale for the growth-equity tradeoff. Economists, drawing on the experience of the advanced world, have grounded their tolerance for a short-run worsening of equality in the underdeveloped world on the conviction that an extreme distribution of income generates the savings requirement for fast rates of economic growth. As Harry Johnson puts it, "there is likely to be a conflict between rapid growth and an equitable distribution of income; and a poor country anxious to develop would probably be well advised not to worry too much about the distribution of income."[12]

[9] See Anthony B. Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) for the British data; and Lester C. Thurow, *Generating Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, 1975) for the American data.

[10] The expectation that it is "the history of advanced or established industrial countries which traces out the road of development for the more backward countries" is extremely pervasive in economic theory. See Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 6.

[11] Kuznets, "Economic Growth," p. 25. This authoritarian and capitalist route to development approximates that described by Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 433–53.

[12] Harry G. Johnson, *Money, Trade and Economic Growth* (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1962), p. 153.

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A highly skewed distribution of income, according to this argument, promotes savings because a large portion of disposable income is in the hands of an elite group that has a high marginal propensity to save. High rates of savings are translated into high rates of investment, which, in turn, lead to rapid rates of economic growth. The logic of this theory is flawed and inconsistent with the available evidence. It ignores the possibility that high-income groups in underdeveloped countries may indulge in conspicuous consumption rather than save; it neglects the growing importance of corporate savings and public sector savings in modern growth processes;[13] it forgets that private savings may be channeled into Swiss bank accounts rather than domestic investment; and it overlooks the fact that the empirical evidence shows no correlation between inequality and high rates of savings and investment in developing countries.[14]

It is true that private savings did play an extremely important role in the initial industrialization of Britain and America, and this saving was the result of frugal behavior on the part of entrepreneurs—an elite group within an extremely skewed distributional picture. But this development reflected an unique set of historical circumstances that will never be duplicated. In the contemporary Third World, inequality is functional to both stability and growth; but, as noted in a latter section of this paper, the role it plays is quite different from the argument outlined above.

There are four elements in the economic histories of Western Europe and North America that conspired to make not only growth-equity tradeoff a temporary phenomenon but also long-run economic development compatible with a better deal for the mass of the people. None of these crucial factors exists today in the underdeveloped world.

In the first place, the extent and pace of change in economic structures over the course of the last two centuries is often underestimated. Capitalism in the latter half of the twentieth century is entirely different than it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the presently developed countries entered their take-off phase. Today, the process of capital accumulation is more highly concentrated, more internationally integrated, and much more technologically advanced. Underdeveloped nations entering the industrial phase today have few alternatives but to adopt a capital-intensive, technologically sophisticated production function that often has little to do with their own factor endowment

[13] Kuznets finds that only 7 to 12 percent of savings come from private individuals in low-income countries as opposed to 32 percent in high-income countries. The rest of domestic gross savings comes from governments, public and government enterprises, and private corporations. See Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 8 (July 1960): 73.

[14] Leff, for example, finds that the savings-income ratio in less-developed countries averaged 14.2 percent in 1964, while in Western European countries the savings-income ratio averaged 25.2 percent. This is despite the fact that income was much more unequally distributed in the less-developed countries in his sample. See Nathaniel H. Leff, "Dependency Rates and Savings," *American Economic Review* 59 (December 1969): 886–896. For further evidence see H. S. Houtakker, "On Some Determinants of Saving in Developed and Underdeveloped Countries," in *Problems in Economic Development*, ed. E.A.G. Robinson (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 212.

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(where labor is abundant and capital scarce) because of its evolution in a context of high-cost labor. This type of industrialization often coincides with, or closely follows, the transfer of another type of technology from the developed world—that of medical know-how. Within a few years killer diseases are wiped out, death rates fall drastically, and population growth rates soar.

The coincidence of these types of technological transfer has obvious implications for income distribution in underdeveloped countries. Industrial growth rates are often quite high by any historical standard, but, given an imported capital-intensive technology and an accelerated population increase, the rate of growth of industrial employment is often less than the rate of growth of the population. This quite simply results in a situation where the modern work force is a declining proportion of the potential labor pool: industrial workers become a small, privileged, protected minority; a labor aristocracy that is quite distinct from the mass of the population in both political and economic terms.

This contrasts markedly with the structure of early industrialization in the advanced nations. In Western Europe and North America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a gradual and mostly indigenous evolution of the technological base of society, which went hand in hand with a much slower and milder demographic transition. Over the course of a century, first death rates and then birth rates fell; and, by the beginning of the twentieth century, population growth rates had stabilized in most industrial societies. (North America is an exception because of large-scale immigration throughout the first quarter of this century.) Another factor was that the simple technologies of the original industrial revolution were relatively labor intensive and absorbed large quantities of unskilled as well as skilled workers. The net result of these trends was the eventual elimination of surplus labor: the bulk of the potential labor pool was ultimately absorbed into the modern industrial sector with beneficial effects on the standard of living of the mass of the populace.

A second discrepancy in the economic sphere that serves to differentiate the advanced from the underdeveloped world revolves around the demand dynamics of early as opposed to late development.[15] Since the end of the nineteenth century the advanced nations of Western Europe and North America have been reliant upon mass production and mass consumption for the maintenance of their growth rates; thus, the major threat to prosperity has been recurrent crises of effective demand.[16] In simple terms, these crises have been caused by an imbalance between the increased output of a growing economy and the capacity of the mass of consumers to buy this additional output.

This demand-constraint-on-growth, and the realization on the part of the

[15] In this paper I restrict the use of the phrase "late development" to those countries of the Third World that began industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s. In some more rigorous sense they should perhaps be called late, late developers (Southern Europe and the USSR being the original late developers). This distinction is irrelevant to my argument.

[16] This "demand-constraint-on-growth" is discussed with great effect by Michael Lipton in *Why Poor People Stay Poor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 36–38.

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capitalist class that low wages meant low demand out of wages and thus low profits in the long run, produced a gradual softening of business attitudes toward trade unionism and ultimately increased money incomes for workers. This change of attitude was helped by the concomitant trend toward oligopoly. In the late nineteenth century, the structure of industry was becoming increasingly concentrated and consequently businesses were freed from the need to pay very low wages in order to remain price competitive. They could therefore afford to play a part in bolstering demand, since they had a collective incentive to do so.

In the contemporary underdeveloped world, this important incentive for wage increases is almost totally lacking. Poverty in underdeveloped countries is not caused by a surplus of production and a deficit of money wages. Rather, it is caused by insufficient production capacity and inelasticities in the supply of the various factors of production. Raising wages will therefore only cause inflation, because supply—of capital, of skilled labor, of energy—is inelastic. In short, poverty in Latin America, Africa, and Asia is caused by the lack of means to create wealth, not by the superabundance of such means and the absence of demand.

A third discrepancy between past and present developmental experiences hinges on the nature and effects of government intervention. Given the link between income levels, effective demand, and the health of mature industrial economies, governments have increasingly taken upon themselves the task of regulating demand via various social welfare and tax programs. In essence, in an effort to regulate the demand crises of capitalism, governments in advanced countries have progressively intervened, with positive results, in the sphere of social welfare. However, even in the advanced world, capitalists and governments have not always accepted the logic of this particular item of enlightened self-interest. The appalling social costs of the Great Depression were obviously exacerbated by governments refusing to reflate via the costly and drastic method of deficit-financed public works. But this aberration does not deny the fairly steady growth of governmental intervention in advanced economies from the nineteenth century to the present day. In setting income "floors" below which the poor could not fall, governments not only met a conspicuous human need; these measures also dampered the decline in purchasing power during downturns in the business cycle. Crisis control, demand management, and income equalization have gone hand in hand. Unemployment relief, social security benefits, progressive income taxation, and a growing public sector all reduce the depth of economic crises, and, in so doing, transfer resources from the rich to the poor.

Almost all these economic reasons for using welfare-state measures to increase social justice are missing in underdeveloped countries. In the contemporary Third World, deficit demand is not the cause of poverty; nor is the welfare state a prescription for high profits. In these contexts, instability is often caused by fluctuations in climate and in agricultural production, in foreign de-

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mand for exports, and in the external supply price of manufactured inputs—fluctuations that no single government can control. And, as already stated, the long-run causes of poverty have far more to do with low productivity and with shortages of machines and human skills than with low levels of domestic demand that can be manipulated by governments. In short, the economic pressures facing governments in the underdeveloped world are not met by giving priority to social welfare measures; thus, regimes in these countries are correct in seeing stability and equality as separate issues that cannot be tackled together by social welfare programs designed to put a "floor" under domestic demand as was the case in advanced nations.

Concerning the politics of government intervention, one would have to be an extremely committed economic determinist to imagine that all governmental action was prompted by economic considerations. True, the maintenance of domestic demand did encourage governments in advanced countries to adopt policies of enlightened self-interest, but the issue is more complex than this and involves the ideological frameworks of nations.

All rich capitalist nations are effective democracies that accord the broad mass of their population an extremely wide range of political and civil liberties and possess an array of public programs that are explicitly geared toward diminishing inequality between social classes and between regions. In many cases such "democratic" attributes are neither novel nor ephemeral but are firmly rooted in a tradition and a philosophy that antedate the emergence of modern representational democracy and well beyond the requirements of economic strategies.

Political freedoms seem to have preceded social justice in the modern evolution of Western Europe and North America. The eighteenth-century doctrines of the natural rights of man hinged on notions of freedom and liberty. The American Revolution was a prime example of these new convictions; it was, in essence, a struggle against tyranny and oppression (rather than exploitation and poverty) fought in the name of such tangible civil liberties as freedom of movement, of expression, and of assembly, and freedom from "taxation without representation."

It was the French Revolution that first focused on basic human needs and turned "the rights of man into the rights of the Sans Culottes."[17] By the end of the nineteenth century, Marx had elevated the welfare of the masses into a key doctrine of the modern age. Life itself became the highest goal, and according to Hannah Arendt:

> The role of the revolution was no longer to liberate men from the oppression of their fellow men, let alone to found freedom, but to liberate the life process of society from the fetters of scarcity so that it could swell into a stream of abundance. Not freedom but abundance became now the aim of revolution.[18]

[17] Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 55.
[18] Ibid., p. 58.

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In summary, the evolution of Western democracies saw successive periods during which governments conferred on the broad mass of the populace three types of rights: civil rights (equality in the eyes of the law, freedom of movement, of expression, and of assembly); political rights (universal suffrage, political parties, trade unions); and certain social welfare rights (old age pensions, unemployment benefits, public health facilities).[19]

The granting of these rights represented successive stages that were, of course, related. An initial civil right of assembly greatly strengthened the chances of successful trade unionism; and collective bargaining on the part of workers was an important ingredient in the struggle toward a higher standard of living and enhanced social welfare for the bulk of the population.

A final discrepancy between early and late development revolves around the political and social attributes of the working class. An important reason for the gains of the working class in Europe and North America was the fact that labor began to organize in trade unions and in political parties. The precondition was obviously an "organizable" working class, in the sense of a mass of urbanized and substantially literate workers. There are fifteen advanced countries with a fairly reliable statistical picture of the beginnings of modern industrialization: all but one (Japan) had over 35 percent of the labor force outside agriculture in the premodern era and a greater than 50 percent literacy rate.[20] An extremely different situation prevailed in most underdeveloped countries when they entered their take-off phases. Generally speaking, only 10 to 15 percent of the workers were outside of agriculture; a similar percentage were literate; and the gap between their output—and hence income levels—and those of agricultural workers was far greater than was the case in developing nineteenth-century Europe or North America. Primarily due to the technological and demographic factors, modern industrialization in underdeveloped countries has confirmed rather than countered this previously existing differentiation. The industrial work force has emerged as a labor aristocracy with more to lose than to gain from sharing the benefits of economic growth with the mass of the people, and the trade union movement has grown up as an instrument to protect the interests of this elite group. The net result—organized labor—in the Third World is likely to fight against equalizing measures. In yesterday's developing nations it led the fight to institutionalize them.

It is clear that the Western European and North American analogy is false. There is nothing in the contemporary structure of Third World nations to lead one to suppose that the "grand dynamics" of the original industrial revolution will repeat themselves. The conditions that enabled growth and development to go hand in hand with enhanced civil liberties, increased political participation, and a much higher standard of living for the bulk of the population—conditions established in most of Western Europe and North America in the early nine-

[19] A similar sequence has been put forward in Thomas H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

[20] These figures are taken from Lipton, *Why People Stay Poor*, pp. 39–41.

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teenth century—are highly special. They involve the cumulative interaction of a specific set of economic, political, and social factors. The original conditions of transition to capitalist industrialization, the contemporary structure of class relations and of political power, and the underlying value systems of Western Europe and North America turned growth from a process in which the wealthy gained both the political power and the economic surplus into a process in which the mass of the people shared. Conditions in the modern underdeveloped world do not support a reasonable expectation of replicating these trends. The same set of factors is simply not at work in the same way.

There was a coincidence of political and economic incentives for greater equity in the advanced world. The wretchedness and the exploitation of the English, European, and immigrant-American working classes in the early and middle nineteenth century stemmed from low wages and permitted high rates of capital formation. But these social costs were short-lived. Not only was there a gradual accumulation of civil and political rights by the laboring classes and increased political activism by and for these classes, but economic imperatives came to the fore. The drying up of the pool of surplus rural labor gave the emerging trade union movement some solid bargaining power, at the same time, the capitalist class discovered that they needed a mass market for their products to make their machinery profitable and an increasingly skilled and literate work force to keep it running and improving. The result was an increasingly prosperous and powerful working class. Capitalist self-interest seems to have determined the path of development of advanced nations as much as capitalist humanity.

The contemporary Third World presents a stark contrast. On the political front, with the gravitation to one-party states in Africa and the recent military coups in Latin America, it seems that repressive, autocratic regimes are increasingly dominant. Few of these regimes have avoided that fatally simple remedy of using "the population as cannon fodder in the fight for economic achievement."[21] In addition, the elitist trade union movements of many Third World countries have often been coopted by the government. A very common pattern is for the trade union structure to became a government-sponsored interest group designed to buy off the industrial work force with material incentives to insure that they do not join with the mass of the population. This tends to complete that differentiation of the lower classes in underdeveloped nations talked about earlier. In essence, the evolution of an official and exclusive trade union structure breaks the identification between "the laboring classes" and "the dangerous classes"[22] and, in so doing, prevents the masses from acquiring this important type of political muscle.

On the economic front, conditions also fail to provide any incentive for egalitarian measure. Almost everywhere in the Third World, the growth dynamics of the modern industrial sector do not impinge upon the vast mass of

[21] Kuznets, "Economic Growth," p. 25.

[22] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Laboring Men: Studies in the History of Labor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 272.

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the population. The nature of capital-intensive industry—which absorbs a small (and often decreasing) proportion of the urban work force, and the composition of production which normally emphasizes consumer durables or "rich country goods"—means that it is possible to have a flourishing industrial sector and high average rates of growth that bypass the vast mass of the population, which remains miserably poor and in a state of increasing relative deprivation.

In summary, the distinctive pattern of industrial growth typical of the capitalist Third World tends to create a situation where there is no economic incentive for improving social equity: the majority of the populace is redundant to the developmental process both as workers and as consumers. Indeed, the situation is more extreme than this: the growth strategy is not merely indifferent to equity considerations, it actively needs a less equal and more repressive "solution" to the social question. As will be explored in the next section of this paper, modern capitalist growth processes have their own sets of tradeoffs with both political freedom and social justice.

Modern Capitalist Development

It is a basic contention of this paper that contemporary growth strategies in the Third World do not engender political freedom and social justice as was eventually the case in Western Europe and North America. Instead, there is a series of tradeoffs that drive poor nations to sacrifice these political and social goals in the name of economic development. I would now like to put these various elements together and construct a dynamic portrait of modern capitalist development that will explain both the origins and functions of social and political inequities.

The first and most fundamental element in my conceptual framework is that contemporary growth patterns are intimately linked to the successive historical stages of late capitalist development.[23] The economic evolution of most underdeveloped countries can be divided into three stages: A primary-exporter (and often colonial) economy based on the production of agricultural cash crops and on mining and geared to the needs of the metropolitan powers. This period lasted until the Great Depression and was characterized by domestic stagnation and a highly differentiated social structure. The second phase of "easy" import-substituting industrialization in some underdeveloped countries started as early as the 1930s and lasted through until the 1960s. This phase was marked by rapid industrialization, recurrent inflation and balance of payments problems, and a rigidifying of the highly skewed distributional pattern inherited

[23] A similar stress on the historical origins of contemporary growth patterns in the underdeveloped world can be found in the works of Andre Gunder Frank and Celso Furtado. See, for example, Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in *Imperialism and Underdevelopment*, ed. Robert I. Rhodes (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 4–18; and Celso Furtado, *Development and Underdevelopment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

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from the previous period. The recent period of stabilization and export-orientated growth, a third phase spanning from the 1960s to the present, has seen the juxtaposition of renewed economic growth with deepening poverty in many underdeveloped countries.

Despite the dramatic changes in economic structures, all three eras witnessed a steady and cumulative differentiation of Third World nations into a privileged elite and a poverty stricken mass.

Each stage of development is associated with a specific political framework:[24] the primary-exporter economy with colonial subjugation and trade-oriented landed oligarchies; the easy import-substituting period with modernizing and often populist regimes; and the recent period with repressive military governments. Generally speaking, the exhaustion of each stage of development has precipitated structural crises and internal political changes. These changes have normally encompassed a regrouping of political actors and a significant redirecting of policy. For example, the structural crisis of the 1930s—precipitated by the Great Depression and the collapse of the primary commodity market—provoked in Latin America the ousting of the landed oligarchy and the coming to power of modernizing urban-based regimes that had marked populist overtones and self-consciously coopted the emerging industrial work force. In Africa, the same structural crisis was complicated by the struggle for political independence, but there was an eventual swing towards modernizing industrial regimes.

One can also detect common threads in the political reaction to the end of easy import substitution. In countries as diverse as Brazil, Pakistan, Ghana, and Peru, mounting inflationary and balance of payments problems were resolved by resorting to more or less repressive forms of authoritarianism that tended to exclude the articulate urban classes as well as the masses from the political process. However, one should not overestimate the differences between modernizing regimes in the capitalist Third World. They have all tended to emphasize developmentalism and nationalism, and none of them has constituted government by and for the mass of the people. In certain countries during certain eras it has proved possible to reward discrete segments of the bourgeoisie with a rather limited set of civil and political freedoms. But such "rights" have rarely been universally applied (mini-farmers, landless laborers, and the marginalized segments of the urban population have been the most conspicuous losers) and have generally been withdrawn when they have come into conflict with the imperatives of economic growth. In short, political differences in the postcolonial era of industrial growth have been in degree rather than in kind.

[24] In developing this political framework, I draw on the works of O'Donnell, Nun, and Hirschman. See, for example, Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Jose Nun, *Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants," mimeograph (Princeton, N.J.: Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, February, 1977).

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Political solutions of economic crises necessarily involve motivating forces. There is nothing automatic or inevitable in the link between economic cause and political effect. But given a driving force—in this case the prime emphasis given by the majority of Third World regimes to national economic success—a strong repressive state has become a necessary component of the answer to structural crisis in many underdeveloped nations. Latin American, African, and Asian leaders since the 1930s and 1940s have "worshipped at the altar of growth."[25] This political project has left little time for civil liberty and social welfare as ends in themselves.

The final element in my conceptual framework is the balance of power among the various economic actors in the growth process. The timing of industrial take-off, together with the nature of the political response, has largely dictated the roles played by national, state, and foreign capital in underdeveloped countries. This balance of power has important implications for equity.

Third World nations are latecomers to the industrial game, and, as a result, national private capital has been unable to capture the dynamic sectors or "commanding heights" of industrial development. Multinational corporations, the industrial giants of the advanced world, have a multifaceted technological edge and privileged access to finance; they have therefore preempted the most profitable areas of final goods production, while the state has become increasingly dominant in basic industry and infrastructural investment. This latter fact is also a function of late dependent development and the economic facts of life in the twentieth century. Economies of scale, "indivisibilities," and long gestation periods make the state rather than the private investor the natural agent for certain types of industrial growth.[26]

Political goals have undoubtedly exacerbated this structural tendency in favor of the multinational corporation and the state. Throughout the modern period, the national projects of most underdeveloped countries have involved the maximization of the rate of growth of GNP. This has necessitated a reliance on the most efficient producers and a progressive strengthening of the multinational corporation and the state. During certain stages the multinationals have grown faster than the state; during other stages slower, depending on the nature of the economic cycle; and most stages have featured the cooptation or assimilation of national private capital. If the political project of these countries had been defined differently—if, for example, the ideology of the state had been dominated by such issues as employment creation and social welfare—the situation might have been different, and private national firms utilizing small-scale, capital-intensive techniques might have been given a more prominent role in the development strategies of these countries.

[25] "A Survey of Brazil," *The Economist*, July 31, 1976, p. 15.

[26] For an authoritative account of the division of labor among foreign, state, and private national capital in underdeveloped nations, see Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

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This brief theoretical framework helps illuminate some of the contraditions of contemporary capitalist development: it has achieved fast rates of economic growth and yet has exacerbated poverty for the mass of the population; it is firmly nationalistic but has linked these countries to foreign capital; it pays lip service to civil liberties and political freedom but has institutionalized regimes that are often autocratic and repressive; and it admires free enterprise and yet has created in practice something akin to state capitalism.

The Circle of Multiple and Cumulative Causation

It should be clear by now that there is no simple or one-dimensional explanation of social and political inequities in the capitalist Third World. We are in an arena of multiple and cumulative causation where the historical evolution of international economic structures, domestic power relationships, the ideologies of regimes, and the balance of power among the various economic actors interact and feed on one another so as to produce the contemporary pattern of inequitable growth.[27]

Conspiracy theories simply do not work; they are too linear, too monocausal, and have no historical perspective. Take for example the multinational corporation. In the radical literature they are often put forward as the evil genius, solely and directly responsible for the ills of underdeveloped nations.[28] It is true that the product mix and employment propensities of multinational firms tend to increase inequality in poor countries, but multinational corporations do not *cause* poverty. We are in a complex world where changing one factor—in this case controlling or even eliminating foreign capital—would be fruitless without change in other spheres, such as domestic industrialization strategies. Multinational corporations entered the Third World, not in a self-conscious effort to shape national development, but in response to the industrialization policies of these regimes. In the years of easy import substitution, successive governments in the underdeveloped world threw up protective barriers (tariffs, import licenses) that gave the greatest degree of protection to goods that had previously been imported, generally, luxury items for an elite group. As the production, managerial, and marketing technologies required to manufacture these sophisticated products were effectively monopolized by the giant international oligopolies, this strategy led to a situation where the dynamic sectors of final goods production in Third World countries came to be dominated by foreign capital and the multinational firm, and with predictable effects on employment patterns and social welfare.[29]

[27] The concept of cumulative and multiple causation was first put forward by Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Nations* (London: Duckworth, 1957).

[28] A good example of this school of thought is Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

[29] See, for example, Frances Stewart, "Trade and Technology," in *Trade Strategies for Development*, ed. Paul P. Streeten. (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 231–63, for a discussion of the undesirable social effects of multinationals in the Third World.

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Although this interaction between domestic industrialization strategies and multinational corporations is complex, more fundamental factors determining the choice and viability of a particular development strategy revolve around previously existing social structures and power relationships. In the first place, the primary-exporter, or colonial, phase of late development created a highly differentiated social structure and an extremely skewed distribution of income. The wealth generated by international trade was either siphoned off by the metropolitan power or appropriated by a domestic planter-exporter elite who used it to buy imported luxury goods. Secondly, when these countries began to industrialize, the new modernizing regimes primarily wanted economic growth, and the easiest and most expedient route to rapid industrial growth was to internalize extant (that is, elite) demand. Hence, these import-substitution strategies encouraged the multinational corporation to produce "rich country goods" within the domestic economies of Third World nations.

I would like to emphasize the complex interrelationships that account for the juxtaposition of rapid growth with deepening poverty and political repression in the modern period. The advent of multinationals, for example, was a response to a demand dynamic emanating from elite groups, and was encouraged by the policies of national governments controlled by the same elite groups. Thus the effect of the multinationals was to reinforce the highly differentiated social structures.

Similarly, successive governments in underdeveloped countries have been part of this chain of cumulative causation. The power elites that initiated the import-substitution processes were the product of highly differentiated class structures inherited from the colonial era. The chosen industrialization strategies reflected the needs of these elites, hence, their reliance on sophisticated consumer goods and the multinational corporation, which both rigidified and exacerbated the previously existing inequalities.

It is important to note that the chain of cumulative causation interacts in multiple ways. A government may affect the multinational corporation directly—through a specific tax incentive meant solely for foreign capital—or, it may encourage multinationals indirectly—via a generalized development policy, such as one which emphasizes sophisticated consumer good. Conversely, the multinational corporation may itself affect government directly—through support for a specific regime (1964 in Brazil, 1966 in Ghana, and 1973 in Chile)—or, it may influence government indirectly through the domestic social structure. An example of the latter affect is the employment propensities of multinational firms which tend to enrich and therefore strengthen the elite classes that are subsequently able to mould the political system to more nearly reflect their narrow class interests.

In summary, the circle of multiple and cumulative causation in contemporary developmental processes results in a situation where several decades of rapid industrial growth bypass the majority of the population. It is as though a vicious circle of wealth were operating between and amongst the top 25 percent of the populace. An elitist power structure inherited from a colonial, primary-

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exporting era promotes an industrialization strategy that both employs and sells to a restricted and privileged group within the population. Succeeding cycles of development rigidify and exacerbate this process as the imperatives of maintaining the growth conditions (namely, inflation control and balance of payments constraints) require that segments of the urban work force as well as the rural mass be excluded from the fruits of economic progress and from the political arena. The interaction between inflationary pressures and political and social equity in Brazil illustrates this point.

Economic Policymaking in Brazil

A recurrent theme in Brazilian economic policymaking in the modern period has been the repeated, but largely unsuccessful, attempts to deal with inflation (in 1953–54, 1955–56, and 1961–64).[30] Until the 1960s these failures did not prevent a resumption of growth, but the inflationary distortions increased; by 1964 it was doubtful if any elected regime could carry out the draconian stabilization program that was needed before the economy could move into a phase of renewed growth.

Many of the critical inflation-producing conditions in Brazil are structural in nature and can be traced to the colonial, primary-exporting era.[31] Shortages and bottlenecks in food production, in infrastructure, in foreign exchange, and in skilled labor are all grounded in the political and economic relations of the colonial age and make many inputs to the industrial process both scarce and expensive.

These structural tendencies toward inflation have been aggravated by the specific aspects of modern industrialization strategies and the policies of modernizing regimes in Brazil. Import-substituting industrialization produced a highly protected domestic market for the production of manufactured goods; thus, local producers with no external competition and little internal competition (the domestic market structure was thoroughly oligopolistic) could earn abnormally high profits. On the political front, the modernizing regimes of the import-substitution period were populist in spirit and relied on the support of the urban working class to maintain their place in office. This added to the inflationary pressures.

In the first place, it meant that government could not radically increase the incidence (or the efficiency in collection) of personal income taxes. This generated a growing dependence on indirect taxes—which pushed prices up—and meant that the soaring expenditures of state-directed modernization grew to exceed governmental revenues.

[30] For a detailed account, see Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).

[31] For an excellent summary of the structural components in inflation, see Rosemary Thorp, "Inflation and the Financing of Economic Development," in *Financing Development in Latin America*, ed. Keith Griffin (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 182–225.

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A further inflationary pressure was a function of the price controls of the populist period. Basic foodstuffs, rents, public transportation, electricity, and telephones were all subject to artificially low price ceilings by populist governments attempting to please their urban constituencies. This discouraged investment in these sectors and aggravated the structural bottlenecks described earlier.

A third and extremely crucial inflationary pressure in the populist period came from wages. The real minimum wage almost doubled between 1940 and the early 1960s. Given the political support base of the populist regime, governments were unable to contain working-class demands for higher wages for any sustained period. In 1958 for example, the Kubitschek government announced an elaborate stabilization program designed to "allow the development of the country to proceed under conditions of economic equilibrium and social stability by means of the pursuit of monetary stabilization."[32] An essential ingredient of this stabilization program was slowing down the rate of expansion of wages, a policy that provoked virulent opposition. "Every class and sector," noted Thomas Skidmore, "wanted the burden to be borne by some other group first."[33] In January 1959, with elections just around the corner, there was a massive upward adjustment of the minimum wage. This spelled the end of the stabilization effort.

The cumulative inflationary distortions of the 1950s and early 1960s contributed significantly to the military coup of 1964 and the advent of authoritarian rule. The new military leaders moved into action with "authentic stabilization" as the most crucial issue on their agenda. They were successful. Between 1964 and 1967 Campos and Bulhões (the planning and finance ministers of the new military government) were able to dampen inflation because they were given great latitude by the new exclusionary and repressive regime to ignore public opinion. Time was the essence of the problem. Previous inclusionary regimes had been able to promote unpopular policies for limited periods; but stabilization needs a two or three years to break the public's well-established inflationary expectations, and elected politicians shrink from this painful economic therapy.

The most ruthless component of the stabilization package was the deliberate policy of letting wage increases lag behind increases in the cost of living.[34] This reduction in real wages, which amounted to 25 percent by 1967, was justified as the lag effect of lowering inflationary expectations and was billed as being temporary. It is difficult, however, to see how such a policy could have been carried out by a government that had to face elections—even under the imperfectly democratic framework of pre-1964 Brazil.

[32] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil*, p. 175.

[33] Ibid., p. 177.

[34] There was a dramatic increase in inequality in Brazil during the 1964–67 period; see John Wells, "Distribution of Earnings, Growth and the Structure of Demand in Brazil during the 1960s," *World Development* 11 (January 1974): 9–25.

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The industrial working class was the chief victim of the stabilization policies, but it would be wrong to assume that it was the only segment of the Brazilian population asked to pay for lower rates of inflation. The Campos-Bulhões stabilization policy also penalized the interests of domestic capital. In an effort to lower prices within the industrial sector, the government reduced the level of effective protection and put an end to the frequent policy of providing publicly subsidized credit from the central banking system in times of liquidity crises. As a result, Brazilian businesses went through a painful shake-out phase during which multinational corporations were able to acquire Brazilian firms that could not find domestic sources of credit.[35] This was surely a type of inflation control that few elected governments could aspire to for long.

Policies designed to eradicate the federal deficit also resulted in political unpopularity. Previous inclusionary regimes had seen a vast expansion of public spending in state enterprises and in government bureaucracy: failure to increase prices for public goods and services and to raise taxes had resulted in large deficits financed by monetary issues. This was highly inflationary, and the new military government moved quickly to settle both accounts. By increasing the price of services—a step that directly increased the cost of living in the short run—the huge deficits in the state-owned utilities, railroads, and oil industry were wiped out. Covering costs meant that long-term, deferred investments could be made in these public enterprises, thus increasing productivity and lowering costs for the future; but it is doubtful if any elected regime could have withstood the storm of protest over costlier bus fares and other public services.

Even more important than "corrective inflation" in eliminating the deficit, however, were the taxation policies of the new regime. In the crisis year of 1964 almost one-third of total government spending was in the red; by 1968–69 there was a budgetary surplus, accumulated mainly through the device of expanding receipts even faster than expenditures and passing the burden on to the taxpaying public. The military regime was, and is, extremely proud of the fact that it has imposed and stringently enforced collection of taxes on income. But as Philippe Schmitter has observed, "the specter of fearful middle- and upper-class citizens paying direct taxes for the first time has been used by the regime to enhance its socially neutral technocratically efficient image both domestically and internationally."[36]

There is no doubt that income tax revenue has risen—by as much as 70 percent in 1968 alone—but indirect taxation has risen roughly twice as fast. The "squeezing" of the rich must be placed in context: the urban working class, the main target of indirect taxation, has been squeezed even harder. Such a

[35] Richard S. Newfarmer and Willard F. Mueller, *Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico: Structural Sources of Economic and Noneconomic Power* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 123, report to the U.S., Senate, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

[36] Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Portugalization of Brazil," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 193.

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dramatic increase in the effectiveness of taxation is extremely difficult in a populist or democratic political arena. At least in the Third World, such a program seems to need the repressive and disciplinary powers of a military government that can afford to alienate politically mobilized segments of the population.

In summary, it seems that an exclusionary and repressive regime was a necessary condition for successful stabilization in Brazil, and that, it its turn, successful stabilization was an essential prerequisite for a new cycle of capitalist growth within this Third World nation.

This example of the social and political repercussions of inflationary pressure in Brazil illustrates the ways in which poverty and repression can be directly functional to the growth process. It is not an isolated example. Argentina, Indonesia, Ghana, and Peru in the 1960s; Chile, India, Pakistan, and Zaire in the 1970s, have all tried, with varying degrees of success, to institute drastic stabilization policies.[37] All of these programs have tended to include the reduction of real wage levels, a tightening of domestic sources of credit, and budget cutting. In many contexts, the unpopularity of these programs has necessitated the elimination of various political freedoms, such as the suspension of elections and the emasculation of trade union structures.

Conclusions

How much social injustice and political repression has been functional to growth strategies in the capitalist Third World? Modern industrial growth built upon the highly inequitable structures of the colonial era seems to have excluded roughly 75 percent of the populace from the fruits of economic progress. Apart from this fundamental dynamic, the stabilization policies of many contemporary regimes have constrained living standards among industrial workers, particularly the unskilled. Thus, in the social welfare sphere, there appears to be a narrow range of policy alternatives, and results, within this category of underdeveloped countries. The great majority of governments have pursued developmental strategies that have permitted very little filtering down of the fruits of economic growth to the bulk of the population. Available evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that in capitalist Third World nations growth has been accompanied by a massive concentration of wealth and a drastic increase in inequality; thus, "millions of desperately poor people throughout the world have been hurt rather than helped by economic development."[38]

On the political front, contemporary growth strategies have relied upon considerable degrees of repression. For example, the more ruthless aspects of stabilization policies have resulted in the indefinite suspension of key political freedoms. Open elections, independent political parties and trade unions,

[37] A comprehensive list of countries that went through severe stabilization programs in order to combat inflation and balance of payments difficulties in the 1960s and 1970s is contained in Robert N. Bee, "Lessons from Debt Reschedulings in the Past," *Euromoney* (April, 1977): 33–37.

[38] Adelman and Morris, *Economic Growth*, p. 192.

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freedom of speech and of the press have all proved incompatible with the severe and extended belt-tightening associated with stabilization programs. However, in contexts where regimes have had goals beyond those of stabilization and renewed economic growth, repression has often reached levels that cannot be explained by the requirements of growth strategies. Indeed, these heights of repression may well be dysfunctional to economic development. For example the combination of racial and personal aggrandizement that colored the vision of Idi Amin was a major cause of the extreme repression of Uganda. I make no attempt to link these types of violent extremes with economic phenomena.

In summary, although social justice and political freedom coincide in the fact that they both impede growth, they are not functionally synonomous. Social justice and political freedom are separate bundles of rights that interact somewhat differently with the growth dynamics of Third World nations and that affect different groups within their populations. Social injustice is a result of the ways in which modern capitalist development has built upon and exaggerated the highly unequal patterns of a colonial past, producing a vicious circle of wealth that enables two decades of vigorous economic growth to bypass 75 percent of all citizens. Recent stabilization policies have worsened the situation, but in a fundamental sense, the social welfare issue reaches into the past, and is first and foremost an issue of the masses. Political freedoms and civil liberties, on the other hand, constitute a set of rights that are most relevant to the elite (that 25 percent of the population that is integrated into the modern urban economy), and these rights have been most conspicuously violated in the recent past. True, colonial regimes were not generous in their allocation of political and civil freedoms, but in the 1940s, fifties and sixties, many underdeveloped countries institutionalized a type of democracy that gave the normal range of political rights and civil liberties to their articulate urban populations. As we now know, the structural crises of the 1960s and 1970s made a new and more ruthless form of political repression a necessary condition for economic survival within the capitalist system.

How durable are these social and political costs of growth in the Third World? Two factors lead one to pessimistic conclusions in the social welfare sphere. In the first place, the origins of contemporary growth patterns are deeply seated in the historical evolution of these countries; economic structures, power relationships, and ideologies all played a part in the creation of highly polarized modern societies. Secondly, the specifics of industrial take-off and the emergence of a vicious circle of wealth have created a situation where rapid economic growth is a self-contained and exclusive process that seems capable of permanently by-passing the bulk of the populace.

In the sphere of political freedoms the outlook is a little less gloomy. Many of the more repressive extremes have been linked to the stabilization programs of the 1960s and 1970s. It is at least conceivable that various Third World nations will enter periods where their growth strategies are less prone to inflationary and balance of payments distortions. The oil crisis and stagflation in the

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developed world have probably delayed the coming of an easier era; but, capitalist growth is a cyclical phenomenon and better days will return, at least for a while. At such a time it might prove possible to relax political controls and allow the population a greater measure of political freedom. It is as though these political rights are luxuries in underdeveloped countries, affordable when economies are booming and when growth strategies are not threatened by the twin evils of inflation and balance of payments constraints. But we must remember that even when favorable economic circumstances permit such luxuries they tend to benefit elite groups. Freedom of the press is, after all, of rather far-fetched significance to most citizens in countries where only a tiny percentage of households read newspapers. For the majority of the population in the Third World, many of whom are struggling to survive, social justice has to be of more immediate concern than issues of political freedom.*

* I would like to thank Richard Fagen, Celso Furtado, Duncan Foley, Richard Falk, and Morris Blachman for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Conflicting Images of the USSR: American Career Diplomats and the Balkans, 1944–1946

HUGH DE SANTIS

Recent studies of the role American Foreign Service officers played in the shaping of post-World War II U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union have portrayed them either as adherents of cooperation with Moscow in accord with the Atlantic Charter ideals or as advocates of a consistently hard-line policy of confrontation.[1] Actually, Foreign Service officers exhibited considerable vacillation in their assessment of Soviet objectives. Influenced by American liberal-democratic values and traditions, which were reinforced in the socialization process of the Foreign Service, the historical memory of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Moscow purge trials of the 1930s, and the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, American diplomats harbored pronounced feelings of mistrust and animosity toward the Kremlin during the early war years. While this image never wholly dissipated, it was supplanted after 1943 by a more auspicious view of the Soviet Union that held sway in the minds of career diplomats, even as Russian armies were advancing into southeastern Europe, until the waning months of 1945, when it was, in turn, displaced by renewed suspicion and hostility.

[1] Compare, for example, Lynn Etheridge Davis, *The Cold War Begins* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974) and Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).

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This article examines the images of the Soviet Union formed by Foreign Service officers assigned to the Balkans—Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania—or to the State Department's corresponding geographic divisions of Southern and Eastern Europe from the end of 1944 to the winter of 1945–46. It contends that career officers, encouraged by the Soviet military effort in World War II, the apparent "democratizing" trend within the USSR during the war, and the Kremlin's ostensible abandonment of its interwar revolutionary objectives, were predisposed to view Soviet behavior in the liberated Balkan countries as confirmation of Moscow's willingness to continue the spirit of allied military cooperation in the American government's envisioned liberal-democratic postwar world. It further argues that the different social milieux in which diplomats in the field and in the department functioned gave rise to conflicting images of the Russians.

For the most part, historians of foreign policy have stressed the importance of cultural and historical forces in assessing another state's actions and intentions to the virtual exclusion of other formative influences such as bureaucratic competition, the social roles of foreign-policy officials, or personality. The effect of one's immediate environment, that is, the set of social-psychological factors that define one's existential reality at different points in time, has been particularly neglected.[2] However, a content analysis of official and private records and a series of personal interviews suggest that the divergent images of the Soviet Union formed by American career diplomats were critically influenced by social-environmental factors. This article undertakes to explain this phenomenon and to show its consequences for postwar U.S.-Soviet relations.

Ideological Cooperation

For the first time, career diplomat Maxwell Hamilton wrote to his wife from Moscow at the end of 1943, the Soviet Union was entering into relations with the United States and Britain "as friends on a basis of individual and mutual self-

[2] For a detailed demographic portrait of the diplomats presented in this paper as well as a more comprehensive analysis of the multiple influences that gave rise to their changing images of the USSR, see Hugh De Santis, "The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union and the Cold War, 1933–1946" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1978). My focus on the diplomats' relationship to their social milieux derives from phenomenological-existential philosophy. In short, individuals exist at given moments in time and space and consciously intend, that is, point toward, objects in the world that have meaning for them and that produce certain cognitive-affective states of being. One's predisposition to respond to what one observes, or one's sense of relatedness to the external world in which one constantly participates, stems from one's store of historical, cultural, social, and idiosyncratic experiences. Together these form the "me," or the individual's sense of self. See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy*, 3 vols., trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1969); and Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Press, 1957).

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interest. That is the revolutionary thing that has occurred." Hamilton was referring to the success of the recently concluded Moscow conference of foreign ministers and the Big Three meetings at Teheran, which, among other things, secured Stalin's consent to the establishment of a postwar international organization. Newly appointed ambassador to Moscow W. Averell Harriman, echoing the sentiments of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, described the talks as "historic"; not only had they implanted the idea of mutual understanding in the peaceful reconstruction of the postwar world, but they had laid the groundwork for the United Nations structure that would ensure its survival.[3]

Foreign Service officers in the State Department shared this euphoria. For the previous two years, they served on the departmental committees created to animate the "grand design" for the postwar world enunciated by President Franklin Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter; and they were imbued with the spirit of optimism that permeated the Washington bureaucracy. This is not to say that career diplomats ceased to harbor suspicions of Soviet motives. Moscow's rupture of diplomatic relations with the exiled Polish government in London, the establishment on Soviet soil of the Union of Polish Patriots and Freies Deutschland, and the renascence of a Pan-Slavic ideology, *inter alia*, combined to revive their interwar memories of Bolshevik revolutionary aims and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. Soviet affairs specialist Charles Bohlen cautioned administration officials to heed the concept of "two hostile worlds" written into the 1923 Soviet constitution. Elbridge Durbrow, another Soviet specialist, fretted that Stalin's break with the London Poles served as a warning to Russia's neighbors that "their continued existence depended on a willingness to accede to Soviet demands." Concerned about Communist infiltration of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia, Balkan expert Cavendish Cannon remained apprehensive that "Russia would not dissociate itself from the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe." And the aristocratic European affairs chief James Clement Dunn, who had applauded Franco's efforts in the thirties to suppress communism, still held to the view that the Soviets had "tremendous ambitions with regard to all of Europe."[4]

Despite these rumblings from the past, however, career diplomats, like other

[3] Hamilton to Mrs. Hamilton, 12 December 1943, Hamilton letters courtesy Mrs. Julia Hamilton, Roseburg, Oregon; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1311; Harriman quoted in Hamilton letter to Mrs. Hamilton, 7 November 1943; Harriman to president and acting secretary, 7 November 1943, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943*, vol. 3, pp. 595–96 (hereafter *FRUS*); W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 218–19.

[4] Charles Bohlen, "The Distinctive Character of the Soviet Government," memo, August-September 1943, Box 2, Charles E. Bohlen Files, Department of State (hereafter Bohlen Files); Hull to Standley (Henderson and Durbrow drafted), 28 June 1943, 760c.61/2047, National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereafter NA, RG59); Cannon quoted in Ilija Jukic, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, trans. Dorian Cooke (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1974), p. 133, and in meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Technical Problems, 24 February 1943, ST minutes 10, Box 79, Harley Notter Files, NA, RG59 (hereafter Notter Files); Dunn remarks in meeting of Subcommittee on Political Problems, 12 February 1943, P minutes 206, Box 57, Notter Files.

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officials in Washington and the American public, could not help but admire the Red Army's magnificent war effort. Moreover, Stalin's reinstatement of the Orthodox Church, the growing veneration of the Russian national past, and the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 seemed welcome harbingers of a new international order in which an apparently "democratizing" Russia would again take her place in the family of nations. These factors blended with the favorable outcome of the Moscow-Teheran parleys to reinforce their expectations that the future world of peace, prosperity, and collective security would indeed materialize. As Bohlen, who had lived through the Soviet purges of the 1930s, remarked to Hull after the Moscow conference, Stalin's commitment to join the international organization had engendered a "mood of trust" between the Russians and the United States. "I was influenced by the Altantic Charter," recalled Durbrow, "and the Boss [Roosevelt] was for it. So I figured give them another chance." In short, diplomats in the department, along with the Roosevelt administration, identified Soviet postwar goals with those of the United States: that is, they believed that a war-chastened Soviet Union would accede to, if not embrace, the postwar international order based on liberal-democratic values and ideals. Thus was formed the image of *ideological cooperation*.[5]

By the end of 1943, diplomats in the field, whose main task was to report on political, economic, and social conditions in allied and enemy countries, adopted the same image. H. Freeman Matthews, chargé in London prior to his return to Washington late that summer, was little disturbed by British fears of Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. As long as Russian sensibilities and interests were taken into account, he told Foreign Office officials, there was no reason to believe that Stalin would not sustain the same spirit of collaboration he had demonstrated on the battlefield after hostilities had ended. Nor did the warnings of Communist expansionism voiced by Balkan refugees alter the sanguine expectations of Burton Berry, consul general in Istanbul, and his colleagues William Fraleigh and Roy Melbourne, who at this point had discerned no indications of expansionist motives. In Berry's view, the admonitions of Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Bulgarian nationals were more likely attributable to historic Balkan divisiveness. Similarly, both Francis Stevens and Llewellyn Thompson, Soviet specialists posted in Moscow, came to accept the position that Russia had embarked on a course of "international cooperation." Stalin's cordial reception of Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran, Thompson stated,

[5] Bohlen to Hull, 31 October 1943, Box 52, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; interview with Elbridge Durbrow, Washington, D.C., 3 May 1976; other careerists attitudes revealed in interviews with Charles Yost, Washington, D.C., 6 May 1976, Robert McBride, Charlottesville, Va., 8 May 1976, and H. Freeman Matthews, Washington, D.C., 20 May 1976. For a discussion of postwar planning in the State Department, see Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, Publication 3850, General Foreign Policy Series 15 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1950).

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symbolized his commitment to the American government's anticipated liberal-democratic postwar world order.[6]

Through the spring and summer of 1944, diplomats in the field and the department adhered to the image of ideological cooperation. To be sure, a number of unsettling developments in Eastern Europe rekindled old fears and resentments. Bohlen and Durbrow contended that Moscow's unilateral designation of the Curzon Line as the eastern boundary of Poland imperilled the newly formed association between the Soviets and their Anglo-American allies. Southern European division chief Cannon and his assistant Cloyce Huston, concerned that Soviet reannexation of Bessarabia and the absorption of the former Austro-Hungarian province of Bukovina threatened the survival of the Atlantic Charter ideals, proposed plebiscites in these territories to preserve Rumania's independence. And the Kremlin's refusal to aid the Polish underground during the Warsaw uprising aroused further suspicions of Soviet intentions. Nevertheless, Foreign Service officers continued to perceive the Anglo-American allies and the Soviets "as one" in their "fidelity to the principle of international collaboration." Thus far, Harold Shantz, counsellor of embassy in Cairo, wired from Cairo in July, there were no faults in the "solid framework" of cooperation forged by the allies; and those fissures that might later appear would be compromised in the international security organization. Berry and Melbourne, who had arrived in Bucharest in the fall following Rumania's surrender to Russian armies, were likewise hopeful that Moscow would adhere to American postwar designs. There were still "good personal contacts between Soviet, British and American officials based on respect for our common effort," Melbourne noted. And Maynard Barnes, the newly designated American representative in neighboring Bulgaria, observed that the Russians had demonstrated restraint in their occupation behavior.[7]

[6] Matthews to secretary, 24 February 1943, in *FRUS* 1943, vol. 2, pp. 975–77, and 23 March 1943, pp. 984–85; Matthews memo (initialled by Dunn and Bohlen), 24 August 1943, 740.0011EW39/1657, NA, RG59; Berry to secretary, 3 March 1943, 860h.00/1455, 20 August 1943, 874.00/764, 17 September 1943, 874.00/769, 24 October 1943, 871.01/213, 19 November 1943 (Fraleigh drafted), 860h.00/1566, and 28 December 1943 (Melbourne drafted), 871.00/1005, NA, RG59; Fraleigh to Berry, 22 November 1943, Box 10, Burton Berry Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. (hereafter Berry Papers); Thompson to secretary (F. Barghoorn drafted), 27 January 1943, 861.00/11991; Standley to secretary (Stevens drafted), 17 March 1943, 740.0011EW39/29152; Hamilton to secretary (Thompson drafted), 8 February 1944, 861.00/12055, NA, RG59.

[7] Bohlen to Dunn, 2 February 1944, Box 1, Bohlen Files; Hull to Harriman (Bohlen drafted; Dunn and Matthews initialled), 9 February 1944, 711.61/977A, NA, RG59; Durbrow memos, 11 January 1944, 760c.6115/29½, and 3 February 1944, 761.00/2–344, NA, RG59; Cannon to Dunn, 27 March 1944, CCS 387, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NA, RG218; Huston memo, 11 April 1944, 740.0011EW(Peace)/3–2744, NA, RG59; memo from Southern European division to Undersecretary Stettinius, March 1944, in *FRUS 1944*, vol. 4, pp. 146–47; Bohlen to Dunn, 30 March, 1944, 740.0011EW39/33802, NA, RG59; Matthews unsigned memo, Spring 1944, Box 17, H. Freeman Matthews Files, NA, RG59 (hereafter Matthews Files); see the policy statements on the Eastern Euro-

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Influenced by Bohlen, Thompson, Stevens, and others who had served in Moscow, even Soviet expert George Kennan, at least until the Warsaw massacre, had contemplated the likelihood of U.S.-Soviet postwar cooperation. Unlike his colleagues, however, who perceived cooperation in terms of ideological identification, he foresaw little change in Soviet domestic affairs. Outspokenly critical of Washington's Wilsonian predilections, hence ignored by department policymakers, his view that "differences in social systems might not, after all, be the final determinants of relations between sovereign states" defined cooperation in the *Realpolitik* terms of peaceful coexistence.[8]

Ideological Confrontation

As fall drifted into winter, the earlier optimistic tenor of reports from the field began to fade noticeably. Diplomats in Rumania and Bulgaria watched the Soviets take charge of the armistice controls with a triumphant arrogance that befitted the herculean struggle they had waged. Berry, head of the American team in Bucharest, was shocked by the Red Army's arbitrary expropriation of Rumanian petroleum equipment and the refusal of Soviet representatives on the allied control commission to do anything about it. Equally disturbing was Soviet denunciation of the prewar political elite, with whom Berry identified, as did his fellow careerists, on the basis of shared class backgrounds. The respective heads of the British political and military missions in the country, John H. Lerougetel and Donald F. Stevenson, and Rumanian officials, notably Iulu Maniu, the passionate leader of the National Peasant party, informed him that Moscow intended "to bring about a dissolution of the Rumanian state." Especially affected by Maniu's intimations that the United States and Britain "were abandoning" Rumania, Berry advised Washington to come to the aid of this "champion of pro-Allied action and sentiment."[9]

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pean states, April-June 1944, PWC-139, 143, 151, 202, 204, 214, and 216, Boxes 142-43, Notter Files; Shantz speech on U.S. policy in Balkans to American embassy in Cairo, 20 July 1944, 870.01AMG/8-144, NA, RG59; Roy Melbourne, "Witness to the Start of the Cold War: The View from Rumania" (Paper presented at the conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Altanta, Ga., October 1975); Barnes to secretary, 1 December 1944, 871.01/12-144, NA, RG59.

[8] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 224. According to Kennan's image of *realistic cooperation* (which also underlies the Kissingerian approach to detente), Moscow was indifferent to liberal-democratic values and desired a world order based solely on national interests derived from the circumstances of relative military and political power. Kennan endorsed the division of the world into spheres of influence. Daniel Yergin, in *Shattered Peace*, incorrectly observes that diplomats in the department opposed Roosevelt's "grand design" (p. 68). Quite the contrary, they were invested in its realization. However, they perceived it more in terms of ideological cooperation rather than realistic accommodation.

[9] Berry to secretary, 871.01/11-1744, 11-3044, and 12-944, respectively, dated 17 and 30 November and 9 December 1944, NA, RG59. As a group, career diplomats came from upper-middle-class or upper-class backgrounds and tended to associate with those of their professional and

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Conditions in Bulgaria, where the Communist-led Fatherland Front had seized the reins of government, were "in a hell of a state," Barnes reported. Conversations "with numerous prominent Bulgarians," people of his social ilk, who attributed to Moscow's instigation the purge of the Bulgarian army and the establishment of "people courts" to try fascist sympathizers, strengthened Barnes's opinion that the Communists "are on the make and have every intention of gaining full control of the country." Rebuffed by Russian representatives on the armistice commission, Barnes, an intense man easily aroused to anger, wired the department "that it is 'shameful' for the Anglo-Saxon powers to have signed an armistice and exercise no power in the execution of that armistice." The American government had a responsibility to the Bulgarians, who, he noted, "recognized that America and Britain represented one set of political, economic and social ideas and Soviet Russia another set." While Barnes and Berry felt it premature to conclude that the Soviets had abandoned the idea of postwar cooperation, they had already begun to reconstruct their interwar image of *ideological confrontation*, which defined the Soviets as an aggressive, ideologically expansionist threat to liberal-democratic values.[10]

Diplomats in the department did not ignore the reports from Rumania and Bulgaria. Durbrow, Cannon, and Bohlen were clearly disturbed by Moscow's imperious behavior and the severe reparations claims it assessed upon the former German satellite states. But, with plans underway for the Big Three talks in the Crimea, they could not permit these aberrant perceptions to intrude upon their image of ideological cooperation. In a December 11 memo Bohlen pointed out that U.S.-Soviet difficulties since 1933 had resulted from the ideological differences between a democracy and a Communist dictatorship bent on national and revolutionary expansionism. After 1941, however, relations between the two powers had entered a new phase of military collaboration which, in light of the relaxation of domestic conditions within Russia and the cordiality manifested by Stalin at the Moscow-Teheran meetings, had carried over to the political sphere. Real advances had been made to integrate the USSR into the family of nations, he averred; American policy accordingly "remains unchanged in its objective of working out the fullest cooperation with the Soviet Union . . . without making any concessions which would compromise our basic principles."[11]

While diplomats contended that continued amicable relations between the

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class standing. For a more detailed description, see De Santis, "The Diplomacy of Silence," pp. 10–14 and 177–185.

[10] Barnes to secretary, 1 December 1944, 871.01/12–144, and 27 December 1944, 740.00119 Control(Bulgaria)/12–2744, NA, RG59; Barnes to secretary, 7 December 1944, in *FRUS 1944*, vol. 3, pp. 498–99; Berry to secretary, 12 December 1944, 871.01/12–1244, NA, RG59.

[11] Memo of conversation by Chief of Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs Luthringer with Matthews, Cannon, Durbrow, *et al.*, 21 October 1944, in *FRUS*, vol. 3, pp. 917–18; Durbrow to Stettinius (Bohlen chit attached), 20 November 1944, 711.60n/11–2044, NA, RG59; Bohlen memo, 11 December 1944, Box 1, Bohlen Files.

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two powers were necessary to assure a skeptical American public that the Atlantic Charter ideals remained intact, they mainly sought to assure themselves that the postwar world of peace and harmony for which they had prepared so long would eventuate. Actually, the results of opinion polls were inconclusive; there was no clear indication that public sentiment, Polish-Americans and isolationists excepted, toward Russia or the United Nations had waned. As Matthews and Balkan specialist Walworth Barbour were later to state, public opinion did not have a significant influence on the State Department's thinking at this time. The real influence came from high government officials, the president, secretary of state, and respected colleagues in the department, who were dedicated to the policy of postwar cooperation. Thus Foreign Service officers focused on those poll results that resonated their anxieties about the embryonic Atlantic Charter world, and screened out those public views that deviated from their own.[12]

Seemingly, the Yalta agreements, and particularly the "declaration on liberated Europe," an obscurely worded document that meant free elections and political self-determination to Americans and "friendly governments" in Eastern Europe to the Soviets, gave assurance to diplomats in Washington that American postwar objectives would indeed be attained. Durbrow felt the declaration "was a damn good document." Thompson, Bohlen, and Barbour concluded that Stalin sincerely wished to compromise differences. "There was hope, as we left Yalta," Bohlen recorded in his memoirs, "of genuine cooperation with the Soviet Union on political questions after the war." Believing that the Kremlin had embarked on a democratizing course domestically and ostensibly had abandoned its erstwhile revolutionary objectives, diplomats in the department now awaited Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as further evidence of Moscow's good faith adherence to America's liberal-democratic postwar order.[13]

[12] Although the 18 January 1944 American Institute of Public Opinion poll reported that only 40 percent of the American people felt Russia would cooperate with the United States after the war, versus 51 percent in December 1943, by April those who anticipated continued cooperation had risen to 50 percent. During the Warsaw massacre, a National Opinion Research Center survey pointed out that only 20 percent of the public feared Soviet expansionism; 45 percent attributed Soviet behavior in Poland to security needs. By January 1945 roughly 70 percent of those sampled expected U.S.-Soviet relations to be closer after the war than before. See Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 370, 375, 1169; and the President's Secretary's File, Box 138, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. (hereafter Truman Papers). This diverges from the positions taken by John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 151, who used selective data to substantiate the department's view, and Lynn Etheridge Davis, *The Cold War Begins*, pp. 126-33, who insufficiently stressed the department's selective screening of poll data. As Gabriel Almond stated in *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), the American public generally saw Russia as cooperative during and immediately after the war (pp. 92-99). See also Milton Rosenberg, "Attitude Change and Foreign Policy in the Cold-War Era," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[13] Interviews with Durbrow, Washington, D.C., 29 January 1976, Walworth Barbour,

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Implementation of the Yalta declaration proved another matter. Convinced that Roosevelt had recognized Eastern Europe as the Soviet sphere of influence, which in fact he had, Stalin set out to assert that influence. Methodically, the Soviets censored the Rumanian press, continued their pell-mell expropriation of Rumanian petroleum properties, and demanded the ouster of the fledgling government of General Nicolae Radescu. It became increasingly apparent to Berry and Roy Melbourne that Moscow aimed to dispossess politically the leadership of the Peasant and Liberal parties in favor of a "puppet government" unless the United States were to "translate its principles into action." Similar remonstrations issued from Bulgaria, where an outraged Barnes looked on helplessly as the "people's courts" meted out sentences of imprisonment and death, and as the Soviets stifled political opposition and literally isolated the American mission by indiscriminately dictating the arrival and departure of the weekly mail plane.[14]

To make matters worse, non-Communist political leaders inflicted American diplomats with feelings of guilt for having abandoned them. Distressed by Maniu's doleful remark that Rumania was virtually "lost to the Russians," Berry rebuked the State Department for not demanding a truly tripartite control commission, which, he noted, might have encouraged Rumanian democrats to resist the communization movement. Nearly every day since Yalta, Barnes wrote at the end of February, "some prominent Bulgarian, frequently a member of the Government or a leading military figure," had asked whether "the United States really [intended] to make its influence felt in this part of the world or whether it wished to [surrender] to Russia 'the key to the Balkans.' "[15]

Diplomats in the department, however, tended to minimize these disquieting telegrams. Despite recent disturbances, Cannon pointed out, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov had unequivocally stated the previous April that the Soviets would not interfere in Rumanian domestic affairs, and there was no reason to expect a departure from that position. Huston advised Berry to remind the Soviets of Washington's unflagging desire for the formation of a representative government in accord with the Yalta declaration. Even after Moscow's deposal of the Radescu government on March 6, which Berry, prodded by Maniu, accused the State Department of indirectly abetting by its silence, Huston, Cannon, and Bohlen recommended continued consultations with Soviet officials to understand better the Kremlin's intentions and to reiterate Allied obligations to the liberated European states. This posture of patience and accommodation was

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Gloucester, Mass., 2 June 1976, and Foy Kohler, Coral Gables, Fla., 13 September 1976; Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 200.

[14] Berry to secretary, 7 February 1945, 871.00/2-745, and 27 February 1945, 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2745, NA, RG59; Barnes to secretary, 2 February 1945, in *FRUS 1945*, vol. 4, pp. 155–56.

[15] Berry to secretary (Melbourne drafted), 16 March 1945, 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1645, 17 March 1945, 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-1745, and 18 March 1945, 871.00/3-1845; Barnes to secretary, 27 February 1945, 740.0011EW/2-2745, NA, RG59.

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also reflected in their replies to Barnes's strident cables. On March 29 Cannon, Huston, and Theodore Hohenthal directed the Moscow embassy to inform the Soviet government of its responsibility to ensure free elections in Bulgaria, in which, they pointed out, the American public had an "intense interest."[16]

Alas, the department's conciliatory line had no impact on Soviet actions in Bulgaria and Rumania. "We must admit to ourselves," Berry wired in April, "that the encouragement that comes from words expressed in Bucharest at a time when action is desired in Moscow forms but a fragile bulwark for resisting the pressure of powerful groups." The expressed intention of the Socialist party to sever ties with the Soviet-sponsored National Democratic Front government of Petru Groza, the divisions between the "Comintern" and "nationalist" factions of the Communist party, and the growing restiveness of the Rumanian peasantry over the continued presence of the Red Army did offer some hope that internal conditions might improve. Considering that Finland had held free elections the previous month, a *modus vivendi* with the Russians, thought Berry and Melbourne, was not impossible. But exposed daily to Moscow's unremitting exploitation of the country, by early summer they had almost completely abandoned their hopes for a democratic Rumania.[17] Dismayed by Soviet efforts to eliminate the leaders of the Agrarian and Social Democratic parties from the Fatherland Front, Barnes cabled, "we should not delude ourselves into believing that three-cornered collaboration here is going to pay dividends." When he exhorted Washington to intervene on behalf of Georgi Dimitrov, the secretary general of the Agrarian party who had escaped house arrest and received asylum in Barnes's home, diplomats in the department cautioned against any action save the request for Dimitrov's safe passage from the country. Infuriated by this seemingly indifferent attitude, Barnes condemned the "diplomacy of silence," which he considered a "sign of impotence" to the Bulgarian people. In a final effort to save the day for political and economic democracy in the Balkans, he strenuously urged the department to correct Soviet excesses in Bulgaria at the Potsdam Conference.[18]

[16] Grew to Bucharest (Cannon drafted), 23 February 1945, 871.00/2-2345, Grew to Berry (Cannon drafted; Thompson, Dunn, and John Hickerson cleared in draft, Huston and Dunn initialled), 24 February 1945, 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2445; Grew to Berry (Cannon, Huston, and John C. Campbell drafted; Bohlen, Dunn, and Matthews initialled), 27 February 1945, 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-2745; Acheson to Sofia (Cannon drafted), 6 March 1945, 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/3-645; Stettinius to Moscow (Huston drafted; Cannon, Dunn, Thompson, and Matthews initialled), 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3-845; Grew to Moscow (Cannon, Hohenthal, and Huston drafted; Thompson, Dunn, and Matthews initialled), 29 March 1945, 874.00/3-2945, NA, RG59.

[17] Berry to secretary, 871.00/4-1245, 871.00/4-2245, 871.00/5-1345, and 871.01/5-1345, respectively dated, 12 and 22 April and 13 May 1945; Melbourne to secretary, 19 June 1945, 761.67/6-1945, NA, RG59, and 13 July 1945, 800Rumania, Bucharest Post Files, Washington National Record Center, Suitland, Md., Record Group 84 (hereafter WNRC, RG84).

[18] Barnes to secretary, 5 April 1945, 874.00/4-545; Grew to Truman (Cannon drafted; Matthews cleared in draft, Reber initialled), 1 May 1945, 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/5-145, NA, RG59; Barnes to secretary, 24 May 1945, in *FRUS 1945*, vol. 4, pp. 221-22, and 25 May 1945, p. 223; Grew to

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The same protestations emanated from Yugoslavia following the arrival in late March of the American diplomatic delegation. Witnesses to acts of intimidation and terror against rival political forces by the partisans and secret police, and persistent attacks against private business, Shantz and Fraleigh concluded that Tito, despite entering into a coalition with Ivan Subasic, former prime minister of the Yugoslav exiled government, was a Soviet puppet "heading straight towards Russia and a totalitarian economy." Shantz informed Washington in June that "the obvious object of the Communist Party," which controlled the Yugoslav legislature, "was to enact laws which will enable it to consolidate its control, and at the same time make it appear to the western world that it had this through 'free elections.' " Beset with appeals for assistance from the prewar Yugoslav elite—Subasic, Milan Grol, and Lazar Markovic—Shantz was convinced that "there is no hope of free democracy here." Potsdam, therefore, also represented to him "a last opportunity to manifest our support for the principles for which Grol and a few others in government are still fighting" and to arrest the oppressive conditions "in which we would seem to have a responsibility to the people."[19]

Although career officers in the department did urge President Harry Truman to demand the withdrawal of partisan forces from the Italian province of Venezia-Giulia, in general they were inclined to play down the anxious reports from Belgrade, some of which were withheld from the secretary's attention. As Hohenthal had stated earlier in the year, it was inconsistent with American principles to interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. And with the Potsdam Conference about to convene, Cannon, Thompson, and their fellow officers remained hopeful that the Yugoslav government, which appeared "thoroughly totalitarian," would eventually support "the principles for which the United Nations have solemnly adopted for their guidance in the war and in the establishment of the peace."[20]

The head of the American mission in Albania, Joseph Jacobs, a Chinese specialist with no prior experience in Europe, arrived in April and found Soviet and Yugoslav cultural and propaganda networks already well-established. However, Albanian Communists had neither embarked on a program of terror and intimidation nor received significant opposition from the Albanian people. While "ignorant of the science of government," Albanian leaders, in his judg-

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Sofia (Cannon drated; Matthews and Reber initialled), 874.00/5-2545; Barnes to secretary, 9 July 1945, 761.67/7-945, NA, RG59.

[19] Patterson to secretary (Fraleigh drafted), 9 May 1945, 860h.00/5-945, and 4 June 1945 (Shantz drafted), 860h.00/6-445; Shantz to secretary, 18 June 1945, 860h.00/6-1845, NA, RG59, and 23 June 1945 (Fraleigh drafted), 710-631/Yugoslavia-U.S., Belgrade Post Files, WNRC, RG84, 26 June 1945 (Fraleigh drafted), 860h.00/6-2645, NA, RG59, 14 July 1945, 860h.01/7-1445, NA, RG59, and 29 July 1945, 860h.01/7-2945, NA, RG59.

[20] Hohenthal memo, 2 January 1945, 860h.00/1-245; Cannon to Jones, Reber, and Matthews, 6 May 1945, 740.00119 Control (Italy)/5-645, NA, RG59; Grew to Truman (Cannon drafted), May 26, 1945, Official File, Folder 364, Truman Papers; Thompson memo of conversation with Dunn and Subasic, 26 May 1945, 500CC/5-2645, NA, RG59; Barbour interview, 2 June 1976.

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ment, were "patriotic well intentioned individuals striving to bestow their abilities in their lights to give the Albanian people a better Governement." In contrast to the experiences of his Balkan colleagues, the major problem in Albania was the presence of the British military mission, which was conspiring to overthrow the government of Enver Hoxha. Deviating from their proposed policy of ideological counteroffensive, Jacobs advocated American recognition of the Hoxha regime pending free elections and the accordance of traditional rights and immunities to foreign diplomats.[21]

Estranged Allies

As it turned out, the Potsdam Conference concluded in neither recognition of Albania nor Allied reaffirmation of the "declaration on liberated Europe." References to free elections and political self-determination, which diplomats in the field had entreated Washington to impress on the Soviets, were nowhere to be found in the final communiqué. Conditions for recognition of the former enemy states were left for each government to determine independently, a clear departure from the notion of joint Allied responsibility and an implicit acknowledgment of the power realities that divided Eastern and Western Europe.

In marked contrast to Yalta, diplomats in the department were disappointed with the results of the conference. A major source of their dissatisfaction was Stalin's unwillingness to perceive Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe as a violation of the Yalta declaration. As a consequence, Durbrow, for one, felt that Truman might have conceded too much in accepting the Soviet-proposed Oder-Western Neisse boundary for western Poland. Dunn, now assistant secretary of state, contested Durbrow's attitude lest it might lead to the department's abandonment of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Dunn's reaction was instructive. Having participated in planning the postwar world, and having sustained the image of ideological cooperation for the past two years, career officers expected some pay-off for their personal and professional investment in the future world of peace, prosperity, and harmony. It was clear, however, that their hopes, jarred by the repressive conditions in the Balkans, had begun to wane.[22]

[21] Jacobs to Matthews, Dunn, and Cannon, 3 April 1945, 800Albania, WNRC, RG84; Jacobs to secretary, 16 May 1945, in *FRUS* 1945, vol. 4, p. 26; 20 May 1945, 875.916/5-2045, and 1 July 1945, 875.01/7-145, NA, RG59.

[22] Bohlen, *Witness*, pp. 230, 238-39; see Matthews Oral History, p. 8, Joseph Satterthwaite Oral History, p. 45, and James Riddleberger Oral History, p. 23, all in Truman Library; Durbrow interview, 3 May 1976. For the results of the Potsdam Conference, see U.S., Department of State, *The Conference of Berlin: The Potsdam Conference, 1945*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 1499-1514. Dunn's support for U.S.-Soviet postwar cooperation was also evidenced at the London foreign ministers conference in September. Although liberals within and without the department such as Archibald MacLeish, Henry Wallace, and Eleanor Roosevelt, who remembered the diplomat's Francoist sympathies, opposed his appointment as permanent American representative on the Council of Foreign Ministers, it was largely because of Dunn that

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Thus diplomats in the department, mirroring the views of Truman, Byrnes, and other foreign-policy officials, continued to advocate a policy of patience and accommodation in the Balkans in the hope that Moscow would reaffirm its adherence to the American-designed postwar order. Accordingly, Berry and Melbourne were reminded that the American government desired "to keep the road open to a solution of [the] Rumanian political crisis which will be acceptable to all three Allied Governments." Disturbed that Barnes, in consort with his British counterpart, William E. Houstoun-Boswall, had on his own initiative directed the Anglo-American members of the armistice commission to demand the postponement of the Bulgarian elections, Barbour reiterated this message and cautioned the embattled diplomat to consult with Washington before making further representations. Notwithstanding Shantz's statements to the contrary, Huston, newly designated chief of Southern Europe, Cannon, and Barbour believed "that a sufficient field for maneuver still exists for the Yugoslavs to work out their transition to democratic government without United States or British intervention." As for Albania, Huston acceded to Jacobs's recommendation for recognition, provided the Hoxha government reinstated its prewar treaty obligations abrogated by the Anti-Fascist Congress in May 1944.[23]

Dejected by the outcome of the Potsdam talks, diplomats in the Balkans pressed the department to confront the Soviet challenge to liberal-democratic principles. With the media, courts, police, and army controlled by the Communists, and the democratic parties fighting for their lives, Melbourne wired from Bucharest, the Soviet goal of Communist dictatorship "was never more apparent than now." "I fear the continuation of our present tactics," Berry wrote, "will assist in bringing about the defeat of the policies to which the American Government has publicly adhered." The United States government had to assert itself with the Soviets, Barnes implored, or "the term 'liberated countries' can in the end evoke only derision in eastern and southeastern Europe." Milton Rewinkel, his young associate in Sofia, repeated the refrain that Moscow's patent objective was the "complete control and communization of Bulgaria within the Soviet orbit." Contemptuous of the new electoral law that denied suffrage to half the Yugoslav electorate, Shantz echoed Barnes's admonition to postpone the forthcoming election and even recommended severing diplomatic relations. In his view, the United States "had an obligation to make

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the United States agreed to recognize the Hungarian government. See Leslie Squires to H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld in Hungary, 11 October 1945, in *FRUS 1945*, vol. 4, pp. 886–87.

[23] Byrnes to Bucharest (Campbell drafted; Dunn signed, Matthews initialled), 25 August 1945, 871.00/8-2545; Byrnes to Sofia (Barbour drafted; Reber, Matthews, Bohlen, Dunn, and Durbrow initialled), 11 August 1945, 874.00/8-1145; Byrnes to Sofia (Barbour drafted; Matthews and Dunn initialled), 24 August 1945, 874.00/8-2345, NA, RG59; Barbour, "The Situation in Yugoslavia," memo, Fall 1945, Box 17, Matthews Files; Huston to Reber and Matthews (Barbour drafted), 8 October 1945, 860h.01/9-2745; Jacobs memo of conversation with Cannon and Mssrs. Hayter and Laskey of Albanian and Greek desks, 4 October 1945, 875.01/10-1645; Byrnes to Paris (McKisson drafted; cleared with Huston, Matthews, and J. Bonbright), 13 October 1945, 875.01/10-1345, NA, RG59.

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our position clear to [the] world and to attempt to redress [the] harm we have done by our part in establishing Tito in power." Only in Albania, where political control rested with local authorities, was there still a shred of hope for the survival of the Atlantic Charter principles and the Yalta declaration. However, the absence of normal relations between Washington and Tirana, Jacobs warned, "tended to encourage a pro-Soviet orientation on the part of the latter."[24]

Further aggravating their depressed state of mind, diplomats in the field felt alienated from their own government. Their recommendations for a more vigorous policy in the Balkans not only went unheeded; often they were completely ignored. Despite Shantz's pleas, Yugoslavia was given only perfunctory attention at Potsdam by Truman and James Byrnes, the new secretary of state. Furthermore, the department frequently neglected to respond promptly to the telegrams of diplomats in the field, which heightened their sense of isolation. "Not a day goes by that I do not envy my British colleague because of the prompt responses he receives from his Government," Barnes complained in the wake of Potsdam, "while in my own case weeks go by with little or nothing to rely on except local possibilities for temporization."[25]

Demoralized by the department's apparent disregard for the brutalizing conditions they experienced, besieged with appeals for deliverance from the non-Communist elite, and commiserated only by their British colleagues, who, while less invested in the diplomacy of principle, shared their misery and, as 1946 dawned, their fear of Communist expansionism beyond Eastern Europe, diplomats in the field languished in an implacable sea of hopelessness. The November election parodies in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and the breakdown of the Moscow foreign ministers conference in December bolstered their image of ideological confrontation. Shantz, like his colleagues, importuned the department to educate the American public concerning the Communist menace and to offer its assistance to other democratic governments that might fall prey to Soviet influence. By January 1946, following the arrival of Soviet military and technical personnel, conditions in Albania also began to assume the same ominous character as in the other Balkan states. Confronted with the liquida-

[24] Berry to secretary (Melbourne drafted), 31 August 1945, 800Rumania, Moscow Post Files, WNRC, RG84, and 4 September 1945, 871.00/9-445, NA, RG59; Barnes to secretary, 3 September 1945, 874.00/9-345; Rewinkel to secretary, 19 September 1945, 874.00/9-1945; Shantz to secretary, 27 September 1945, 860h.00/9-2745; Jacobs memo of conversation with R.E. McKisson of the Southern European division and columnist Edgar Ansel Mowrer of the *New York Post*, 10 September 1945, 875.00/9-1045, NA, RG59.

[25] Barnes to secretary, 31 July 1945, 874.00/7-3145, NA, RG59. Sheer physical distance from foreign-policy circles in Washington exacerbated the diplomats' feelings of alienation and arguably contributed to their demands for a more assertive policy. For a cogent exposition of this central-periphery theme in a different historical setting, see Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (New York: Macmillan, 1967). Gary Wills has applied this argument in connection with the recently passed Panama Canal treaty and its effect on the attitudes of American nationals residing in the Canal Zone. See Wills, "Panama: A New Peril," *New York Review of Books*, 1 June 1978, pp. 10-11.

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tion of political opposition, anti-U.S. propaganda, and restrictions on the movement of the American diplomatic delegation, Jacobs averred that Albanian strings were now being pulled by a small group of Communists "working hand in glove with Moscow."[26]

Sheltered from these storms of despair, diplomats in the department tried to breathe life into the blueprint for the postwar world they helped to create. The United States was "committed to the fulfillment of the principles and responsibilities contained in the Atlantic Charter and the Crimea Declaration," Huston pointed out in October. "These policies and principles are right and good, and they are endorsed by the American people; they accordingly should not, and need not, be changed." At the same time, they could no longer ignore the harsh reality, as Bohlen put it, that Moscow's actions in the Balkans "have directed towards the establishment of complete Soviet domination and control over all phases of the external and internal life" of those countries. Their image of ideological confrontation intensified after the Moscow foreign ministers conference. Appalled by Stalin's refusal to permit the development of democratic conditions in Bulgaria and Rumania, Durbrow, Barbour, and their fellow officers felt Russia's "real intentions"—the creation of a global Communist fiefdom—were now unmistakably clear.[27]

Apprehensions about Soviet objectives caused diplomats in the department to pay closer attention to the incoming cable traffic from the Balkans and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. These reports, combined with the breakdown of the Moscow conference, Stalin's reluctance to set a fixed date for the removal of Russian troops in Iran, and mounting criticism of Washington's foreign policy by Republicans in Congress, prompted Freeman Matthews, director of the office of European affairs, and the respective new heads of the Eastern European division, Durbrow and Stevens, to call for a different method of dealing with the Kremlin. But the policy alternatives they faced—acceptance of the division of Europe into spheres of influence; nationalistic expansionism on the part of the United States, including the acquisition of strategic bases; or military confrontation—violated America's liberal-internationalist concept of world affairs, lacked domestic support, and portended possible war with Russia. The diplomats' very awareness of alternative possibilities for dealing with the Soviets intensified their anxiety, for it disrupted the psychological security they derived from their attachment to the prevailing policy of world cooperation. Partly to alleviate their anxiety, they rejected the alternatives. Thus, in spite of

[26] Berry to secretary, 28 November 1945, 871.00/11-2845, NA, RG59; Berry to mother, 4 February 1946, Box 13, Berry Papers; Barnes to secretary, 14 November 1945, 874.00/11-1445, and 30 January 1946, 874.00/1-3046, NA, RG59; Shantz to secretary, 16 March 1946, 860h.00/3-1646, NA, RG59, and 27 May 1946, Box 80, NA, RG43; Jacobs to secretary, 8 February 1946, 701USMission-Albania/710, Tirana Post Files, WNRC, RG84.

[27] Huston to Hickerson, Durbrow, and Bohlen, 24 October 1945, 711.61/10-2445, NA, RG59; Bohlen memo, 18 October 1945, Box 1, Bohlen Files; H. Freeman Matthews, "Memoirs of a Passing Era," p. 298. I am grateful to Ambassador Matthews for permitting me to read his private memoir. Interviews with Durbrow, 29 January 1976, and Barbour, 2 June 1976.

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their changing image of the Soviets, the old policy of cooperation along Atlantic Charter lines, the evident ineffectiveness of which necessitated the policy reevaluation in the first place, seemed to offer, in Bohlen's view, the only hope of resolving differences "on a clear moral issue and not as a result of conflict of national interests." Actually, cooperation—really coexistence—with Moscow would likely have been achieved had the United States explicitly acknowledged the postwar division of Europe on a basis of power politics. Acceptance of this reality, however, would have violated the Atlantic Charter principles, which eschewed *Realpolitik*.[28]

Unable to abandon their moribund expectations for the postwar world, in which they were constrained by bureaucratic inertia within the State Department, diplomats were suspended in a policy vacuum. Relief came on February 9, 1946, in the form of Stalin's speech in preparation for elections to the Supreme Soviet. To Bohlen, Durbrow, Matthews, and others in the department, Stalin's rhetoric, which stressed the incompatibility of the Communist and capitalist worlds, resurrected the interwar memory "of all the harsh and antagonistic elements of Bolshevism" and constituted "the most important and authoritative guide" to postwar Soviet policy. Resolution followed two weeks later with the receipt of the "long telegram" from George Kennan, chargé in Moscow, which, notwithstanding Kennan's *Realpolitik* proclivities, reinforced the department's image of ideological confrontation and provided the intellectual foundation for the eventual policy of containment. Like their colleagues in the Balkans, diplomats in the department had too come to the position that the United States and the Soviet Union, once perceived as partners-to-be in the postwar world of peace and security, were locked in a global struggle of irreconcilable ideologies pitted against each other in what would become perpetual cold war.[29]

Conclusion

Undeniably the images of the Soviet Union formed by Foreign Service officers were influenced by American ideals and traditions, their socialization as members of the Foreign Service into a liberal-internationalist worldview, and

[28] Bohlen to Matthews, 14 February 1946, 711.61/2-1446, NA, RG59; Stevens to Matthews and Durbrow, 18 February 1946, Box 51, NA, RG353, Lot 122; Rollo May, "Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy," in *Existence*, eds. Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri Ellenberger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 52. In his "Paths not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternatives to Containment, 1945-1946," *Diplomatic History* 1 (Fall 1977): 297-319, Robert Messer contends that Bohlen's and Huston's policy views represented a potentially viable alternative to containment. The fact of the matter is that this universalistic policy of cooperation had broken down. Cooperation was indeed still possible, but not on the global basis American policymakers wished.

[29] See, for example, Research and Analysis Report 3443.1, "The Capabilities and Intentions of the Soviet Union as Affected by American Policy," 19 November 1945, and the unsigned policy statement approved by Truman, "Foreign Policy of the United States," 1 December 1945, 711.00/12-145, NA, RG59; Kennan to secretary, 22 February 1946. 861.00/2-2246, NA, RG59.

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the historical memory of the Bolshevik Revolution. But diplomats did not all see the Soviets in the same way at the same time. Differences in perception, evident from the late fall of 1944 to the winter of 1945–46, resulted from variations in the social reality they experienced: their exposure to Soviet or Soviet-influenced actions, their respective roles as foreign-policy formulators or implementers, the impact of political elites on their perceptions and expectations, and the confirmation of their judgment by British diplomats in the Balkans and their perceptions of American public opinion.

Directly confronted with the psychologically brutalizing effects of Soviet behavior, diplomats in the Balkans, save Jacobs until 1946, experienced conditions consistently dissonant with their predisposed image of ideological cooperation and their expectations of postwar peace and harmony. Unwilling to relinquish precipitately their hopes for the future, they sought corroborating information—Berry's and Melbourne's recognition that Moscow had permitted free elections in Finland as an example—to stave off the image of confrontation. Failure of the Postdam Conference to moderate Soviet behavior confirmed their inability to implement American postwar policy. As their image of confrontation rigidified, all Soviet behavior was overrationalized to fit their revised view; and the reality of later events that might have disconfirmed it—free elections in Soviet-occupied Hungary in the fall of 1945 and in Czechoslovakia the following spring—was denied.[30]

Career diplomats in the Balkans were also burdened with guilt by the appeals for deliverance from the non-Communist political elite, which reinforced the dissonance they experienced and heightened their feelings of powerlessness to implement State Department policy. Feeling responsible, as representatives of the American government, for the plight of Maniu, Georgi Dimitrov, and Subasic, they exhorted Washington not to "sell out" its democratic friends. Given their feelings of guilt, their social-class identification with the old elite, their relative inexperience with Balkan politics (only Barnes had prewar service in the region), and their growing hostility toward the Soviets, they tended to select out discrepant information such as the nondemocratic political histories of these states during the interwar years and the possibility that local leaders—Maniu is a good example—sought American support partly to advance their own political ambitions. It is significant in this regard that the caveats Berry expressed about Balkan political divisiveness in 1943–44 are markedly absent from his telegrams after 1945. Neither did his or Melbourne's reports seriously con-

[30] The basic work for an understanding of cognitive dissonance is Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957). According to Festinger, "Two elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the other" (p. 13). See also Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 11; Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: John Wiley, 1962); Joseph De Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), pp. 28–29; and Raymond A. Bauer, "Problems of Perceptions and the Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5(1961): 223–29.

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sider Moscow's extreme sensitivity to Rumania's anti-Bolshevik, philofascist past and the intensity with which Rumanian armies had fought on the Russian front during the war.[31]

With the installation of Soviet-backed governments in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and Hoxha's eventual gravitation into the Soviet orbit, Foreign Service officers increasingly perceived the prewar political leadership as a disfranchised elite, that is, as "insiders" outside their own governments. At the same time, diplomats perceived themselves as "outsiders," a state of mind affected not only by Soviet-imposed constraints on their activities in those countries, but also by the State Department's reluctance to heed their advice and its dilatoriness in communicating with them, which may have induced a further psychological identification with the prewar elite.[32]

Finally, it appears that career officers were given emotional and intellectual support for their views by their British colleagues. While the British were inclined to depart from the principles of the Yalta declaration in the hope of achieving some measure of postwar cooperation, they shared the Americans' repugnance toward Soviet actions and their apprehensions of further Communist expansion. Together they appealed to their respective governments to protest vigorously Moscow's behavior. After 1946 even Jacobs came to the view that he and his British associates were driven "to a completely parallel policy" in Albania.[33]

Diplomats in the Eastern and Southern European divisions of the State Department, however, were physically, hence psychologically, insulated from the conditions experienced by their colleagues in the Balkans. As Durbrow put it, "We didn't have to face the music." Despite the incoming information discrepant with the image of ideological cooperation, they were slow to alter their perceptions because they knew only indirectly what their colleagues experienced firsthand. Thus they reacted far more dispassionately than Berry or Barnes to the Rumanian coup and the Dimitrov episode.[34]

[31] See the Russian attitude in Berry to secretary, 15 February 1945, 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2-1545, NA, RG59, and also B. Ponomaryov, A. Gromyko, and V. Khvostov, eds., *History of Soviet Foeign Policy, 1945-1970*, trans. David Skvirsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974). Useful histories of the Balkans during the interwar years include Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941*, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Times* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); F. L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and Rene Ristelheuber, *Histoire des Peuples Balkaniques* (Paris: Fayard, 1940). For a social and political analysis see Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

[32] Interviews with Yost, 6 May 1976, Loy Henderson, Washington, D.C., 5 May 1976, and Rudolph Schoenfeld, Washington, D.C., 16 January 1976. See Franz From, *Perception of Other People*, trans. Eric Kvan and Brendan Maher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

[33] Berry to secretary, 11 December 1945, 871.00/12-1145, NA, RG59; Barnes to secretary, 23 August 1945, 874.00/8-2345, NA, RG59; Jacobs to secretary, 13 March 1946, 701USMission-Albania, Tirana Post Files, WNRC, RG84.

[34] Durbrow interview, 3 May 1976.

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Moreover, because they had participated in planning the postwar world, they tended to be psychologically more invested in its realization than diplomats in the field. Consequently, they focused on information that bolstered their image of cooperation. Cannon's readiness to recall Molotov's assurance that the Soviets would not interfere in Rumanian internal affairs is a case in point. As Robert Jervis has pointed out, "when a policy has high costs, decision-makers are likely to believe they have accomplished something worthy of their sacrifice." This frequently results in "propensities to overvalue what has been achieved and to perceive failures as successes."[35] As long as diplomats felt, both in terms of sociopolitical considerations and their psychological state, that the policy of world cooperation was preferable to the alternatives of spheres of influence, nationalistic expansionism, or military confrontation, they resisted evidence from the field that U.S.-Soviet ideological cooperation was failing. After December 1945, however, once the costs of this policy—the facilitation of Communist expansionism—became more apparent to them, they reacted far more anxiously to reports from the field.

Since the United States had not yet formally reestablished diplomatic relations with the Balkan countries, diplomats in the department were not faced with the constant appeals from non-Communist leaders for American intercession as were diplomats in the field. Nevertheless, they had to contend with bureaucratic pressures, analogous to those exerted on diplomats in the Balkans by the old elite, from Truman, Byrnes, Roosevelt's special adviser Harry Hopkins, and other officials, that reinforced their expectations of postwar cooperation. The possible bureaucratic costs of recommending a policy change, namely the loss of professional status, inhibited them from formulating alternative approaches. Intent on preserving their influence within the department, they diluted the often harsh and belligerent messages they received from the field that deviated too sharply from their own views, discredited the source of messages in some cases, such as those from Barnes, or simply did not pass them on to the secretary. They considered recommendations for a more assertive posture "impractical," as Matthews put it, and potentially dangerous. "The men in the field viewed things from a narrow perspective," explained Charles Yost, another careerist who participated in postwar planning, "and didn't appreciate that the department was concerned with the entire world."[36]

[35] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 140.

[36] De Rivera, *Psychological Dimension*, pp. 56–60, 232–42; Bohlen, *Witness*, pp. 248, 256–60; interviews with Barbour, 2 June 1976, Matthews, 20 May 1976, and Yost, 6 May 1976. Davis contended in *The Cold War Begins* that Eastern European specialists in the State Department functioned virtually autonomously amid the bureaucratic decentralization of the Roosevelt administration. To be sure, the Roosevelt style was one of decentralization which bordered on bureaucratic anarchy; but career diplomats, save Kennan, were not inclined, either in terms of personality or socialization, to take advantage of that bureaucratic condition as Davis asserts. Rather they adhered to superior bureaucratic authority and followed the administration's and the department's Atlantic Charter line. Given the negligible foreign-policy role diplomats had played during the interwar years, they

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Finally, diplomats in the department were affected by their perceptions of the popular mood. Despite the amorphous nature of opinion polls during most of 1945, they concluded that the American people would not permit deviation from the policy of postwar cooperation in accordance with the Atlantic Charter ideals. To the extent they felt that they were simply responding to the public will, they were able to resist dissonant messages from the field. Actually, their assessment of domestic opinion served as a rationalization for their preferred adherence to the policy of cooperation. Between Potsdam and the Moscow conference, however, when public and congressional attitudes vis-à-vis the Soviets began to harden, they found it more difficult to filter out discrepant evidence from the Balkans. The image of confrontation and the attendant policy of containment they embraced after 1946, which further inflamed public hostility toward the Kremlin, was subsequently similarly rationalized as a reaction to domestic opinion. In both instances, diplomats heard what they wanted to hear.[37]

were particularly sensitive to their possible loss of professional status. See De Santis, "The Diplomacy of Silence," chap. 1.

[37] Concerning the indirect influence of public opinion on foreign policy, see De Rivera, *Psychological Dimension*, pp. 343–60. As Bernard Cohen has noted in *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), the views of foreign-policy officials tend to be more influenced by personal relationships within the department than by the amorphous public (pp. 72, 80). For public opinion data, see 500CC/5–745, 20 April 1945, NA, RG59; and the President's Secretary's File, Box 138, Truman Papers.

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The 1948 American Embargo on Arms to Palestine

SHLOMO SLONIM

The 1948 American arms embargo on Palestine and the Middle East stands in stark contrast to the general diplomatic support that President Truman extended to the nascent and fledgling Jewish state. As is well known, President Truman repeatedly countermanded State Department directives that he felt were inconsistent with his pro-Jewish-state policy.[1] It is enough to recall the promotion by the administration of the U.N. General Assembly's partition resolution;[2] the immediate American recognition of the new state;[3] the appointment of James G. McDonald as Washington's special representative to Israel in June 1948;[4] and the rejection of the Bernadotte proposal to detach the Negev from

[1] See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 190–99; Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: Morrow, 1972), pp. 424–28.

[2] In this connection, note Truman's decision to overrule the State Department's proposal to exclude the Negev from the area to be allotted to the proposed Jewish state. See *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947*, vol. V, *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 1269–71 (hereafter cited as *FRUS 1947*).

[3] See minutes of White House meeting of May 12, 1948, which record the opposition of Secretary Marshall and State Department officials to this step. See *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, vol. V, part 2, *The Near East, South Asia and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 972–76 (hereafter cited as *FRUS 1948*). For rejoinder of Clark Clifford, who argued that recognition was in the national interest, see ibid., pp. 974, 976. Truman decided not to announce, in advance, an American intention to recognize. He refused, however, to postpone recognition, even momentarily, once the state was proclaimed. Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett subsequently claimed: "The President's political advisers, having failed . . . to make the President a father of the new state have determined at least to make him the midwife" (ibid., p. 1007).

[4] See memorandum by Special Counsel Clark Clifford to President, June 17, 1948, in *FRUS 1948*,

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Israeli territory.[5] Yet in what was perhaps the most critical issue of all—the issue in which Israel's security and existence hung most in the balance—the approach of the State Department would seem to have prevailed. During the entire course of Israel's struggle for independence the embargo policy was rigorously maintained.[6]

How can one account for this apparent inconsistency in American policy? What were the factors that led to the initial imposition of the arms embargo, and what pressures were brought to bear on the administration for removal of the embargo? Why did all endeavors to modify the arms policy prove futile, even after recognition of the new state? And further, what were the long-range implications of the embargo policy for the peacemaking process in the Middle East?

The relevant diplomatic correspondence of 1947–48, as revealed in the recently opened Department of State archives, sheds new light on this aspect of America's 1948 Middle East policy.

Partition and Imposition of the Embargo

The suggestion for an arms embargo on Palestine was first raised by Loy Henderson, head of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the Department of State, on November 10, 1947.[7] At this point, the United States was actively engaged in promoting the General Assembly's adoption of the partition resolution that called for the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish states in Palestine.[8] Already on October 11 the United States had pro-

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pp. 1117–19; memoranda of phone conversations between Clifford and Lovett, June 22, 1948, in *ibid.*, pp. 1131–32, and between Lovett and Clifford, June 24, 1948, in *ibid.*, p. 1140; and memorandum of conversation between Lovett and McDonald, June 28, 1948, in ibid., pp. 1151–52. For McDonald's own account of the circumstances surrounding his appointment, see James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel, 1948–1951* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 3–19.

[5] See *FRUS 1948*, pp. 1415–16, 1430–38, 1512–14, 1565–67, 1570, 1610, 1617. See also *New York Times*, October 28 and 29, 1948. On the United States and the Bernadotte plan generally, see Joseph B. Schechtman, *The United States and the Jewish State Movement: The Crucial Decade 1939–1949* (New York: Herzl Press, 1966), chap. 14. For Truman's account of the Bernadotte episode, see Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, pp. 195–97. In his letter to President Weizmann on Nov. 29, 1948 (after he had upset Dewey in the elections), President Truman wrote: "I remember well our conversation about the Negeb. . . . I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of the area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously, regarding it as 'just another campaign promise' to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error (ibid., p. 198); also in *FRUS 1948*, p. 1633.

[6] The United States did not lift the embargo until August 4, 1949, after armistice agreements had been concluded between Israel and all the bordering Arab states. See *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949*, vol. VI, *The Near East, South Asia and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 1283–84 (hereafter cited as *FRUS 1949*).

[7] *FRUS 1947*, p. 1249.

[8] On October 22, 1947, Secretary Marshall had given instructions to the U.S. delegation to

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posed "the establishment of a special constabulary or police force" to ensure unhampered implementation of the partition scheme.[9] In the final draft resolution, in place of a constabulary, provision was made for the creation of "an armed militia" in each state "to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes." It also appealed to "all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations." Additionally, the draft resolution requested the Security Council to "take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation" and to "determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the [U.N.] Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution."[10] Thus, the resolution contemplated the possibility of resistance and the contingency that partition would have to be implemented by force—by local militia forces initially, and, if necessary, by the collective forces of the international community.

Supplying the militia with arms could be considered as a legitimate, and even required, first step toward partition and certainly fell within the entire spirit of the resolution. As Dr. Herbert E. Evatt, Australian minister for external affairs, stated subsequently, the resolution "calls for militia and militias need arms."[11] The United States, as one of the prime movers of the partition resolution and one of the permanent members of the Security Council, might reasonably have been expected to assume a prominent role in furnishing the militia with essential weapons and supplies. This would represent a minimal American role in ensuring implementation of the resolution. These considerations, however, do not seem to have deterred Henderson from outlining a policy that would bar the United States from contributing to the effective implementation of the partition resolution. He proposed prohibiting the export of any military material to Palestine or neighboring states "so long as the tension continues. Otherwise, the Arabs might use arms of U.S. origin against Jews, or Jews might use them against Arabs. In either case, we would be subject to bitter recrimination.[12] Henderson's proposal received the endorsement of Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett and Secretary of State George Marshall.[13] On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly, with active American support, adopted the parti-

line up the vote to support the American proposals on the issues "of amendments to the majority plan on partition and manner of implementation" (ibid., p. 1199). In the words of Fraser Wilkins, adviser to the U.S. delegation, this confirmed "active support of our stated Palestine policy" (ibid., n. 3).

[9] United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, *Summary Records*, 2d sess., 1948, p. 64.

[10] For the final text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), see United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Resolutions*, 16 September-29 November 1947, pp. 131. The full text with accompanying maps is reprinted as an appendix in *FRUS 1948*, pp. 1709.

[11] Canberra to Secretary of State, April 9, 1948, U.S., Department of State, Decimal File 501.BB Palestine/4-948.

[12] Henderson quoted in *FRUS 1947*, p. 1249.

[13] Ibid.

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tion resolution. Barely a week later, on December 5, the State Department formally announced the discontinuance of the licensing of arms shipments to Palestine and neighboring countries.[14] No evidence has been found to suggest that President Truman's authorization for instituting the arms embargo was ever sought or obtained.

The attitude of the State Department is reflected in a message sent the next day, December 6, by Undersecretary Lovett to Secretary Marshall, who was then in London. After describing the scope and nature of the embargo policy, Lovett states:

> In view recent disorder Palestine and threats from Arab states, Dept anticipates representatives Jewish Agency . . . will shortly request US Govt to permit export to Palestine from US of military supplies.
>
> Dept proposes if and when approached by representatives Jewish Agency, to reply:
>
> 1) In period preceding termination mandate, requests for military supplies should be made to British authorities in Palestine.
>
> 2) In period following termination mandate, requests for military supplies should be made to UN Commission. Commission procedure thereafter is as yet unknown.[15]

Under the circumstances it was, of course, vain on Lovett's part to suggest that the Jewish authorities should approach Britain or the U.N. commission to procure weapons for defense. The British had made abundantly clear in the General Assembly debates that they would not consent to transfer power directly to either of the envisaged governmental bodies, since this "would in practice amount to the implementation of this scheme . . . which, failing Arab-Jewish agreement, they [were] not prepared to undertake."[16] They would transfer power only to the U.N. commission which, in turn, would transfer it to the appropriate bodies. At the same time, however, the British Foreign Office had secretly notified Lovett on November 28 that the commission would not be permitted to enter Palestine until two weeks before termination of the mandate, that is, on May 1.[17] Lovett, in a telegram on November 29 (the very day the partition plan was adopted), confirmed American acceptance of these terms.[18] Thus, on December 6, when Lovett dispatched his cable to Marshall, he could have realized that the Palestine commission would not emerge as an effective body in Palestine until it was probably too late. Consequently, there was little point in the suggestion to turn to this ineffectual organization for military supplies. Likewise, it was common knowledge that even at that very moment, the British were busily engaged in disarming Hagana forces who were attempting to

[14] U.S., Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 14, 1947, p. 1197; see also *FRUS 1947*, p. 1300, n. 2.

[15] *FRUS 1947*, p. 1300.

[16] Ibid., p. 1274.

[17] Ibid., p. 1290.

[18] Ibid., p. 1290, n.1.

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defend the Jewish community from Arab attacks.[19] Thus, there was little reason to expect that the British would be prepared to provide the Jews with arms. Indeed, the United Kingdom was continuing to ship weapons and supplies to the Arab states. The Foreign Office, in reply to an American inquiry, confirmed: "HMG [His Majesty's government] has treaty obligations to supply certain Middle East states with war materials. . . . It is not intended to hold up delivery such items, which form part previous orders. Any new orders from Palestine or Arab countries will be scrutinized with great care before decision is taken on them."[20] In a subsequent message the Foreign Office noted: "HMG is bound to assume these will not be used contrary UN Charter."[21]

From all this, it is clear that the American policymakers, no less than their British counterparts, realized from the outset that while the arms embargo would profoundly affect the defense capability of the Jewish community, it would, at most, only marginally affect the Arab states. The latter would continue to receive British supplies in fulfillment of earlier commitments.

Retreat from Partition

Even as the embargo policy was being launched, Jewish Agency officials made their first move to obtain American arms for defense. On December 10, 1947, the American consul general in Jerusalem reported that agency officials were preparing a formal request for arms "in keeping with US responsibility for partition decision."[22] On the eve of his departure from the United States on December 9, Chaim Weizmann, in a letter to the president, posed the issue:

> The only matter which causes us anxiety is our people's deficiency in the equipment necessary for their defense. The Arabs obviously suffer no such lack. It is a paradox of history that the Jews, who are the only people in the Near East threatened by aggression, are the only people who have not been able to provide freely for their own defense. In our efforts to correct this dangerous position we shall have cause to rely on the good will of your administration; and it is for this reason that I venture to bring the matter to your attention.[23]

Early in January, Jewish Agency representatives Eliahu Epstein and Abba Eban met with State Department officials in Washington, including Henderson and Rusk, and expressed the hope "that the members of the UN including the United States would be in a position to arm and equip these [militia] forces."

[19] Netanel Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence 1947–1949* (New York: Putnam, 1961), *pp. 47–49*. See also *Palestine Post*, December 2, 1947.

[20] *FRUS 1947*, p. 1315.

[21] *FRUS 1948*, p. 562, n. 1.

[22] *FRUS 1947*, p. 1309.

[23] Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Truman's reply of December 12 did not touch on the arms issue. It simply urged "restraint and tolerance . . . if we are to get a peaceful settlement in the Near East."

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Mr. Eban noted "that the Arabs hoped the UN recommendation to partition Palestine would not be implemented. . . . Strong support by the U.S. for partition in the Security Council and the provision of equipment for the Jewish militia would indicate American determination and would thus have a stabilizing effect on the situation in Palestine."[24] Later in the month, Moshe Shertok, in a meeting with members of the U.S. delegation at the United Nations, presented the arms question as a matter of the highest priority. "The most urgent need," he declared, "was to find a means of supplying the Jews in Palestine with arms so that they could defend themselves and prepare for the defense of the Jewish State."[25] Following her arrival in New York on January 23, Mrs. Golda Myerson, then head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, announced that one of her goals was to try and persuade the United States to relent on the issue of the arms embargo.[26]

At the same time, pressures were building up within the United States to persuade the administration to modify its position on arms sales. Several prominent personalities argued that imposition of an arms embargo was inconsistent with support for partition. On January 28, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, herself a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, wrote to Secretary of State Marshall: "It seems to me that the decision which was made to support the majority report on Palestine, and our leadership in the UN, place a responsibility on us to see the UN through in actually implementing its policies. . . . The quicker we remove the embargo and see that the Jews and any UN police force are equipped with modern armaments, which is the only thing which will hold the Arabs in check, the better it will be for the whole situation."[27] On February 10, 1948, thirty Republican members of the House of Representatives—including Jacob Javits, Christian Herter, Clifford Case, Kenneth Keating, Thurston B. Morton, and Margaret Chase Smith—sent a public letter to Secretary Marshall in which they posed a series of questions regarding the nature and implications of the administration's arms embargo.[28] In particular, they wished to know whether it was true that Great Britain was permitting arms to be shipped to Arab nations and whether this would interfere with carrying out the United Nations decision on Palestine. Furthermore, they wished to know what the United States was prepared to do to help implement the U.N. decision.

On February 13, 1948, Representative Charles A. Buckley introduced a resolution into the House calling on the president to lift the arms embargo.[29] On the same day, Dr. Clark M. Eichelberger, president of the American Association

[24] *FRUS 1948*, p. 538.

[25] Ibid., p. 566.

[26] *New York Times*, January 23, p. 13 and January 27, p. 7.

[27] U.S., Department of State, Decimal File, 867 N. 01/1-2848.

[28] See U.S., Department of State, Decimal File, 501.BB Palestine/2-1048; see also *New York Times*, February 11, 1948, p. 15.

[29] *New York Times*, February 13, 1948, p. 16.

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for the United Nations, dispatched a letter to the seventy-five chapters of the association urging that immediate steps be taken to set up an international peace force and to lift the embargo. In the event of failure, he warned, "a major blame will be placed upon the Government of the United States.[30] In a letter to the *New York Times*, which appeared on February 13, a similar note was sounded by James G. McDonald, a member of the 1946 Anglo-American Committee on Inquiry on Palestine and subsequently Washington's first ambassador to Israel: "Talk of a compromise involving a reversal of the United States decision can only tend to appease and, therefore, to encourage such [Arab] aggression."[31] On February 15, the American Zionist Emergency Council convened an urgent meeting in Washington, D.C., and adopted resolutions that, inter alia, called upon the administration to take active steps to arm the Jewish militia in Palestine and charged the British with sabotage of the U.N. partition resolution.[32] On February 18, former New York Governor Herbert Lehman condemned the British for continuing to ship arms to the Arabs.[33] He joined with Mrs. Roosevelt in a public appeal for an end to the U.S. embargo.[34]

None of these efforts, however, succeeded in modifying the State Department's stand. The standard reply issued by Secretary Marshall was that the shipment of arms to one side in the dispute would only exacerbate the strife and frustrate ongoing efforts to reach a peaceful solution.[35] This logic, however, did not seem to hold for pressuring the British to suspend their arms sales to the Middle East. Perhaps most revealing in this respect is the conversation on January 29 between Undersecretary Lovett and Lord Inverchapel, the United Kingdom ambassador to the United States.[36] Three days earlier Lovett had suggested to the ambassador "that the British should if possible, in view of the pressure being brought in Congress to have the U.S. embargo on arms to the Middle East raised, issue a statement to the effect that they have suspended all shipments of arms to the Arab states."[37] In reply, London now reaffirmed its earlier stand that only supplies for internal purposes, in fulfillment of "long-standing orders" were being delivered. Lovett thereupon observed "that he had then been given nothing to tell Congress except that the British felt that they must continue to deliver arms for internal security purposes if assured such arms

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., p. 20.

[32] U.S., Department of State, Decimal File, 867 N. 01/2-1748; see also *New York Times*, February 16, 1948.

[33] *New York Times*, February 18, 1948, p. 6.

[34] Ibid., February 19, 1948, p. 6.

[35] See, for example, Marshall's reply to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt dated February 16, 1948: "A decision by the United States . . . to permit American arms to go to Palestine and neighboring states would facilitate acts of violence and the further shedding of blood and thus render still more difficult the task of maintaining law and order. We are continuing, therefore, to refuse to license the shipment of arms to that area" (*FRUS 1948*, p. 629).

[36] Ibid., pp. 581–84.

[37] Memorandum of conversation by Joseph C. Satterthwaite, deputy director of Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, in ibid., p. 581. See also ibid., pp. 562–63.

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would not be used in Palestine." Lovett explained further: "A statement in such limited terms might do more harm than good, since it would serve only to emphasize the fact that the British are in fact furnishing arms to certain Arab states. About the only thing we can do therefore is to let the matter ride as it is and hope that the U.S. can nevertheless succeed in maintaining the arms embargo."[38]

Apparently, Lovett was not overly concerned about the British shipments and was not prepared to pressure them to suspend their sales. What he needed was not a British embargo but simply a British statement in order to deflect congressional criticism and preserve the American embargo. In the absence of such a statement the State Department would "let the matter ride" and hope for the best.

In sum, therefore, the State Department was not moved to consider lifting its one-sided embargo either by virtue of domestic pressures or by virtue of external failure to keep faith with the embargo policy. Nor was it even prepared to use the leverage offered by the presence of its own freeze on shipments in order to compel the British to desist from arms sales and thereby broaden the embargo.

In fact, the State Department was advancing step by step in the opposite direction, toward complete abandonment of the partition scheme. The process of erosion had already gotten underway even before the General Assembly had adopted its November 29 resolution. A week earlier, on November 24, Henderson had sent Lovett a memorandum in which he asserted that, in the view of all the members of his office, support for the partition plan was "contrary to the interests of the United States." He warned of the loss of friendship in the Arab world, and continued: "It is extremely unfortunate that we should be criticizing the British for following the only kind of policy which, it seems to me, they can follow if they are to remain in the Middle East."[39] Henderson and other State Department officials obviously felt that Truman's propartition stand was misguided and would seriously endanger American interests in the Middle East. Their misgivings were in no way attenuated by the General Assembly's adoption of the partition resolution with American backing. Thus, by December 17, 1947, barely two weeks after adoption of the Assembly resolution, a report was circulated in the State Department that called into question American support for the partition program that it claimed was "impossible of implementation."[40]

[38] Ibid., p. 582.

[39] *FRUS, 1947*, pp. 1281–82. With Mr. Lovett's approval the memorandum was transmitted to various members of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, see ibid., p. 1282, n. 3.

[40] U.S., Department of State, Decimal File, 501.BB Palestine/12–1747. The purpose of the report was stated to be: "To assess and appraise the position of the U.S. with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration the security interests of the U.S. in the Mediterranean and Near East areas and in the light of the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the partition of Palestine." An editorial note in *FRUS 1947*, pp. 1313–14, reproduces the text of the two recommendations presented in the report, and indicates that authorship of the report is unknown.

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Only the Russians stood to gain from partition, it was alleged. The report recommended that the United States either call for a special session of the General Assembly to consider a U.N. trusteeship for Palestine or simply wash its hands of the whole issue. In either case, the arms embargo should be maintained and enforced.

This report served as the basis for a more comprehensive Policy Planning Staff Report (PPS/19) issued by its director, George F. Kennan, on January 19, 1948. "The U.S. Government," the report stated, "should face the fact that the partition of Palestine cannot be implemented without the use of force. . . . It should be clearly recognized that such [military] assistance given to the Jewish state, but withheld from the Arabs . . . would in Arab eyes be a virtual declaration of war by the U.S. against the Arab world."[41] Promoting the implementation of the partition scheme, it was argued, would introduce a Soviet presence in Palestine. This "would constitute an outflanking of our positions in Greece, Turkey and Iran, and a potential threat to the stability of the entire Eastern Mediterranean area." "In the U.S.," the report further warned, "the position of Jews would be gravely undermined as it becomes evident to the public that in supporting a Jewish state in Palestine we were in fact supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism, to the detriment of overall U.S. security interests."[42] The report recommended therefore that the United States take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition, that the embargo be retained, and that the Palestine issue be referred back to the U.N. General Assembly.

On January 29, in response to critical comments on PPS/19 made by Dean Rusk, director of the Office of Special Political Affairs in the State Department, Kennan elaborated upon the analysis presented in the report.

> I am concerned at Mr. Rusk's suggestion that armed interference in Palestine by the Arab States to prevent the implementation of the Assembly resolution, even in the form of furnishing arms and assistance for guerilla action, would constitute aggression, and that the United States has a responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council to act within the limits of the Charter to prevent this. . . . I do not feel that we should put further pressure on the British, with respect to arms shipments to Arab countries. The importation of arms into Palestine is still clearly a question for the mandatory power, which bears responsibility for internal law and order there. As for British relations with the Arabs, the remaining British strategic positions in the Middle East are among the few real assets which we still have in that area.
>
> . . . Mr. Rusk is correct that a hands-off policy will leave Palestine in a state of violence. For that, all of us will share some measure of blame who have been connected with the Palestine question in these past 30 years; but the main responsibility will have to continue to rest with the Jewish leaders and organizations who have pushed so persistently for the pursuit of objectives which could scarcely fail to lead to violent results.

[41] U.S., Department of State, *Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine*, in *FRUS 1948*, pp. 546–54.

[42] Ibid., p. 553.

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> . . . In these circumstances, I think we have no choice but to try to extricate ourselves from the existing commitments as rapidly as possible.[43]

Further memoranda in a similar vein emanated from both the Department of State and the National Security Council.[44] Together, these two organizations laid the groundwork for the ultimate public abandonment of the partition scheme by the United States. The first public intimation that Washington's Middle East policy was about to take a revolutionary turn was provided by Senator Warren Austin in his speech to the Security Council on February 24:[45] "The Security Council is authorized to take forceful measures with respect to Palestine to remove a threat to international peace. The Charter . . . does not empower the Security Council to enforce a political settlement. . . . The Security Council's action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition."[46]

The coup de grace was delivered by Senator Austin in his famous March 19 address before the Security Council in which he called for the immediate convening of a special session of the General Assembly to institute a temporary trusteeship for Palestine. Partition would be shelved for the meantime.[47] This move, engineered by the State Department, shocked members of the Jewish Agency,[48] as well as such independent bystanders as U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie[49] and Dr. Evatt, Australia's minister for external affairs.[50] Even President Truman was dismayed, as his papers so glaringly reveal.[51]

[43] Ibid., pp. 574–81.

[44] See, for example the memorandum circulated on January 27, 1948, by Mr. Samuel K.C. Kopper of the office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, in ibid., pp. 563–66; the paper prepared by the Policy Planning Staff at the specific request of Undersecretary Lovett on alternative courses of action open to the United States, February 11, 1948, in ibid., pp. 619–25; the Draft Report prepared by the staff of the National Security Council, February 17, 1948, in ibid., pp. 631–32; and the report by the Central Intelligence Agency, February 28, 1948, in ibid., pp. 666–75. This report warned that U.N. authorization of unilateral support for the Jewish state would constitute "a course of action extremely dangerous to world peace" (Ibid., p. 674). The USSR would be quick to take advantage of the situation. The report, therefore, recommended that the United States oppose any such U.N. authorization.

[45] Ibid., pp. 651–54. Reprinted from U.N., Security Council, *Official Records, 3rd Year*, nos. 16–35, 1948, pp. 264–69.

[46] *FRUS 1948*, p. 653. See further, in this regard, Philip C. Jessup, *The Birth of Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 263–64. But compare the views of the U.N. Legal Adviser Ivan S. Kerno, as reported in *New York Times*, February 27, 1948, p. 1.

[47] *FRUS 1948*, pp. 742–44. Reprinted from U.N., Security Council, *Official Records, 3rd Year*, nos. 36–51, 1948, pp. 157–68.

[48] See the reaction of Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, in *New York Times*, March 20, 1948, p. 2, and April 1, 1948, p. 8.

[49] In his autobiography, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 171, Trygve Lie relates that he suggested to Ambassador Austin that the two of them resign their respective positions as a sign of extreme displeasure with the new course of American policy. The ambassador demurred, and the secretary himself was dissuaded from taking the drastic step proposed. See also *FRUS 1948*, p. 744, n.2.

[50] U.S. embassy officials in Canberra cabled that, in talks with them, "Evatt compared present Palestine situation to Spanish civil war. . . . We are barring arms to Jews (as to Loyalists)

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The people in the State Department had finally succeeded in derailing the partition plan. When they first voiced opposition to the partition plan they had been overruled. Nonetheless, they succeeded in obtaining the imposition of an arms embargo that seemingly did not require presidential approval. In this manner, the provisions for self-implementation of partition—that is, implementation by the militias of the two projected states—were hamstrung even before the partition resolution was adopted. The alternative form of implementation contemplated by the resolution—use of Security Council forces—was also ruled out. By March 1948, the cold war was at its height and the United States would not countenance any arrangement, the effect of which would be the introduction of Soviet forces into the Middle East. Thus, in the view of the State Department, there was no longer any alternative to scrapping the plan entirely.

From American to United Nations Embargo

The full implications of the State Department's antipartition stance were pointed up critically in two memoranda submitted to President Truman on March 6 and 8 by White House adviser, Clark Clifford.[52] Judged by the sole relevant criterion—America's own self-interest—U.S. support of partition, Clifford insisted, was and remained sound policy. American security and oil in-

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while Arabs (like Franquistas) are continuing to receive them (largely from British). . . . Feels President Truman . . . has been put in dreadful position by poor advisers. Says it is shocking. Department is controlled by 'little men'. Claimed some Arab lovers were actually disloyal" (Canberra to Secretary of State, April 9, 1948, U.S., Department of State Decimal File, 501.BB Palestine/4-948).

[51] According to Margaret Truman, the president made the following entry in his calendar on March 19, 1948:

"The State Dept. pulled the rug from under me today. . . . In Key West . . . I approved the speech [of] Senator Austin to U.N. meeting. This morning I find that the State Dept. has reversed my Palestine policy. The first I know about it is what I see in the papers! Isn't that hell? I am now in the position of a liar and a double crosser. I've never felt so in my life.

"There are people on the third and fourth levels of the State Dept. who have always wanted to cut my throat. They've succeeded in doing it" (Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, pp. 424–25). See also, Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, pp. 190–193.

There has been considerable debate over Truman's foreknowledge and appreciation of the contents of Austin's statements proposing an international trusteeship for Palestine. A three-page editorial note in *FRUS 1948*, pp. 744–46, summarizes the contrasting viewpoints and their supporting arguments. See also the various memoranda relating to Clark Clifford's "investigation" of the Austin episode, in ibid., pp. 749–50, 751–52. For two important new contributions to the literature on this subject, see Zvi Ganin, "The Limits of American Jewish Political Power: America's Retreat from Partition, November 1947–March 1948," *Jewish Social Studies* 34 (1977): 20–24; and Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948* (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 372–79. See also Clark Clifford, "Factors Influencing President Truman's Decision to Support Partition and Recognize the State of Israel" (Paper presented at a panel on The Palestine Question in American History, sponsored jointly by American Jewish Historical Society and American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 23, 1976), pp. 9–13.

[52] *FRUS 1948*, pp. 687–96.

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terests in the Middle East required peace, and this was best secured by means of partition.

> There are those who say that partition will not work and that another solution must be found. This comes from those who never wanted partition to succeed and who have been determined to sabotage it. If anything has been omitted that could help kill partition, I do not know what it would be. First, Britain, the Mandatory Power, not only publicly declared she would have no part of it, but she has done everything possible to prevent effective action by the Palestine Commission. Next, we have placed an embargo on arms to Palestine, while Britain fulfills her "contract obligations" to supply arms to the Arabs. Thirdly, our State Department has made no attempt to conceal their dislike for partition. Fourthly, the United States appears in the ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a few nomadic desert tribes. This had done us irreparable damage. Why should Russia or Yugoslavia, or any other nation treat us with anything but contempt in light of our shilly-shallying appeasement of the Arabs.[53]

Clifford then presented a "Program of Action for the U.S.," which included the following points:

> The United States should call upon the Security Council to invoke economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Arab States as aggressors threatening world peace.
>
> The United States should immediately lift its embargo on arms to the Middle East, shipments subject only to limitations set by the U.N. Palestine Commission or the Security Council.
>
> The United States should call upon the Security Council immediately to create and arm the Arab and Jewish militias provided for in the General Assembly resolution, and should cooperate fully with the UN Palestine Commission to this end.[54]

Ten days later, Senator Austin delivered his famous "bombshell" address at the United Nations announcing American withdrawal from the partition plan. This event, and the president's earlier receipt of the Clifford memoranda, formed the background to an urgent White House conference on Palestine convened on March 24 and attended by the president; Secretary Marshall, Loy Henderson, Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, and Dean Rusk of the State Department; and several White House advisers, including David Niles and Clark Clifford. The arms embargo was one of the main subjects discussed. Clifford records that the president and the White House advisers "were in favor of lifting the arms embargo as soon as possible."[55] However, Secretary Marshall intervened to say "that they were working on plans for a truce and that it was felt that there was a good possibility that a truce could be effectuated." The White House advisers pressed for an early answer on the success of the truce efforts. The meeting concluded with "the general understanding . . . that, if they [the State Department] could not report

[53] Ibid., p. 695.

[54] This part of the document is not reprinted in *FRUS 1948*. It is to be found in the original document, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

[55] *FRUS 1948*, p. 755.

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that they had been successful in obtaining a truce by April 7 [two weeks later], steps would be taken to release the embargo."[56]

In agreeing to the postponement the White House failed to appreciate what it was actually conceding. The two-week period was allotted for effectuating a *truce*, but, in fact, only a truce *resolution* emerged. The distinction is not minor. Even more significant, the White House failed to recognize that the concept that underlay the proposed truce resolution ran diametrically counter to White House desires. In the White House scheme, removal of the embargo and institution of the truce were alternative measures to achieve the identical goal: secure the Jewish community against aggression and enable it to proceed to realize the partition scheme. As adopted, the truce resolution reflected totally the philosophy of the State Department—that partition needed to be discarded and an alternative solution sought. This can be seen from the terms of the April 17 Security Council resolution that provided for a political as well as a military truce. All parties were called upon to "refrain, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the General Assembly, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims, or position of either community."[57] Clearly enough, this provision would effectively throw up a roadblock to establishment of the Jewish state. Moreover, the truce resolution became a vehicle for strengthening and multilateralizing the State Department's arms embargo policy. Thus, the Security Council called upon all governments "to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out . . . and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, and weapons and war materials."[58] From a self-denying ordinance of the State Department alone, the embargo had become the fiat of the United Nations. The entire truce resolution was, in effect, the logical sequel to Austin's March 19 speech announcing American withdrawal from partition. This, however, was not the intent of the White House advisers.

Armed with the truce resolution, State Department officials now had a ready instrument to justify before members of Congress nonmodification of the embargo. Aid could not be extended to the embattled Jewish community and the embargo could not be eased, it was explained, because the administration's hands were tied by Security Council Resolution 46, although that resolution was only recommendatory.

An early illustration of the manner in which the Security Council resolution served to deflect attacks on the embargo policy is provided by a letter dated April 27 from Charles E. Bohlen to Congressman Charles A. Eaton, chairman of

[56] Ibid.

[57] Resolution 46 (1948), in ibid., p. 827. Reprinted from U.N., Security Council, *Official Records, 3rd Year, Resolutions*, 1948, p. 16.

[58] *FRUS 1948*, p. 828. Reprinted from U.N., Security Council, *Official Records, 3rd Year, Resolutions*, 1948, pp. 16–17.

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the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Eaton had asked for State Department comments on a House draft resolution that provided for the lifting of the embargo. Bohlen replied that the proposed resolution "would seem to contravene the spirit and letter of the Truce resolution adopted by the Security Council on April 17. . . . The United States voted for this resolution and as a Member of the United Nations is obligated to abide by the terms thereof."[59] Additionally, Bohlen cited the General Assembly resolution of May 15, 1947, in support of the embargo policy. That resolution, endorsed by President Truman in a public statement, had called on all governments and peoples to refrain from any "action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine." But Bohlen omitted to emphasize that the Assembly resolution itself spelled out the terms: "pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine." Subsequently, the Assembly had met and had adopted the partition scheme. Bohlen was less than candid in citing the prepartition Assembly resolution as grounds for not promoting implementation of the Assembly's partition plan.

It is interesting to note that on April 9, only a few days before the Security Council adopted its truce resolution, a moving plea arrived at the White House from Chaim Weizmann.[60] He welcomed President Truman's assurance (contained in a statement issued March 25)[61] that the United States had not abandoned partition as the ultimate political settlement in Palestine. He went on to say:

> Having recognized the right of our people to independence last November, the great powers now expose them to the risk of extermination and do not even grant them the arms to provide for their own defense. Arab aggression is now more confident than ever. Arabs believe that an international decision has been revised in their favor purely because they dared to use force against it. Mr. President, I cannot see how this belief can honestly be refuted. The practical question now is whether your Administration will proceed to leave our people unarmed in the face of an attack which it apparently feels it is unable to stop; and whether it can allow us to come directly or indirectly under Arab domination which is sworn to our destruction. The choice for our people, Mr. President, is between Statehood and extermination. History and providence have placed this issue in your hands, and I am confident that you will yet decide it in the spirit of the moral law.[62]

The White House itself made no reply to the letter. But in response to a copy sent to the secretary of state, Undersecretary Lovett wrote on April 24: "I sincerely hope that action which has been and will be taken in the United Nations will lead to the restoration of peaceful conditions in Palestine and to agreement between Arabs and Jews resident there on their future government."[63] The

[59] Bohlen quoted in Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Harry S. Truman Library. Also in Palestine Reference Book of Dean Rusk, U.S., State Department Records, Box no. 3.

[60] *FRUS 1948*, pp. 807–809

[61] For text of statement, see *FRUS 1948*, pp. 759–60.

[62] Ibid., pp. 808–809.

[63] Ibid, p. 809, n. 1.

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last words in particular demonstrate how remote the State Department was from what was happening in Palestine and how tightly the diplomats still clung, as the zero hour approached, to their antipartition stand. Illustrative of their thinking was the May 8 suggestion by Senator Austin to Harold Beeley, a British Foreign Ministry official, that a joint British-American naval blockade be instituted off the shores of Palestine to intercept arms shipments.[64]

Events, however, were taking their own course, and by May 14 the state of Israel was an undeniable fact. President Truman decided to catch up with reality and to abandon the outdated solutions of the State Department by according de facto recognition to the new state moments after its formal proclamation.

The State Department Triumphs

Given the new turn in America's Middle East policy, with the White House apparently reasserting its dominance over the State Department, it might reasonably have been expected that the arms embargo policy would be critically reappraised. Recognition of the state of Israel, even more than America's previous endorsement of the partition resolution, carried with it, arguably, some measure of moral responsibility for the security of the newborn state; thus, speculation was rife that Washington would indeed speedily abolish the embargo.[65]

The prospect of an early end to the embargo, it appears, greatly alarmed State Department officials who moved quickly to forestall any such development. They warned of the repercussions that unilateral lifting of the embargo might have for America's relations with the Arabs, the United Nations, and above all, the West. Thus, three days after recognition, Secretary Marshall met with the president and cautioned, at considerable length, against precipitate action in the matter. As he relates:

> I had Mr. Rusk explain to him the present situation regarding the arms embargo and following that I stated that I was not certain that Mr. Rusk had made the facts clear enough. The President then said "I will recite how I understand it" and did so reflecting correct understanding of our point of view.
>
> After Mr. Rusk's departure I again referred to the arms embargo and read the section of the Resolution of April 17 that referred to it and made a particular point of the fact that we must proceed in this matter with extreme care or we will give a final kick to the UN. The President agreed to that view of the matter. . . . That we had to see what happened and he said he agreed. . . . I went on to say that we felt that the United States had hit its all-time low before the UN and that we must be most careful what we do in relation to this arms embargo.[66]

The State Department skillfully managed to escape the necessity of revising its own policies in light of the presidential initiative on recognition, and instead

[64] Ibid., p. 938.
[65] See *New York Times*, May 17, 1948, pp. 1 and 5.
[66] *FRUS 1948*, p. 1008.

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invoked the recognition policy as a means of maintaining the arms embargo and neutralizing the president. Recognition became a trap that placed Truman on the defensive over the arms issue. U.N. expectations had already received a rude shock, it was argued, when the United States violated the provisions of the April 17 resolution dealing with the *political* truce. The United States, therefore, dare not now add insult to injury by violating the provisions for a *military* truce as well. Otherwise, America's own prestige and credibility would be severely injured. The theme sounded by Marshall was reflected also in a report sent to him by U.S. representative to the United Nations, Warren Austin, on May 19. The recognition policy, he reported, had damaged America's standing in the United Nations; it had "deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in our integrity." Moreover, "current newspaper comment concerning possible US action on the existing arms embargo is an element mentioned by other delegations as contributing to their mistrust."[67]

Within a week a new factor entered the picture when the British began a relentless campaign to convince the U.S. administration to retain the arms embargo. In secret dispatches they warned repeatedly that lifting the embargo would produce a dangerous, and even ugly, situation. The first shot in this campaign was fired by Sir John Balfour, British charge d'affaires in Washington, when he met with Lovett, Henderson, and Rusk on May 21. He reported that British Foreign Secretary Bevin "hopes that the United States Government will feel able to maintain its arms embargo. If this is raised, HMG will almost certainly be obliged to raise their own embargo on the export of arms to certain Arab states, and the unfortunate position will then be reached of one side being largely armed by the Americans and the other by the British."[68]

Within the State Department, George Kennan, in a May 21 memorandum to the secretary of state, similarly pointed to the dangers of an Anglo-American split resulting from a revision of the embargo policy.[69] He reminded the secretary that PPS/19 of January 19 and the supplement of January 29 had specifically cautioned against any action that would bring the United States into conflict with the British over the Palestine issue or lead to American "assumption of major responsibility for the maintenance and security" of the Jewish state. "The course of action we are now embarking on," he warned, "threatens not only to place in jeopardy some of our most vital national interests in the Middle East and the Mediterranean but also to disrupt the unity of the western world and to undermine our entire policy toward the Soviet Union."[70]

[67] Austin quoted in ibid., pp. 1013–14.

[68] Ibid., p. 1019. Britain, it will be recalled, had never imposed an absolute embargo on arms to the Middle East. "Long-standing orders" continued to be fulfilled. Bevin's reference, therefore, to the existence of a British embargo presumably related to orders for *new* deliveries not previously contracted for. On May 17, the British delegate to the United Nations acknowledged that Britain was still making deliveries to Egypt, Iraq, and Trans-Jordan "in completion of existing contracts" (*New York Times*, May 28, 1948, p. 4).

[69] *FRUS 1948*, pp. 1020–21.

[70] Ibid., p. 1021.

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The American ambassador in London, Lewis H. Douglas, sent frequent dispatches on the consequences that could ensue from a lifting of the American arms embargo. Thus, in a top secret message of May 22, Douglas wrote:

> I am convinced that crevasse widening between US and Britain over Palestine cannot be confined to Palestine or even to Middle East: It is already seriously jeopardizing foundation-stone of US policy in Europe—partnership with a friendly and well-disposed Britain. Irrespective rights and wrongs of question, I believe worst shock so far to general Anglo-American concert of policy since I have been here was sudden US de facto recognition Jewish state without previous notice of our intentions to British Government. . . . Worst prospect I can see on horizon American-British relations is possibility that we may raise embargo on Middle East arm shipments to favor Jews. If we do so, it will be only short step until British Government, impelled by what it conceives to be its vital interests in Middle East extending as far as Pakistan . . . may lift embargo re arms to Arabs. When this happens, the two great democratic partners will indirectly be ranged on opposite sides of a battle line scarcely three years after May 8, 1945.[71]

He returned to the same theme several times in the next few days.[72]

As these messages were crossing the Atlantic, it seemed a matter of utmost urgency to the State Department to persuade the president of the justice of the department's position on the arms embargo. Chaim Weizmann was scheduled to visit the White House on May 25, and, undoubtedly, he would argue forcefully for removal of the arms embargo.[73] In preparation, Marshall garnered all his evidence. As he describes it:

> I went over with the President the serious situation regarding Palestine matters particularly with reference to his reception of Mr. Weizman and its possible implication of *de jure* recognition, and also the dangerous aspects involved in the question of the arms embargo. This was done along with reading numerous documents to him including Bevin's current message and Douglas' views. I emphasized the tragic results which might well follow any action not carefully considered, its devastating results to him, not to mention the situation in the Middle East, and I said the only protection that I could see at the present time was a very careful maintenance of a relationship between Clark Clifford and you, Lovett, so that no action be taken that had not been either cleared by the State Department or the conditions implied explained for the President's information. He agreed to this.[74]

In effect, President Truman's acceptance of Secretary Marshall's argument sealed the fate of the embargo question. The arms issue gained a logic or rationale of its own. It was no longer simply part of a scheme to frustrate fulfillment of the partition plan; it was now viewed as an essential element in developing a concerted Middle East, and hence, global policy for the two great Western allies.[75] The whole issue of the embargo thus became intertwined in the defense

[71] Ibid., p. 1031.

[72] See ibid., pp. 1032–33, 1047–50.

[73] This was, in fact, the case. See ibid., pp. 1042–43 and 1050–51.

[74] Ibid., pp. 1036–37.

[75] See in this regard, ibid., pp. 1027, 1032, 1034–36, 1042 n. 2., 1047–50, 1099–1101, 1178, 1217–18.

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blueprint that the British were developing for the Middle East.[76] In the British scheme, Israel was envisaged as a sharply reduced territorial entity that would not interfere with broader British strategy in the Arab Middle East.[77] The U.S. embargo policy would henceforth be merged in the overall framework of U.N. peacemaking efforts.[78] And in this manner the embargo question was detached from the issue and logic of recognition.

The Long-Range Implications of the Embargo

What were the repercussions—short and long term—of the embargo policy? The whole process of American withdrawal from the partition plan, it appears, prompted the Arab states to believe that defiance of the United Nations would be profitable. One need only review the 1948 reports of American ambassadors in Arab capitals to realize how their talks with Arab leaders led the latter to believe that the United States was not seriously committed to the U.N. partition plan and would do nothing to see it implemented.[79] On May 5, State Department official Philip Ireland held conversations in Damascus with Azzam Pasha, secretary general of the Arab League, in an effort to deter the Arabs from invading Palestine. Ireland asked Azzam Pasha if the Arabs "considered the grave responsibilities which they were assuming before the world." Ireland reported that "every possible argument" had been used to convince the Arab leaders to accept a ten-day truce. Azzam Pasha, however, remained unmoved.[80] The reason is not far to seek. Ireland was authorized to use every means of persuasion except the one that would really count—that the United States, acting through the United Nations, would take action to repel the invasion, including an immediate lifting of the arms embargo.

But it is no longer necessary to speculate on the effect that the retreat from partition had on Arab plans. Today there is evidence that American tergiversations played a critical role in inducing Egypt to invade Palestine on May 15. In March 1975 the Egyptian journal *Al-taliah* published the debates of the Egyptian Parliament of May 11, 1948, four days before the invasion took place.[81] The

[76] See ibid., pp. 1034–36, 1047–50.

[77] Ibid., pp. 1100, 1133–34, 1134–37.

[78] Ibid., pp. 1027–28. The matter was summed up in a message by Undersecretary Lovett to the U.S. ambassador in London. "You may say to Bevin that this Govt will not lift arms embargo except in conjunction with SC action or inaction" (ibid., p. 1070). In his press conference on May 27, 1948, President Truman made the same point. Ibid., p. 1072. See also ibid., pp. 1110, 1187–88.

[79] See, for example, memorandum of U.S. ambassador to Iraq, George Wardsworth, of his conversation with President Truman, February 4, 1948, and his prepared "paper," in ibid., pp. 592–99; and memorandum of conversation between U.S. ambassador to Egypt, S. Pinkney Tuck, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Khashaba Pasha, March 4, 1948, in ibid., pp. 677–78. See also memorandum of conversation between Dean Rusk and Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, May 3, 1948, in ibid., p. 888.

[80] Ibid., p. 916.

[81] The debates were published in Hebrew in the Israeli daily *Ma-ariv*, May 4 and 6, 1976.

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following excerpts convey the spirit of the discussions. Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmy el-Nukrashy said:

> The valiant defense of the Palestinians of their homeland aroused worldwide attention and particularly that of the United States, so that the United States began to reduce its support of partition. Americans began visiting Arab capitals to convey to their governments, officially or unofficially, the decision of the United States to reduce its commitment to partition. . . . Subsequently, as you will recall, the American representative to the Security Council announced that his country was no longer for partition.[82]

The debate closed with a ringing call from member of Parliament Muhammad Ali Aluchad Pasha to join the other Arab armies in the struggle.

> The United States itself has withdrawn from the partition plan. I consider—and no one is compelled to agree with me—that they thought that partition would be implemented without opposition, namely, with the stroke of a pen. And when opposition by the Palestinians emerged, they had to consider the use of force. Then there developed competition between governments and a dispute arose between the blocs. And since the United States was intent on excluding its rival, it abandoned the partition scheme. Thus, if by means of meagre force the Palestinians managed to achieve this, will not all the Arab states, united, be able to encircle Palestine and to save it from the fate of tyranny and this death? As the Al-mightly liveth, woe to us if history records that the Arab states fled from the battle and allowed the Zionist state to develop and succeed.[83]

His words were greeted with applause.

Thus, wavering elements in the Arab world were led to believe that with resolute and forceful action they could undo the General Assembly decision. This inspired their invasion of Israel with such disastrous results and such fateful long-range consequences.

The 1948 American arms embargo on Palestine was a product of concerted and consecutive efforts of the State Department and the British Foreign Office. In its initial stages it was launched by State Department officials who were intent on minimizing any American role in the implementation of the projected partition plan—despite the fact that this move was clearly at cross-purposes with the announced policy of the president. President Truman was correct when he charged in his memoirs that certain members of the State Department were less than faithful in supporting his policy.[84] He was incorrect, however, in asserting that

[82] Ibid., May 4, 1976 (Translation from Hebrew by author).

[83] Ibid., May 6, 1976. It is to be noted that ten days earlier, April 26, 1948, the U.S. ambassador to Cairo, S. Pinkney Tuck, had cabled that the Egyptian prime minister was opposed to the invasion of Palestine "generally, and by Egypt in particular," in *FRUS 1948*, pp. 862–63; but compare ibid., p. 872.

[84] "I was always aware of the fact that not all my advisers looked at the Palestine problem in the same manner I did. . . . The Department of State's specialists on the Near East were, almost without exception, unfriendly to the idea of a Jewish state. . . . I was never convinced by these arguments. . . . Like most of the British diplomats, some of our diplomats also thought that the Arabs, on account of their numbers and because of the fact that they controlled such immense oil resources, should be appeased. . . . But I wanted to make it plain that the President of the United States, and not the second or third echelon in the State Department, is responsible for

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only second- or third-echelon staffers were involved. For, in fact, his most senior officials failed to adhere to the policy line that he had set.

With his act of recognizing the state of Israel, Truman jettisoned the whole ballast of the State Department on the Palestine question. It was at this point that the British stepped in and, highlighting the tensions arising out of the cold war, prevailed on the U.S. administration to maintain the embargo policy. Likewise, State Department officials used the shock of recognition to stay the president's hand. Thus, external and internal forces interacted to maintain the status quo.

The American retreat from partition, engineered by the State Department and characterized by the institution and maintenance of the arms embargo, however, encouraged wavering Arab states to believe that their endeavors to frustrate implementation of partition would go unchecked. Thus Egypt was led to intervene in the Palestine conflict with such fateful consequences for Middle East history over the course of the next three decades.*

making foreign policy, and, furthermore, that no one in any department can sabotage the President's policy. . . . In the Palestine situation, as Secretary Lovett said to me after the announcement of the recognition of Israel, 'They almost put it over on you' " (Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, pp. 190–94).

* This paper forms part of a broader ongoing study of the United States and the Middle East. The author is grateful to the Harry S. Truman Library, the Littauer Foundation, and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University for their generous support toward this research.

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The Political Lessons of Two World War II Novels: A Review Essay

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

Forty years ago this September World War II began. The memory of this greatest of all human conflicts has reached a kind of middle age. It is no longer green. The leaders of the warring nations have long since passed from the scene. The world that the war made is disappearing. New issues, even entirely new nations, have arisen. The memoirs have all, or almost all, been written.

But the war is not wholly remote from us. Its survivors are still numerous. Its history is not yet of interest solely for the purposes of scholarly dissection. If World War II is no longer what the Vietnam War, whose wounds have not yet healed, still is, neither has it quite become World War I, which enflamed European passions for decades afterward but now matters only to historians.

World War II is the subject of a 1900-page, two-volume work by the novelist Herman Wouk, which falls somewhere between fiction and history.[1] Since both have been best sellers, it is likely that more Americans have learned about, or remembered, the war through Wouk's account than from any other single source in the last decade. The literary form that he has chosen—he calls it a "historical romance"—is well suited to the portrayal of those things that seem, in retrospect, most important about the war: its scope, the leaders who conducted it, its effects on ordinary people, the great naval struggle for control of the Pacific, and the Holocaust. The books' central characters, an American naval officer named Victor "Pug" Henry and his family, are fictional. The

[1] Herman Wouk, *The Winds of War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) and *War and Remembrance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

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events in which they are caught up, however, are real and are described in scrupulous detail with impressive fidelity to the historical record. The first volume, *The Winds of War*, carries the Henrys from the invasion of Poland to Pearl Harbor; the second, *War and Remembrance*, from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima.

A memorandum he writes from Berlin, where he is posted as naval attaché in 1939, predicting the Nazi-Soviet Pact brings Victor Henry to the attention of Franklin D. Roosevelt. As a special presidential envoy, he comes to meet Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, and even Mussolini. He is present at the summit meetings off Nova Scotia in 1940 and in Teheran in 1943. He is in London during the Battle of Britain; accompanies the Harriman-Beaverbrook mission to Moscow in 1941; and, in Russia again, tours the front in 1944. His naval service brings him to Pearl Harbor on the morrow of the Japanese attack, and he takes part in the battles of Midway, Guadalcanal, and Leyte Gulf. Along the way he comes in contact with people working on the Manhattan Project. And what little he misses, members of his family see: Poland under attack, the campaign in North Africa, the fall of Singapore, and, most vividly and terribly, Auschwitz.

The ordinary person who is privy to extraordinary men and events is a familiar literary device. Upton Sinclair's Lanny Budd rubs shoulders with the high and the mighty. More recently in Gore Vidal's *Burr*, the narrator, Charlie Schuyler, serves as Aaron Burr's amanuensis and meets, or hears Burr's first-hand accounts of, the leading personalities of the American Revolution. Schuyler is simply an observer; the Henrys are caught up in events. And they are more concrete and fully drawn characters than the family that plays an important part in another recent amalgam of fiction and history, E.L. Doctorow's *Ragtime*.

Literary critics have given higher marks as works of fiction to *Burr* and *Ragtime* than to Wouk's opus, which they have fixed firmly in the category of "middlebrow" writing. (The book's prominence on national best-seller lists has no doubt reinforced this general opinion.) If literary critics have on the whole been reserved in their enthusiasm for *The Winds of War* and *War and Remembrance*, historians have simply ignored them. They do not qualify as works of history at all.

Wouk's aim, however, was to create something that was neither purely fictional nor straightforwardly historical. His intention, he says in the foreword to the second volume, is for the reader to "remember what happened in the worst world catastrophe." To this task his hybrid literary genre turns out to be singularly appropriate.

It was a global war. The unity of the planet in our age of instantaneous worldwide communication and daily transcontinental jet transportation seems a commonplace. The war of 1939 to 1945 was, however, the first time that all the land masses and oceans of the globe were the stage of a single enterprise. World War I spread from Europe to the Middle East. World War II engulfed Africa, East and South Asia, and the South Pacific as well.

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Conventional histories of the war find it difficult to tie together these far-flung theaters. Wouk successfully integrates them. Victor Henry himself is a unifying thread; as Roosevelt's personal envoy he shuttles around the world. The United States Navy is another: Henry and his sons—the elder, Warren, a carrier pilot; the younger, Byron, a submariner—see action in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

A special invention of the two novels brings home the scope of the war with particular force. The narrative is interspersed with chapters from the war memoirs of a member of the German General Staff named Armin von Roon, which Victor Henry has translated into English during his retirement. Although Roon is a fictional character, his memoir, *World Empire Lost*, is based on actual postwar writings of German officers. For Roon, the war's global dimension offered opportunities that could have changed history. The two principal theaters of operation might have become linked, and if they had been, the course of the war might have been different, but because of German and Japanese decisions they never were.

In the fall of 1941 the Japanese might, for example, have struck Siberia rather than Hawaii. Coming on the heels of the German onslaught, this might have finished the Soviet Union. Another turning point came in early 1942. After Pearl Harbor and Barbarossa, Axis strength stood at high tide. Japan had pinned the United States back in the western Pacific; Hitler's legions were at the gates of Moscow. Had the Germans held their eastern lines and turned their full attention to North Africa and the Middle East, and had the Japanese swept south, through India to the Persian Gulf, together they might have crushed the tottering British Empire, in Roon's words, "like a nutcracker," linked up in the Middle East with its huge reserves of oil, and then turned on their principal foes, the United States and the Soviet Union, with greater strength than they ultimately mustered.[2] Plans for such strategic thrusts were floating around both the German and the Japanese high commands. But they chose differently. Both turned east: the Japanese toward Midway, the Germans toward Stalingrad, decisive battles that they would lose and that would mark the beginning of the end of their thrusts for world empire.

Wouk's two books give more vivid pictures of the principal leaders of the war than military and political history could. Fiction is better than history at showing "how it really was" where matters of human character are concerned. And the characters of national leaders were crucial during World War II. A few men held their nations' destinies more firmly in their hands than at any time since the defeat of Napoleon. "It all boils down to Hitler's impulses nowadays" Wouk has Roosevelt say of European affairs in 1940.[3] Roosevelt himself became the arbiter of American policy after Pearl Harbor; Churchill dominated his war cabinet and thus British policy; and Stalin, as absolute a ruler as Hitler, like his German

[2] *War and Remembrance*, p. 210.
[3] *The Winds of War*, p. 579.

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counterpart not only made the major Soviet strategic decisions himself—often seemingly without any consultations—but also controlled day-to-day operations in the field, sometimes conferring hourly with his generals.

War during the nineteenth century, and between 1914 and 1918, was war by committee. World War II was a war of the warlords. Victor Henry meets them all. The Hitler he encounters is a study in contrast. On one occasion he is shy, pasty-faced, and unprepossessing. The American finds him wholly ordinary, "all the Germans rolled into one."[4] In an unguarded moment he is even clumsy and waiflike. It is as if he were returning the compliment of "The Great Dictator" by imitating Charlie Chaplin's "Little Tramp." On another occasion, however, Hitler is a powerful, raging orator, pouring out venom against his enemies. His magnetic appeal is all too apparent. Far from a "half-crazy, half-comical gangster," Henry tells Roosevelt, Hitler is "a very able man."[5]

Henry glimpses Stalin at a Kremlin reception, and later, as a personal emissary of Harry Hopkins, has a private meeting with him. Short, with a noticeably pock-marked face, immaculately dressed, the Soviet dictator says little. When he does speak, however, the attention he commands from the other Russians present makes clear his enormous power. He can be emphatic, and eloquent when he chooses, such as on the need for a second front in Europe.

Churchill is a jolly, fussy, playful Toby jug of a man, but with an iron determination to beat Hitler that gleams through the light banter and cigar smoke with which he surrounds himself.

Franklin Roosevelt is the subject of the fullest, richest portrait of the four. Victor Henry finds a sugary coating covering a hard nut; a cheery, casual, slightly comic aristocratic veneer masking cunning and purpose. Wouk is no revisionist. His Roosevelt does not conduct foreign policy haphazardly, without clear direction. He is as determined to defeat Hitler as is Churchill, but is acutely wary of the fickleness of American public opinion and resolved not to race too far ahead of his countrymen.

Where the warlords led between 1939 and 1945, millions followed. No one was untouched by the war, not even Americans, who were the safest of all the belligerents from its ravages. The virtue of historical fiction is precisely its capacity to show how great events affect ordinary people. The most famous example is the classic from which Wouk has drawn at least indirect inspiration, Tolstoy's *War and Peace*.

The lives of the Henry family form the counterpoint to the overarching theme of the world at war. Wouk is less artful at romance than he is at history. He is a workmanlike, even accomplished, novelist, but he is hardly to be compared to Tolstoy. The axes of the domestic subplot are the romantic entanglements of Victor Henry with Pamela Tudsbury, an English woman twenty years his junior and the daughter of a peripatetic journalist whom she accompanies as he covers the war, and of Byron Henry with Natalie Jastrow, a Jewish Radcliffe graduate

[4] Ibid., p. 301.
[5] Ibid.

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and the niece of Aaron Jastrow, an American historian living in Italy who is patterned after Bernard Berenson. The two romances are conducted throughout the war and across the continents and oceans. Both result in marriage—"Pug" and Pamela near the end of the war, Byron and Natalie at the outset. Neither is an altogether plausible match. The second, especially, seems to be included as much to bear the weight of the historical theme as for its own sake: Natalie and Aaron are trapped in Europe as the Germans conquer it and share the fate of the continent's Jews.

Neither, however, are the matches wholly implausible. The war did forge hasty, unlikely liaisons, even as it dissolved marriages and families. And one effect of the war on ordinary people Wouk portrays uncommonly well. The death of Victor Henry's son Warren, who is shot down at Midway, is superbly rendered. It is a powerful reminder of the price of war.

If the central wartime experience of national leaders is the making of great decisions, that of ordinary men is combat. Accounts of combat come in two varieties. Most military histories chart the overall pattern of battles, like running accounts of chess games. They afford a commander's eye view of things. All too rarely is what the man under fire sees and feels recorded. Wouk describes combat from both points of view and for each of the two very different main theaters of World War II.

The war in Europe was a war of the nations, a brutal death struggle on land among peoples, above all the Russians and the Germans, who hated each other deeply. Roon's memoir gives a German commander's perspective on the European war, and the narrative provides glimpses of some of its crucial moments from ground level. Byron Henry finds himself in Poland when the Germans attack in September 1939. Victor Henry rides along on an RAF night raid over Berlin in 1940. He tours the Russian front in 1941, coming under fire outside Moscow, and walks through the rubble of Stalingrad and the ghost town that Leningrad has become three years later.

The war in the Pacific was mainly a naval war, and a war of the professionals. Wouk furnishes glimpses of the principal American naval commanders, Nimitz, Spruance, and Halsey. He gives splendid descriptions of the Battle of Midway, the turning point of the Pacific campaign and perhaps the most important naval engagement of the twentieth century, and of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, which had a less decisive impact on the course of the war but was, by the number of ships involved, a bigger battle.

He gives too a sailor's eye view of all three kinds of naval warfare. Warren Henry pilots a dive bomber against Japanese aircraft carriers off Midway. The heavy cruiser that Victor Henry commands is sunk by a Japanese torpedo in the Battle of Tassaforanga. Byron Henry's submarine sinks a freighter and later a troop ship, and is itself badly damaged by a depth charge and forced into desperate, and ultimately successful, evasive maneuvers. All are vividly portrayed.

The naval war in the Pacific is perhaps the part of Wouk's tale that is most decisively part of the past and least connected with the events of our own day.

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Like the war in Europe, it was the greatest of its kind, measured by the men and material involved, that has ever been fought. Unlike the war in Europe, it is probably the last of its kind that ever will be fought. Tanks, infantry, and supporting aircraft have clashed frequently since 1945. Since the end of World War II there has, however, been no combat between aircraft carriers. It is unlikely that there ever will be. The march of technology has overtaken them.

A foreshadowing of the carrier's probable fate occurs at the end of *The Winds of War*, when Victor Henry flies to Pearl Harbor to fulfill his lifelong dream by assuming command of the battleship, only to find that his ship has been smashed beyond repair by Japanese planes. He had disdained carriers, believing that the heavy-armored battleship, with its booming guns, would remain the heart of the modern fleet. As he gazes on the wreckage in Pearl Harbor he realizes that in this, "the one crucial judgment of his profession," he has been wrong.[6] The war in the Pacific, he recognizes instantly, will be principally a carrier war, with battleships serving as escorts or spectators.

In another major naval conflict carriers would likely meet the same fate that awaited battleships in 1941. Today's models are far larger and carry much more airborne firepower than their World War II ancestors. But they are perilously vulnerable to air power launched from long distances away. In the battle of Midway that Wouk describes, American B-17 bombers fly sorties against the Japanese carriers; but the height at which they must operate degrades their accuracy to the point that the bombs fall harmlessly into the sea. Today, with television and computer-guided bombs, with missiles that can be launched with pinpoint accuracy against targets halfway around the world, the descendants of those bombers would probably not miss.

History, as well as military history, comes in two varieties. Traditionally it has taken a narrative form. Wouk's historical romance is simply traditional history, with fictional characters added to depict the lives of the Indians in addition to the policies of chiefs about which historians have always written. More recently professional historians have turned from description to analysis, from narrative to argument. Their emphasis has shifted from showing what happened to trying to explain why. There is an argument running through Wouk's opus, which, with the course of the war and the fate of the Henry family, stands as its third major theme.

It centers on the German question. Why did the Germans do it? Why did they cause so much trouble? Why, especially, did they behave in such brutal, aggressive fashion? These questions arise again and again, and Wouk has different characters give different answers. Together they make for a symposium on the central puzzle of the twentieth century.

There is the geopolitical explanation. According to Roon, Germany did what great nations always do: it made a bid for world power. There are cultural explanations: one person describes the Third Reich as romanticism gone berserk; another emphasizes the peculiar rigidity of the German character. There is the

[6] Ibid., p. 839.

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political explanation: Germany as a nation thrown into turmoil by the Great Depression and succumbing to the extremism that is "the universal tuberculosis of modern society."[7] There is a historical explanation. Aaron Jastrow at first sees Hitler as another of the great conquerors set upon the European stage to serve as an agent of history's sweeping purpose, in this case the destruction of the petty, obsolete, cumbersome political units into which Europeans have been divided, leading to the unification of the continent.

The heart of the German question is the fate of the Jews under the Third Reich. World War II was really three conflicts: the battle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with Britain and the United States playing secondary but crucial parts, for control of Europe; the struggle between Japan and the United States for mastery of the Pacific; and the unequal conquest between the Nazis and Europe's defenseless Jews. Wouk describes this terrible slaughter from beginning to end; from the Nuremberg Laws, which cause a Jewish merchant to seek out Victor Henry in Berlin in 1939 and ask the American to rent his house, to Auschwitz, where one of Aaron Jastrow's Polish relatives is sent as a laborer and where Aaron and Natalie finally arrive in early 1945.

No doubt a fully adequate appreciation of Auschwitz is impossible to convey in print. By portraying the German officials as well as the victims, by describing day-to-day existence in the camp based on such records as there are and on the memoirs of survivors, however, Wouk does bring what he calls the "sinister red stain on all mankind" to a kind of grim life.[8]

The description of the war against the Jews gives the two books their enduring message, a message that neither plain fiction nor standard history could convey as forcefully. It is not the only, nor perhaps the primary, message that the author intends. His theme, he says in the foreword to *War and Remembrance*, is the obsolescence of organized human conflict: "either war is finished or we are."[9] The last scene of *War and Remembrance* is Hiroshima.

Auschwitz, however, leaves a more powerful impression. Historians of World War I, and now of the Vietnam War, have tended to investigate each war's origins as a way of asking why each conflict was fought. In retrospect neither seems to have been worth fighting. World War II raises no such question. It was a war that had to be fought because it was a war against evil. That is the enduring lesson that it has to teach.

In contrast to Auschwitz stands Victor Henry himself. If he is flawed as a fictional creation it is because he is too tough, too down to earth, too much what his wife Rhoda calls him, "something simple and almost obsolete . . . a patriot."[10] He is too much what he is because he is a symbol—of the basic decency and strength, of Americans and America, that stopped Hitler and saved the world from barbarism. He is the expression of the fact that, for Americans as

[7] *War and Remembrance*, p. 610.
[8] Ibid., p. 726.
[9] Ibid., p. 973.
[10] *The Winds of War*, p. 230.

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well as for Englishmen, World War II was our finest hour. The world has been a far better place because the war was fought and won, and American power, which has been put to uses that have seemed less than noble in the years since, helped to win it. His elder son, Victor Henry writes to the younger one, "died in a right and great cause."[11] Forty years later, that is something worth remembering.

[11] *War and Remembrance*, p. 1022.

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Book Reviews

The Presidential Experience: What the Office Does to the Man *by Bruce Buchanan. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1979. 198 pp. Cloth $8.95; paper $3.95.*

In a famous passage, Woodrow Wilson declared that the president is at liberty "to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit." What Buchanan does in this book is to study the psychological environment of the office to show how *it* limits the occupant.

Buchanan identifies four principal functions performed by presidents: policy advocate, symbol, mediator, and crisis manager. He points out that the president, in discharging those duties, necessarily encounters frustration, dissonance (leading to misrepresentation and lying), deference from subordinates and the public, and stress. Cumulative exposures to these stimuli eventually condition, in Pavlovian manner, "the perceptions and responses of presidents" (p. 25).

Building on James David Barber's characterization, Buchanan emphasizes the importance of self-esteem and relies heavily on self-concept theory. He agrees with Barber that active-positives are preferable as president, but concludes that the dynamics of the political process and the electoral system will most likely produce candidates possessing compensatory power-striving, authoritarian, and other "pathological" traits. For institutional remedies, he recommends that citizens be educated to become more skeptical and watchful about the presidential office. He also advocates two legislative remedies: a question period and a censure motion.

Buchanan draws principally from the behavioral sciences: clinical psychology, social psychology, and personality dynamics. The literature is shaky and tentative, and will probably remain so. Buchanan admits that none of the techniques for measuring self-esteem (a key concept for his study) is widely accepted: "there is great disagreement among measurement specialists concerning how to assess this attribute" (p. 153).

Psychological concepts are elusive; contradictions, inconsistencies, and anomalies abound. Buchanan says that the need of citizens for a human symbol of government "led to an investment—in the presidency and the president—of an aura of majesty, splendor,

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and magnificance fully equal to the most resplendent European monarchies of the eighteenth century" (p. 53). Yet he also concludes that success comes to those who de-royalize the presidency, such as Jefferson and Carter (p. 70). As to the effect of being the nation's symbol, Buchanan isolates two schools of thought: those who believe that the office aggravates a violent egomania, and those who claim that the office ennobles the occupant (p. 54). Interesting alternatives, but what really is the effect?

Buchanan says that an implicit climate of tolerance surrounds the presidency—"a tolerance which has countenanced presidential liberties with the truth for most of the country's history" (p. 79). At the same time, he argues that FDR should have been straightforward on his court-packing plan, instead of playing on the issues of old age and workload. The guile and cleverness of FDR's strategy backfired: "people were struck by its deviousness, and angered that he would compromise his own legitimacy with such a transparent and irrelevant ploy" (p. 114). If so, how much does the public tolerate deception and misrepresentation, and under what conditions? As for stress, we all need it to some degree to function effectively. It is a healthy stimulant. When does "good stress" become "bad stress," and why?

Given an understanding of presidential character, Buchanan believes that the educated public can make fairly accurate predictions about presidential behavior. "No reasonably objective and informed observer could have missed predicting" that the firing of Archibald Cox "would destroy Nixon's moral-symbolic hold on the people" (p. 64). Curiously, he supports that statement with a passage from Theodore White, a reasonably objective and informed observer who failed spectacularly in understanding Nixon's character. In fact, White's passage states that the reaction to the Cox firing produced "an explosion as unpredictable and as sweeping as mass hysteria (p. 64). The record of political scientists with predictions has not been very impressive. Although Buchanan raises a number of interesting issues, we are left with few answers and a host of new questions.

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Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 *by Robert Dallek. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979. 657 pp. $19.95.*

Dallek presents a detailed defense of FDR's foreign policy. Though admitting Roosevelt made mistakes, the author insists that critics have not appreciated the complex situation he confronted. Possessing an uncanny blend of realism and idealism, the president was committed to improving the international climate over the long run. Nevertheless, he realized the need for short-term compromises. Roosevelt also understood that an effective foreign policy required a strong base of domestic support and was reluctant to move beyond what he thought the public would accept.

According to Dallek, from 1933 to 1939, FDR remained somewhat aloof from foreign affairs because Americans were looking inward and because he wanted to inspire others by demonstrating the superiority of democracy. From the outbreak of the European war

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until Pearl Harbor, the president capitalized on overseas events to obtain support from a divided country for pro-Allied actions. During the war, Roosevelt struggled to gain British, Russian, Chinese, and the American public's support for new international understandings. Only the emergence of uncontrollable historical forces kept the story from having a happy ending.

The book has several strong points. It is based on a wide range of source material. The author states his views directly, explaining where he thinks other academics have gone astray. He focuses on the way the difficult domestic environment shaped FDR's actions and describes how complex situations often led to unintended results. Finally, he demonstrates conclusively that Roosevelt was ambivalent toward Russia. FDR's apprehensions about Soviet power influenced his attitude toward occupied territory, Britain, China, and control of the A-bomb and inclined him toward a get-tough policy.

The book's shortcomings lie with certain of the author's interpretations and his reluctance to push promising lines of inquiry. Believing the president's objectives were in the nation's best interests, he tolerates FDR's secretive acts. The true culprits become those whose shortsightedness compelled the president to act surreptitiously. The fact that Roosevelt supported colonial self-determination only when under public pressure to do so elicits little comment. Dallek, furthermore, might have noted that some of FDR's domestic problems were attributable to his poor performance as a party leader.

Of greater concern, the author fails to examine the contradictory aspects of Roosevelt's Soviet policy. What he terms realism—FDR's apprehensions—occasionally caused the president to approve measures that generated friction. To assert that Russian suspicions doomed conciliatory gestures is unconvincing in lieu of persuasive evidence that this was the case. It also is mildly hypocritical: why were U.S. suspicions wise but Soviet ones menacing? In an attempt to cast FDR in a more favorable light, Dallek contends that Roosevelt, in his meeting with Niels Bohr, was signaling Stalin of his intention to share A-bomb secrets. Readers should examine Martin Sherwin's account of this episode.

The book's biggest disappointment is in the area that had most promise: the impact of internal affairs on foreign policy. By stressing the degree to which public opinion restricted Roosevelt, the author ignores literature showing how presidents can manipulate events to their advantage. While they do not have a free hand, they have maneuvering room. In all likelihood, FDR was not as hemmed in as he liked to maintain. In addition, Dallek implies that the struggle between internationalists and isolationists was the main cause of domestic disunity. Yet by 1935, New Deal reforms, with their implications for the future, were the major source of tensions. The latter formed prisms through which individuals interpreted foreign events and related them to the domestic power struggle. Unfortunately Dallek is too concerned with using the internal deadlock to justify FDR's actions to appreciate how domestic tensions decisively shaped American diplomacy.

The book, however, is essential reading for those interested in the Roosevelt years. It covers the major issues effectively and represents the strengths and weaknesses of traditional diplomatic history.

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Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left *by Sara Evans. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 274 pp. $10.00*

This is an excellent account of the development of the contemporary women's movement. Excerpts from oral interviews, activist group publications, and personal correspondences document the evolution of the women's movement out of the civil rights and New Left movements of the 1960s.

The author uses a theoretically based approach (instead of the usual personal experience approach) to examine the linkages between female activists in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. She finds a high degree of interlocking among female participants in the earlier southern civil rights and northern New Left movements, and the more recent women's movement.

Evans begins with a macro-level look at the impact of changes in the educational and economic activities of American women in the late 1950s on the erosion of the housewife role—a role at its peak of acceptance in the 1950s. She then takes a more micro-level look at the socioeconomic backgrounds of activist women by race and region. Particularly insightful is her discussion of the backgrounds of southern white women active in the civil rights movement. She finds religion (Protestantism) to be the common ideological bond and religious groups on southern university campuses to be the common recruitment ground. In contrast, white female activists from the North are found to come from middle- or upper-class families with a history of liberal activism. These young women tended to be recruited from high school and college organizational leadership positions.

Black females, predominantly active in the civil rights movement as opposed to the New Left movement, are found to be southerners. They tended to come from two age groups. The younger activists were political activists recruited from black college campuses. The middle-age activists were primarily social activists centered in the black community.

The role conflicts that encompassed these women activists are portrayed in a highly descriptive manner. Among white females, the conflict came largely from family and friends. Among black females, the greatest conflict was with white women activists. The author's discussion of this racial conflict is particularly important to understanding the eventual fragmentation of the women's movement, often along racial lines.

Most intriguing about *Personal Politics* is its discussion of the benefits and liabilities of female participation in the southern civil rights and northern New Left movements in terms of the development of the women's movement. (The linkage between the movements was a consequence of the participation of a small group of women in each of these movements.) Participation was predominantly exercised in organizations dominating the respective movements (Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee—civil rights movement; Students for a Democratic Society, Economic Research and Action Project—New Left movement).

The benefits of participation in the early movements were found to be of two types: personal and ideological. Participation from a personal perspective increased the self-confidence and self-assertiveness of female activists. It also improved their oratorical and

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organizational skills and created a nationwide network of female activists that was eventually used to mobilize support for the women's movement.

Participation in these organizations also created a common ideologically based discontent among these female activists with regard to their "proper" organizational roles. Evans skillfully documents the increasing frustration and anger among these women and their successors as they were repeatedly assigned to traditional women's roles (housekeeping, clerical and secretarial, sexual) by male leaders. As the author states, women were "implementors and listeners" (p. 113). But while they were highly effective, particularly in community organizing efforts, "men were [always] the stars" (p. 149). Women were also uniformly excluded from the policy-formation activities of the organizations even though they were expected to implement the policy. Such treatment was, of course, contradictory to the ideological goal (human equality) of each of these movements. Such a contradiction became the seed of discontent out of which grew the contemporary women's movement.

In a forthright and refreshingly honest manner, the author also focuses on the liabilities of participation in earlier movements, largely from an organizational perspective. Specifically, Evans notes that the transmittal of the antileadership philosophy of the earlier movements led to the organizational fragmentation of the women's movement. Likewise, transmittal of the revolutionary values of *within*-organization egalitarianism and cooperation led to further fragmentation by failing to give the movement programmatic focus. According to the author, "the lack of structure and of responsible leadership led, inevitably, to a loss of internal coherence as the women's movement expanded" (p. 223).

It is unfortunate that the author abandons her discussion of the liabilities of participation in earlier movements in the final chapter. Instead of continuing her parallel between the evolution of earlier movements of the 1960s and that of the women's movement of the 1970s, Evans concludes that the women's movement will halt its splintering as consciousness-raising activities increase. By doing so she ignores the evidence regarding the evolution of the civil rights and New Left movements. Those movements demonstrated that any movement whose membership is initially unified by a broad ideological goal will eventually fragment, usually along socioeconomic lines, when the means and methods of reaching that goal begin to be discussed. In the end Evans ignores the powerful influence of education, religion, economic class, and family background in creating differences of opinion among women with regard to implementation of "women's rights" policies. These differences are, of course, reflected in the emergence of varied styles of personal politics—a theme prevalent in the book's beginning but abandoned in the end.

Overall, *Personal Politics* should be read by all students of organizational theory and by persons interested in the linkages between the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. It is well written, well researched, and highly provocative.

Susan A. MacManus
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Lobbying the Corporation: Citizen Challenges to Business Authority *by David Vogel. New York, Basic Books, 1979. 270 pp. $14.95.*

There is perhaps no problem in twentieth-century American history more persistent or less tractable than the place of the large corporation in our common life. Nothing could be more obvious than the massive presence of a few hundred corporations with names familiar to everyone. Their influence is pervasive in a multitude of ways, some open and others subtle. And yet we have no clear or agreed-on set of ideas by which their power or even existence is legitimate. The basis on which they operate is itself founded on legal fictions more than a little touched with absurdity. To consider that Exxon, for example, has any of the characteristics of a person should cause laughter. And the crude parody of democratic self-government by vote of stockholders has long been so transparent that almost no one takes the pretense seriously. Yet the sheer power of these behemoths in a supposedly democratic society persists and even grows.

Although the conceptual problem has drawn a fairly consistent flow of legal, economic, and political studies since the turn of the century, it remains as murky as ever. Efforts to cope with the more immediate and practical problems posed by the large corporations have been more sporadic and have tended to ride intermittent waves of popular distrust and activism. We have recently witnessed one such wave, a large one. This occurred in the sixties and early seventies and was associated loosely, but not exclusively, with the New Left.

This wave is the topic of an unusually reflective and perceptive book by David Vogel, a political scientist at the School of Business of the University of California at Berkeley. As the title intimates, Vogel finds the recent wave different from most of its predecessors in that it has not sought governmental action except incidentally. It has been characterized instead by action intended to influence the behavior of corporations directly. Thus, most of the book is given over to accounts of a number of campaigns focused on particular corporations and specific perceived evils: Campaign GM, the effort of the Council to Advocate Public Utility Responsibility, the Project on Corporate Responsibility of the National Council of Churches, and a number of others. The objectives of all of these campaigns have been either to end particular activities—for example, the manufacture of napalm by Dow or antipersonnel weapons by Honeywell, investment and trade with South Africa—or to gain access in other areas, such as the employment of blacks and women, the representation of the public on corporate boards, and general public participation in corporate decisions.

Vogel particularly emphasizes the new reformers' distrust of government and tendency to equate the evils of both forms of authority. Their techniques have been borrowed from the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement: picketing, protest meetings, appearance at stockholders meetings to ask questions, offer resolutions, and so on. In this sense there is a slight inaccuracy in the word "lobbying" as it appears in the title of the book.

What has this recent wave amounted to? If we assume that the wave has now spent its force, as seems likely, the answer has to be: rather little. A few directorships have gone to women and blacks, there is somewhat more disclosure of corporate doings than in the past, and a few reforms of particular policies of some corporations have been made.

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Nevertheless, corporations continue to assert their autonomy. Business leaders have been shaken by the confrontations they have had to face, but it would be difficult to establish that many of these leaders perceive that they have anything more of a problem than one of public relations.

Perhaps this is what should have been expected from any effort to hobble corporate power. As Vogel implicitly indicates in his excellent opening chapter, however, ultimate failure of the recent wave was foreordained by the refusal of its activists to seek explicitly political—that is to say, governmental—solutions. Ironically, then, failure was dictated by the very sources of the recent movement in the civil rights and antiwar movements with their indiscriminate hostility to government. As is now evident, business leaders with their political action committees proved shrewder and more comprehending. Meanwhile the problem of the place of the large corporation in our society remains unresolved.

GRANT MCCONNELL
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Curing Chronic Inflation *edited by Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978. 297 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

In the United States most wages and prices respond only slowly to excess supplies. During the severe recession of 1974–75 prices continued to rise at a 6 percent rate and wages at an 8 percent rate. It seems apparent that curing inflation, currently viewed by the public as the number one economic problem, with traditional monetary and fiscal policy tools would involve politically unacceptable sacrifices in real output. The alternative is an incomes policy. The papers and proceedings of *Curing Chronic Inflation* analyze and discuss the costs and benefits of a variety of such policies. The focus of the volume is on proposals that would use the tax code as a vehicle for providing incentives for moderate wage and price behavior.

Several variants of the tax-based incomes policy (TIP) have been suggested. The original proposal of Henry Wallich and Sidney Weintraub ("A Tax-Based Incomes Policy," *Journal of Economic Issues* 5 [June 1971]) would impose a penalty tax, in the form of an increased corporate income tax rate, on employers who grant excessive increases in wages. In principle, the arrangement could be extended to discourage excessive increases in prices. Arthur Okun ("The Great Stagflation Swamp," *Challenge* 20 [November-December, 1977]) has described a reward TIP that would provide tax-relief incentives to employees of firms whose wage and price policies conform to national economic guideposts. Another possibility would be to disallow excessive wage increases as deductions from revenue in computing corporate taxes.

The introductory essay by George Perry—"Slowing the Wage-Price Spiral"—summarizes the behavior of wages and prices over the postwar period and presents evidence that wages have been less responsive to excess labor supply during the current decade. His empirical results indicate that the cost of a 1 percent decrease in the inflation rate,

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engineered by conventional monetary or fiscal policies, would result in an output loss of about $180 billion.

A second paper by Laurence S. Seidman, "Tax Based Incomes Policies," provides an analytical framework for the discussion of alternative TIPs. He examines the microeconomic decision process through which reward and penalty TIPs could operate and shows how these decisions might be expected to influence the macroeconomy. One would expect that a penalty TIP on wages would be contractionary, lowering both wages and employment. Indeed, this is what Seidman discovers in his "myopic" model. For the TIP to have the desired disinflationary effect on wages for a given level of employment, firms must have excess job applicants at prevailing wages. This could be the case for firms that pay high current wages as a personnel investment policy. If this were so, as Seidman illustrates with his "value-maximization" model, a penalty TIP on wages could be expected to lower current wages leaving employment unchanged. Firms would have an incentive to grant smaller increases in wages to avoid incurring a higher corporate tax rate. Seidman then presents some empirical evidence indicating that a measure of aggregate profits and wages are positively correlated and, by implication, evidence that TIP, by "squeezing" profits, would reduce wage inflation. While his analysis of alternative TIP plans is interesting, one must conclude that the mechanism by which a penalty TIP would reduce wage inflation without reducing employment is quite tenuous, especially in view of the rough nature of the empirical evidence.

Other essays included in the volume evaluate prospective TIPs on the basis of administrative feasibility and political acceptability. A sixth essay by Robert Crandall explores federal government policy options to reduce the price level.

A majority of conference participants expressed a preference for a penalty wage TIP levied on employers, primarily for reasons of administrative feasibility and the belief that there is a strong line between wages and prices. However, as a number of discussants point out, any workable incomes policy would have to be based on a substantial social and political consensus in favor of disinflation. Furthermore, to insure such a consensus under a TIP program, it would be necessary to extend the penalties or rewards to cover price behavior of at least the largest corporations, seriously complicating the administrative task. If such broad support were obtained for any of the various TIPs, inflationary expectations would presumably be revised downward. But this should also be the case if such support were forthcoming for the more conventional wage-price guidelines or a disinflationary monetary policy.

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Boston College

The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House *by Kenneth A. Shepsle. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978. 333 pp. $30.00.*

In many ways this volume by Kenneth Shepsle, a professor of political science at Washington University, is two books, since it is of primary interest to two professional audi-

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ences that overlap only minimally: those who are interested in the details of processes of the United States House of Representatives; and those interested in the formal modeling of political processes.

Shepsle takes a unique data set—the requests by Democratic members of the House for committee assignments and the decisions of the Democratic Committee on Committees in response to those requests at the beginning of eight Congresses (those elected in 1958 through 1974, with the exception of 1968)—and explores it in detail in two quite different ways. The first mode of analysis is based both on interviews with members of the House making requests and granting requests and on reconstruction of past events through qualitative and judgmental analysis of file materials and other "softer" data. The second mode of analysis uses a variety of mathematical techniques to analyze the request data.

How successfully Shepsle marries the two different styles of analysis will have to be judged by those few individuals who are equally expert in both. What is clear, however, is that he has worked carefully, thoroughly, and exhaustively in both modes.

Shepsle's focus is on "who gets assigned to which committees, how they are assigned, and why" (p. 5). His central purpose is "to articulate and test a theory of congressional behavior that addresses these questions" (p. 5). He starts with the notion that a variety of actors—new members seeking their first assignments, returning members seeking transfers or dual assignments, sitting senior committee members, party leaders, and interested parties outside the House—have a variety of different goals. And these goals must be sought within the institutional constraints of the House itself. Thus, the book is "an attempt to examine how self-interest is manifested, channeled, and redirected in an institutional environment" (p. 7).

The findings in the book are numerous and cover most aspects of the elaborate process that is observed. Few of the findings will surprise readers who already have a detailed understanding of the House. One interesting exception is Shepsle's observation that initial assignments do not, in fact, "lock members into particular institutional careers. Changes in committee holdings are quite common" (p. 61). In addition, he finds that congressional committee membership is highly variable and shifting from Congress to Congress and that nearly 40 percent of all changes stem from committee seats awarded to nonfreshmen. Since most changes by nonfreshmen occur whithin their first few terms, this finding suggests that committee memberships may become even more unstable *if* the recent trend toward an increased proportion of relatively more junior members continues.

The change in committee personnel takes place, however, in a rational, routine, and predictable way. The broadest statement of the pattern that Shepsle's analysis uncovers is that "the committee assignment process involves an *interest-advocacy-accommodation syndrome* in which interests are articulated, advanced, and accommodated in a highly institutionalized fashion" (p. 231). Interesting implications of this general finding for the management of the committee system, the functioning of subgovernments in many policy areas, policy innovation, oversight, and committee representativeness are discussed. In general, the assignment process and outcomes reinforce and interact with other aspects of the institutional life of the House to produce the fragmented and conservative body familiar to observers. An epilogue written after the primary analysis had been completed and after some institutional changes were made in the House in late 1974 suggests that those "reforms" altered some details of outcomes in the assignment process for the new

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Congress meeting in 1975 but that the changes were not fundamental. Clearly, the forces producing a stable, conservative, and fragmented institution will not be altered dramatically overnight by changing some of the details of making committee assignments for members of the majority party.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY
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Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure by William J. Crotty. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 318 pp. $16.50.

Following the 1968 Democratic National Convention, the Democratic party initiated a process of changing its procedures for delegate selection and of codifying the rules for its governance. William J. Crotty sets out to narrate "the reform movement and its generative forces, its contributions and its problems" (p. vii).

By a variety of measures the efforts of party reformers were successful. Starting with a vague mandate and uncertain power, they were able to formulate, implement, and defend a new system of presidential nominations. Crotty explains this success through an examination of events occurring within formal party arenas: the most important being the McGovern-Fraser (delegate selection) and O'Hara (rules) commissions, and their successors—the Winograd (primaries), Mikulski (delegate selection), Sanford (charter) commissions, as well as national committee meetings and conventions.

At the risk of overstructuring Crotty's material—he avoids general characterizations in favor of specific detail—the success of the commissions is attributable to several factors. The opponents of reform (the AFL-CIO, state party officials, and regular presidential candidates) consistently failed to participate effectively in shaping rules, and when the consequences for their own power became evident during implementation, their opposition was sporadic and poorly coordinated. In addition, there was a continuing elite consensus on the general desirability of procedural democracy and fairness. National party chairmen, nominee Hubert Humphrey, and insurgent presidential candidates all could agree that a repetition of the 1968 Chicago convention was to be avoided through rules to regularize procedures, to increase a sense of participation in the selection of delegates, and to prohibit blatently unfair practices.

The specific paths that led the McGovern-Fraser and O'Hara commissions to their respective conclusions differed. The McGovern-Fraser commission developed a comprehensive reform agenda, over time, through a process of hearings and meetings orchestrated by its staff. The experience of 1968 and subsequent hearings detailing state delegate selection activities produced an agenda of specific practices that, the commission agreed, ought to be banned. Thus, for example, commission members agreed that the "unit rule" should be abolished because it was a device for silencing minority views on a few delegations. Before long, however, agreement on what should be abolished evolved into a more positive agenda for reform. Thus, a concern over a voice for minority views was expanded to a positive obligation to move toward a system of proportional represen-

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tation. In this manner, the commissions vague mandate changed from correcting specific abuses to making more comprehensive prescriptions.

The O'Hara commission on rules, and the later Sanford commission on the party charter, took a different course. Here the consensus on procedural democracy was translated into a legalistic view of party rules. Thus the process involved codification of procedures, definition of regular jurisdictions for party units, and the creation of quasi-judicial bodies to adjudicate disputes.

This book is limited by its nearly exclusive focus on events occurring within party arenas. It is, perhaps, a too restricted explanation. Many important events occur off-stage. For example, the state by state effort of reform groups to secure compliance was critical to the success of the McGovern-Fraser commission, yet these activities are not treated in depth. On the other side, the strength of the book is that it chronicles in considerable detail activities in national arenas. As in all specialized scholarship, the value of the Crotty book can only be fully realized when other works detailing other important facts of the reform movement are written.

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Creating Jobs: Public Employment Programs and Wage Subsidies *edited by John L. Palmer. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978. 379 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $5.95.*

Events frequently run ahead of policy analysis, and this has certainly been the case with policymakers use of, and interest in, direct measures by the government to stimulate employment, especially for disadvantaged workers. Analysts are struggling to catch up with events in this area, and *Creating Jobs* makes an important contribution toward that end.

This volume presents the results of a Brookings conference convened in 1977 to assess the effects of direct measures to create jobs. It contains eight papers (and commentaries) on the public employment and wage subsidy approaches to dealing with cyclical and structural unemployment. The emphasis is on an economic analysis of the issues, rather than a political or social perspective. The first paper, by the conference organizers, Irwin Garfinkel and John L. Palmer, is extremely useful because it summarizes, synthesizes and interprets many of the principal conclusions of the papers and discussions. The next three papers—"Inflation-Unemployment Consequences of Job Creation Policies" by Martin Neil Bailey and James Tobin, "Subsidies for Jobs in the Private Sector" by Daniel S. Hamermesh, and "Structural Unemployment Consequences of Job Creation Policies" by George E. Johnson—concentrate on macroeconomic issues, such as the possibilities for improving the inflation-unemployment tradeoff, for targeting on individuals most in need, for prompt timing, and for the number of jobs per billion dollars of budget cost. The next three papers are case studies of "Work Relief Programs in the Great Depression" by Jonathan R. Kesselman, "The Dutch Social Employment Program" by Robert H. Haveman, and "Economic Efficiency of Public Employment Programs" (supported work programs in the U.S.) by Peter Kemper and Philip Moss. The final paper, "Participation

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in Public Employment Programs" by David H. Greenberg, analyzes the implications of alternative programs using micro simulations.

One of the most important contributions of the book is its insightful theoretical analysis of economic issues, such as the comparative effectiveness of alternative policies in creating employment. It thus establishes a framework for debate and for further analysis of employment programs and wage subsidies. The papers focus on some of the inherent problems of these approaches and identify relevant factors affecting outcomes. A related contribution is that it warns the reader that these approaches, particularly if they are used on a large scale or have design errors, have serious drawbacks. This theme is present in all or most of the eight papers.

However, it seems to this reviewer that the volume has two general limitations. First, in the first four papers, which are primarily theoretical, the authors sometimes reach conclusions about how programs and policies actually operate, or the net impact of various factors—sometimes contrasting factors—without presenting sufficient empirical evidence. For example, the reader learns that public employment has certain potentials as a countercyclical tool in terms of jobs per billion dollars of public funds, targeting, and timing, but there are problems on each of these counts such as fiscal substitution and the skilled nature of local public employment in general. It is implied that the public employment approach, as it actually operates, offers little advantage over conventional monetary and fiscal tools because of these deficiencies, but the evidence presented is incomplete and not particularly balanced. With respect to wage subsidies, the reader is left with a somewhat more optimistic impression of the efficacy of this approach as a countercyclical tool; but some analysts are more doubtful about its net short-run impact on employment or on the distribution of opportunities.

The papers, moreover, might have been more insightful if more attention had been paid to political and social considerations, as well as to economic analysis. For example, at some places in the discussions of countercyclical policies to stimulate employment, differences among policies in timing, targeting, and "bang per buck" (jobs per billion dollars of budget cost) seem to be minimized. In the most recent context in which such policies were adopted, however, there was great concern about how slowly conventional policies operate in affecting high unemployment rates of disadvantaged groups and about the need to slow inflation and simultaneously reduce economic slack. In that context, differences that may seem small from the perspective of macroeconomic theory can be important.

In sum, for the specialist or even the person with a casual interest, *Creating Jobs* is a rewarding source book, but it is not intended, nor should it be taken as, "all policymakers need to know about creating jobs."

GEORGE IDEN
Congressional Budget Office

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Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption *by Lawrence W. Sherman. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 273 pp. $14.50.*

Public events influence scholarly research. The area of government corruption is no exception. The post-Watergate era has generated federal grants to study this phenomena as well as a substantial body of literature. Lawrence W. Sherman is no stranger to this literature. In this volume, Professor Sherman mines and synthesizes this literature with the literature on organizational theory and organizational deviance.

The thread of organizational-environmental interaction admirably integrates the entire study of police goals, corruption, scandal, and organizational reform. Based on his analysis of four police departments, Sherman views corruption and subsequent scandal as derivatives of organizational goal conflicts as they relate to environmental composition, diversity, and interaction. "Given the unstable structure of accommodations in the police environment, it is not surprising that police scandals seem to occur more frequently than scandals over other kinds of organizations" (p. xvii).

Scandal, however, is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reform of police corruption. Reform can only succeed if it serves as a sanction to punish deviance and as a prelude to realignment of the department's working environment, to internal dominant coalition, and ultimately to organizational strategies, policies, and devices for controlling corruption.

These conclusions are derived from a detailed chronological and analytical exposition of the nature and conditions of: goal conflict, corruption, scandal, and external and internal changes necessary to achieve reform. These changes include relationships with such environmental components as the "task environment with its resources for corruption, and the political environment with its pressures for corruption" (p. 134). The former includes such devices as eliminating gambling enforcement in order to minimize the police officer's task authority and discretion. The latter environmental change occurred in two of the cities.

As scandal and environmental changes induced changes in departmental dominant coalitions, the new coalitions sought to limit corruption with preventative and punitive control policies. Most policies were postmonitory, dealing with previous corruption; others, the more effective, were premonitory controls—preventing or detecting ongoing corruption. Contrary to many findings on the intractability of police corruption, Sherman found that the mechanisms of scandals, dismissal rates for corrupt acts, and preventive and punitive policies "can produce a threat of punishment and can reasonably be assumed to have a possible deterrent effect on police corruption activities" (p. 203).

Dr. Sherman presented all this material in a theoretically rich manner, based on intensive and amply detailed research in the cities of New York, Oakland (California), Newburgh (New York), and a pseudonymous Central City. The combination of conceptual and theoretical richness and thorough analysis marks this volume as an important contribution to the literature. Although provacative, the findings must be considered extremely tentative. This derives from rather tenuous distinctions made throughout the study and, more importantly, from flaws in the research's methodology.

Tenuous distinctions emerge, for example, in the discussion of the salience of goal conflict in the revelations of corruption. Since newspapers first revealed corruption in three

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cities, Sherman concludes, "in each case, some participant in the internal decision-making of the newspaper was predisposed to see the police department labeled as corrupt in order to have new police organizational goals adopted" (p. 78). This statement is made without any documentation and discounts the possibility that newspapers could have been motivated by other reasons—for example, the selling of newspapers.

Sherman falls into a similar trap of ascribing motivation in distinguishing between "deviance committed *by* an organization . . . that helps achieve organizational goals" and "deviance committed *in* an organization . . . that does not help to achieve . . . or is harmful to those goals" (pp. 4, 5, emphasis my own). Sherman contrasts price fixing and fraudulent advertising, devices to achieve organizational profit goals, with sexual exploitation of secretaries, which neither benefits nor directly harms organizational goals. But is it not conceivable that sex might be exploited to gain access to superiors for profit goals strategies? These fine-line motivational distinctions are extremely difficult to substantiate.

The methodological problem, however, is more fundamental. One criterion for the selection of the four cities was "a reputation for having successfully controlled corruption under a reform police executive" (p. xx). This criterion stacks the deck and may distort findings. Other selection criteria might include cities that have been unsuccessful in controlling corruption, with and without a reform police executive. The validity of this observation is indirectly underscored: "as it happened, Central City was apparently a case of unsuccessful reform [although he later notes that lack of sufficient resources precluded a follow up] but its failure is very useful in illuminating the conditions of success in the other three departments" (p. xxiv).

At other points, methodological and data weaknesses are more directly acknowledged: "Police administrators have often pointed out that many of my 'data' are based on evidence too weak to obtain even an indictment, let alone a criminal conviction. True enough. But my concern is not with proving that corruption existed; that is taken as an assumption" (p. xx). Sherman astonishingly asserts: "It seems reasonable to assume that smoke is only found near fire, and that a pattern of activity (e.g., prostitution payoffs) would not be alleged about any individual in a city unless it were true of at least some individuals in the city" (p. xxi). Referring to the importance of premonitory policies, Sherman acknowledges that "a larger sample might easily falsify this hypothesis about organizational capacity" (p. 119).

In the final analysis, there is a certain duality in the study. On the one hand, conclusions are reached. On the other hand, "the research design was not intended to allow clear tests of hypotheses. Instead . . . questions were asked . . . to suggest hypotheses worthy of further testing" (p. 204). To this reviewer, this accurately reflects the study's value—provocative hypotheses for future studies. This is no small accomplishment.

ELI B. SILVERMAN
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A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance *by George Cooper. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1979. 115 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper, $2.95.*

In this short, excellent book, George Cooper provides those who make federal tax policy with a valuable and relatively rare commodity: a sophisticated description of what is actually going on "out there" from someone who has no direct economic interest in the outcome.

What Cooper set out to discover is whether the federal estate tax is in fact what the title of his book implies, a voluntary tax. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, according to one estate planner quoted by Cooper, the situation was "you pay an estate tax if you want to; if you don't want to, you don't have to" (p. 1). Despite the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Cooper concludes, the situation is not much different today.

He reaches this conclusion on the basis of extensive interviews with estate planners, a thorough review of estate planning literature, and a detailed analysis of court records in cases involving families whose wealth is sufficient to call forth ingenious and heroic estate planning techniques.

After showing that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has done little to tax the estates of the extremely wealthy, Cooper sets out some additional reform possibilities that he thinks might come closer to doing the job.

Although Cooper does not address the question directly, his book prompts speculation about why estate tax reform efforts have had so little effect. There are a number of likely explanations.

The public consensus supporting the basic goal of the estate and gift tax is probably not as strong as many reformers would like to believe. Since the estate and gift tax does not raise much revenue (about 1 percent of total federal revenues), and since only about 2 percent of all estates actually pay an estate tax, it has to be seen largely as a device to prevent the passing on of great wealth from one generation to the next. The possession of enormous wealth by a few families may appear unlovely to those with a highly egalitarian turn of mind, but is it something that greatly offends the average citizen voter? I doubt it.

Estate tax planning and the countermoves proposed by reformers are too complicated for most legislators to grasp without an inordinate expenditure of time and effort. Estate taxation is pretty heavy going, especially for people who have many other things to worry about, as most legislators do.

Largely because of its low visibility, small revenue yield, and great complexity, it is difficult to get estate and gift tax reform legislation on the congressional agenda. Estate and gift taxes remained essentially unchanged from 1942 to 1976, and only got on the agenda in 1976 because of great pressure for estate tax relief from farmers facing large estate taxes as a result of skyrocketing land prices. Reformers tried to seize this occasion to enact a large backlog of estate tax reforms. The biggest reform enacted in 1976—taxing the capital gains that formerly went untaxed at death—has been repeatedly postponed and remains under siege.

There is no firm consensus among reformers about what an ideal estate tax should look like. At the end of his book, Cooper suggests that a periodic tax on net wealth might be

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substituted for the estate tax. Others have suggested that the tax should be paid by the heirs, based on their ability to pay, rather than being based on the size of the estate.

Until there is more public and professional consensus about what an estate tax should do and to whom, any further efforts at reform are likely to turn into more relief.

JAMES M. VERDIER
Congressional Budget Office

Towards a Philosophy of Administration *by Christopher Hodgkinson. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 244 pp. $18.50.*

Professor Hodgkinson, chairman of educational administration of the University of Victoria, clearly states the theme of his book in the first sentence of the first chapter: "Administration is philosophy in action" (p. 3). As such, he contends that certain components of philosophy should be included in any training program for any type of administrator in the private and in the public sectors. Correctly applying these components, he holds, would produce administrators who have a greater concern for language and meaning, a greater familiarity with the disciplines of formal logic, improved general critical skills, and a heightened self-consciousness of the value elements in organizational decision making. For those of us involved in the professional education of preservice and mid-career executives, this book is timely and very stimulating.

In presenting his argument for a "restoration of dialogue between administrators and philosophers" (p. ix), he organizes his book into three parts. Adopting a Platonic view in Part I, he attempts to elucidate the "meaning" of administration as a generic process. His inquiry focuses on the question: "What are the competencies of administrators" (p. ix)? He finds that these would seem to include knowledge of the general nature of administration itself as a process, the nature of organizations, and the body of theory and practice of decision making, especially in policy formulation. In addition, the competencies include knowledge and skill in the exercise of power, influence, authority, and leadership. In these areas his analyses are influenced very strongly by the work of Herbert Simon and Chester Barnard in particular. For each of these competencies, Hodgkinson provides a thoughtful, competent treatment.

In Part II, the author explicates the concept of "value" from the standpoint of administration. He develops an "analytic model of the value concept" (p. 111). He suggests that this typology of values can be employed to resolve value conflicts. This reviewer suggests that Professor Hodgkinson consider testing his model and his methodology in workshops with practicing executives. In fact, the design and use of such training materials are high on the agenda of the American Society for Public Administration and of the National Academy of Public Administration. More data are needed to assess the effectiveness of his suggested approach.

After reading the first two parts, it is very disappointing to note that there is no acknowledgment of the important contributions of Paul H. Appleby, Stephen K. Bailey, Frederick C. Mosher, Emmette S. Redford, and Dwight Waldo on the subject of adminis-

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trative morality. Disciplinary chauvinism aside, these omissions appear to be a serious gap in Hodgkinson's presentation.

Part III is provocative and stimulating. The author examines "pathologies" (p. 151), or value defects, of administration and their relationship to organizational morality. He explores the question: "To what extent can any collectivity be held responsible in any way commensurate with individual responsibility" (p. 159)? Organizational action, he holds, can often be used by individual members to avoid individual moral responsibility. Associated with organizational morality are four primitive moral imperatives: maintenance, growth, effectiveness, and efficiency. To prevent these "metavalues" (p. 180) from dominating and corrupting the moral or value life of their members, he suggests that they must be consciously reexamined periodically. In examining at length the concept of efficiency, this reviewer has found that the meaning and use of this "metavalue" has been defined, refined, attacked, clarified, and redefined by practitioners and scholars of public administration at many points during the past century.

Professor Hodgkinson concludes his treatise with a set of 317 philosophic propositions intended "to act as a counter irritant against the compulsion towards behaviourism, . . . and, to heighten the awareness of the subtleties and complexities of the human factor" (p. 222). They do.

Many very important questions about administration are posed and examined in this book. There is much "grist" here for graduate seminars in administration and management and workshops for "mid-career" executives. This reviewer recommends it to his colleagues in public administration.

PATRICK J. HENNIGAN
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Essays and Data on American Ethnic Groups *edited by Thomas Sowell. Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute, 1978. 415 pp. $15.00.*

With the revival of interest in ethnicity, The Urban Institute, a nonprofit research organization, has published a comprehensive volume on American ethnic groups, concentrating in particular on ethnics of black, Chinese, Japanese, Irish, Italian, and Jewish backgrounds. In an encyclopedic fashion, the book contains an "everything-you-wanted-to-know" approach about these ethnic groups. The various authors of this collection of essays, however, go far beyond mere historical and socioeconomic descriptions of American ethnic groups by using existing data to compare and account for the uneven rate of advancement of the groups.

The underlying theme of the book is that immigrant groups undergo certain similar experiences in their evolution, but not at the same time, in the same manner, or with the same rate of intensity. The authors attempt to identify those variables that prompted some immigrant groups to advance more rapidly than others. The first and major part of this book contains a series of essays about these six ethnic groups, and it is interspersed with charts and tables depicting various social and economic indicators. The second,

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shorter part of the book is devoted wholly to U.S. Bureau of Census statistical data on income, occupation, education, sex of family head, and fertility rates of most American ethnic groups.

In the first essay, Thomas Sowell discusses black history in terms of three histories: "free persons of color," blacks emancipated by the Civil War and their descendants, and black immigrants primarily from the Western Hemisphere. Sowell contends that dissimilarities in their separate histories have accounted for differences in their socioeconomic advancement. In his essay on Chinese-Americans and Japanese-Americans, William Petersen reviews the histories of these two minorities as they progress through various stages in their socioeconomic development to surpass native born whites in income and education.

In an essay on European immigrants, Alice Kessler-Harris and Virginia Yans-McLaughlin focus on Irish, Italian, and Jewish ethnics, highlighting reasons for differential group achievement. For instance, the two authors compare the amount of capital group members had on arrival in America in addition to the skills and education they had at that point, to determine the effect of these factors on the rapidity or slowness of their evolution in the new country. Finally, the authors trace the uneven rise of these European ethnic groups through the influence of such factors as group cohesiveness, strength of family ties, urban background, and education. The remainder of the first part of the book focuses on special issues—for example, income variations among ethnics, discrimination in the academic job market, race and I.Q., and sibling correlations among ethnic groups.

This book is an impressive contribution to ethnic studies not merely for its historical information about diverse ethnic groups in America but even more for its conclusions about ethnic advancement gleaned from a cross-comparison of these groups. In a uniquely interesting fashion, the authors have refocused on historical factors and studies to elicit similarities and dissimilarities in the environmental condition of immigrants and to offer their tentative conclusions as to why and how groups evolve at different paces. The various authors appear to be meticulous in their use of demographic data and studies to support their viewpoints and generalizations. Their conclusions, particularly in regard to topics such as race and I.Q., are likely to generate lively debate for years to come. Although a few sections of this book may be too technical for the general public, most sections are eminently suitable for general readership. Certainly, students and scholars of ethnicity will not want to miss this informative and insightful volume.

SHIRLEY E. OSTHOLM
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The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War *by Allan E. Goodman. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 298 pp. $22.50.*

Allan Goodman seeks to portray the tangled history of negotiations over the Vietnam War. This valuable book discusses the tentative approaches to negotiations during the early 1960s, the various half- and wholehearted efforts to get talks going during the Johnson administration, and the ups and downs of the negotiations with the North Vietnamese conducted by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration.

In general, it seems, there was rather little substance to these diplomatic affairs—certainly less substance than various administrations sometimes suggested and far less substance than ardent proponents of peace-through-negotiations hoped. For the most part, there was nothing to negotiate about.

The North Vietnamese, very simply, would have been quite happy to negotiate victory: an American withdrawal coupled with a Communist-dominated government in Saigon. The United States and Saigon would have been happy with a settlement in which the Communists agreed to give up and go home. Bridging the chasm through negotiations seemed nearly impossible. Instead the war continued. When the sides felt themselves weak, they were reluctant to negotiate because they apparently felt one must always bargain from "a position of strength"; when they felt themselves strong, they were reluctant to negotiate because it seemed more sensible to press on to possible victory.

Finally, in January 1973, a piece of paper was signed. But by this time the United States, impelled by an escalating distaste for the war at home, had already largely given Hanoi what it most wanted anyway—an American withdrawal from ground combat. The agreement settled only relatively minor issues: a release of American prisoners of war, an acknowledgement by the United States and Saigon of the obvious fact that parts of South Vietnam were indeed controlled by the Communists, a cutoff in U.S. air support (after Saigon had been given the world's fourth largest air force).

It seems clear from Goodman's evidence that neither Hanoi nor Saigon took the 1973 agreement, or its attendant cease-fire, seriously. Violations of the agreement were rampant and immediate as both sides prepared for the next showdown. Goodman interestingly suggests that the seeds for Saigon's 1975 defeat were sown during this period: the South Vietnamese government went on an extensive land grab, trying to exert control over wide areas, and thus vastly overextended itself; the Communists actually withdrew in some places, but thoroughly consolidated their control in those areas they continued to control.

By contrast, Goodman says, Henry Kissinger genuinely "believed" the agreement would lead to real peace (pp. 155, 165). Much of this confidence, it seems, was based on a rather desperate hope that China and the USSR, charmed by Kissinger's policy of detente, would in the future help to restrain their little ally in Indo-China.

The Lost Peace is often quite good at sorting through the diplomatic tangle that is its subject. The book is largely based on extensive off-the-record interviews with American and other non-Communist participants in the search for negotiated settlement. Goodman was unable to secure interviews with Communist negotiators, though this does not

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always stop him from coming to some grandly certain conclusions about what they thought (see pp. 33, 45, 116).

But even given the rather one-sided source of information, Goodman does detail well the North Vietnamese penchant for "leapfrog" or "whipsaw" tactics—being flexible in public, but inflexible in actual secret negotiations; giving encouragement to all sorts of well-intentioned part-time peace brokers while failing to follow through at the peace table. He also shows how Saigon's efforts in the "search for settlement" were (sensibly from its point of view) largely devoted to foot-dragging and obfuscation.

At the same time some elements of the situation seem rather underassessed in this short book (180 pages of text): there are quite a few places where there could be more analysis in depth. The thought processes leading up to the administration's post-Tet Offensive decision in 1968 partially to halt the bombing of North Vietnam are only sketched and the fact that President Johnson dramatically withdrew from the reelection race is not even mentioned. (Nor is it considered that this event, coupled with the previous removal of General William Westmoreland, may have contributed to Hanoi's abrupt willingness to begin preliminary talks.) Considerations of the relevance of domestic U.S. politics are largely missing, including an assessment of the importance of the prisoner of war issue—one of the crucial issues that kept things dragging on so long at the negotiating table. And Goodman's analysis of the effect of Nixon's bombing of Hanoi at the end of 1972 is unsatisfactory. In particular the negative impact of the bombing on Nixon's position in the world and in Congress is not really considered; and though it is suggested that the bombing was partly designed to affect Saigon's intransigence (p. 160), no assessment of whether it actually did so is made.

JOHN E. MUELLER
University of Rochester

Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan *by Athan Theoharis. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1978. 331 pp. $15.00.*

This study is long on "horror stories" and short on analysis. Of all recent books on political surveillance, it is the best researched and documented, and for that reason alone deserves special recognition. But, like most of us who write about the dark underside of American politics, Professor Theoharis has not systematically explained why these abuses should have occurred, so long, in obvious violation of law and decency.

He has some opinions: liberals lacked the grit to stand up to McCarthy; presidents and attorneys general allowed themselves to be manipulated by J. Edgar Hoover; and neither Congress nor successive administrations really sought to learn about (let alone supervise) the boys in the basement. But, like all exposés, *Spying on Americans* is organized around topics, not explanations. There are detailed chapters on the Huston Plan, emergency detention schemes, memoranda games, surveillance, harassment, political gossip, and loyalty investigations, but only sixteen pages about "the politics of intelligence."

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For political scientists who do not need their meat processed, Theoharis provides hearty fare. For full nourishment, however, it will help to search the book for material relevant to at least four complementary hypotheses: the surveillance as the conscious policy of cabinet-level officials, as the product of bureaucratic initiatives, as the result of cross-cutting political pressures, and as the reflection of a still broader political culture.

Theoharis is at his best explaining who ordered the surveillance. He was the investigator who, with the clout of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, cracked open the secret recesses of the presidential libraries. Like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Theoharis lets the Roosevelt administration off much too lightly. However, he is masterful at demonstrating how J. Edgar Hoover persuaded or tricked officials of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations into signing vague authorizations for still more spying. Unfortunately, the moralist within him insists that more libertarian officials could have wrung the embarrassing truth from Hoover and whipped him back into line, while most of the evidence suggests the opposite. As Theoharis demonstrates, men of civil libertarian impulse rarely make it to high office and those who do quickly find reasons not to expose the misdeeds of their subordinates.

The best parts of the book describe how Hoover won the battles of the memoranda and developed his remarkable system of secrecy. However, the emphasis on Hoover as a master of bureaucratic infighting detracts from a full understanding of intelligence agencies as institutions. Like most revisionist historians, Theoharis makes much of the right-wing ideology of the bureau without noting that moderate governments do as much domestic spying. Missing is the realization that all bureaucracies are solutions in search of problems. For the intelligence agencies, the solution is surveillance; thus, when anything goes wrong, the problem must be conspiracy. Professional investigators do not have to be ideologues to want to spy.

The chapter on loyalty programs is full of information about congressional and party pressures for harrying Communists and other nonconformists. Unfortunately, this material is not used to describe the political milieu in which the detention plans, dirty tricks, and most intrusive surveillances took place. Given the political profile of Hoover's legislative overseers during the cold war years, it is surprising that the abuses were not worse.

Theoharis still clings to the myth that New Deal liberals could really cherish civil liberties while they were constructing the national security presidency. He would like us to believe that pre-McCarthy conservatives truly supported the notion of limited government, which he does by starting his book in 1936 and ignoring what the conservatives did to German-Americans, draft resisters, radical unionists, socialists, anarchists, and Communists during and after World War I. But one cannot have it both ways; liberty is inseparable from limited government. Thus it is all too simple to assert, as Theoharis does, that the evil McCarthyites drove the well-meaning Fair Dealers to sacrifice due process at the altar of hysterical anticommunism. Truth is that political liberty for dissidents, like other constitutional guarantees, is rarely more than a blue chip in the Washington poker game.

The most salient characteristic of this sorry tale of political abuse is how insupportable the allegations were. The army had no factual basis for believing that the Japanese-

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Americans were disloyal; McCarthy had nothing to support his claim that the government was riddled with Communists. Hoover had no evidence that Martin Luther King was a Communist, and nobody could prove foreign direction and control of the antiwar movement. But facts did not matter, and herein lies the ultimate question: Why did not the press, Congress, attorneys general, or presidents insist upon solid proof of those allegations?

Part of the answer lies in "human nature," part in the political culture of our times. For most politicians, like most people, the function of information is not to promote rational analysis, but to confirm predispositions and backstop conclusions already reached. Hoover was successful so long as he fed the predispositions of his overseers (just as they fed the predispositions of their constituents). Hoover began to cut back in the mid-1960s, and his agency became vulnerable to investigation in the 1970s, only when the predispositions of the American people underwent great tidal changes and the electorate stopped sending men like Martin Dies, Richard Nixon, Joseph McCarthy, John McClellan, and James Eastland to the Congress.

Similarly, as inflation makes the public more conservative, demand of reform of the intelligence agencies will wane, only to prove once again that ours is a "democracy," but it is a democracy of moods and sentiments, as indifferent to constitutional principles as Hoover and his agents.

CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE
Mount Holyoke College

Never Again: Learning from America's Foreign Policy Failures *by Earl C. Ravenal. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1978. 153 pp. $15.00.*

American foreign-policy makers have not learned from Vietnam, contends Earl C. Ravenal, at least not in any meaningful sense. In his effort to reheat the strategic debate of several years ago, the former Defense Department official now at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, argues that what has passed for "lessons" are either trivial or unworkable and may, in fact, lead us into another unhappy intervention.

Ravenal does a neat job in delineating and demolishing four types of nonlessons and those who offer them. The establishment's "instrumental" lessons merely propose "better tools" in strategy, tactics, and diplomacy. The "proportional" criticism of some liberals says Vietnam simply went too far. Other liberals offer a "consequential" argument that we have skewed our economic priorities. Radicals pose "fundamental" questions of immorality and misuse of power. All these critiques are deficient, argues Ravenal, for none gets at the major determinant of U.S. foreign policy: strategic presumptions. If these do not change, then no instrumental, proportional, or consequential analysis can save us from future follies overseas. The fundamentalists, demanding total change of the system, achieve nothing.

The adjustments forced on Nixon-Kissinger fostered the illusion that we are now pursuing a more limited, nonglobalist policy when in reality, holds Ravenal, our interventionist strategic presumptions have continued intact. Is this in fact the case? Others have

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argued that U.S. policy has changed quite a lot in the 1970s, especially in the area of strategic presumptions. Ravenal, by merely asserting that it has not, begs the empirical question.

Expanding his April 1973 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Case for Strategic Disengagement," Ravenal urges America to get used to living in a disorderly world in which we have little ability to work our will. In "adjusting to a second-best world" we must redefine what is strategic and what is not. I share this view.

But it is precisely here that Ravenal offers little guidance. He criticizes the fundamentalists for their "rigid and complete nonintervention" (p. 97), but suggests we abandon wholesale any difficult position overseas, that we "avoid conflict by divesting rather than acquiring commitments in situations we cannot control"(p. 136). These seem to include all situations. "This process of disengagement would not end until we found a new, obviously defensible security frontier" (ibid.). Where this frontier might lie Ravenal does not say, nor does he give criteria for its determination.

Thoroughgoing noninterventionism has a long and respectable history in this country, one that this book ignores. Ravenal does not seem to recognize that he is participating in a debate that goes back to the birth of the Republic, what Spykman in 1942 called "the oldest issue in American foreign policy," whether to defend ourselves on the near or far side of the oceans. The debate will not end, for the dilemma is inherently insoluble: America can neither totally control nor totally withdraw from the world. Those who understand this dilemma temper their interventionist or noninterventionist prescriptions with the knowledge that both have given rise to catastrophes.

MICHAEL ROSKIN
Lycoming College

America's Ascent: The United States Becomes a Great Power, 1880–1914 *by John M. Dobson. DeKalb, Ill., Northern Illinois University Press, 1978. 251 pp. $15.00.*

Though there have been numerous studies of various aspects of American imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries recently, no book has synthesized the primary sources and the scholarly literature into a satisfactory general account. John M. Dobson now offers "a detailed study" of how "economic expansion, political aggrandizement, and moral assertiveness" combined to make possible the emergence of the United States as "an internationally recognized great power" (pp. 4, 5).

Dobson has read in the personal papers of the secretaries of state in these years, along with several other relevant manuscript collections. He has surveyed some, but not all, of the published work on the subject. *America's Ascent* is, in places, a clearly written book with some useful insights. An abundance of factual errors and a basic mistake in the research strategy, however, limit its usefulness.

In approaching primary source material for his topic, Dobson erred first in not using presidential papers, a rich trove for this period. The collections of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft are indispensable for policymaking and would have revealed to the author the narrow range of his evidence. His assertion,

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moreover, that the official records in the National Archives "add almost nothing to what can be derived" (p. 230) from the *Foreign Relations* series is not accurate, as a look at the record on trade negotiations, the correspondence from individual countries, and other files discloses. In the case of the Spanish-American War, private collections such as the George B. Cortelyou and John Bassett Moore papers rival the papers of the president and the secretary of state in importance.

Multiarchival research is a cliche of diplomatic history, but it is one to which Dobson gave little heed. Even the published French and Spanish documents for the birth of American imperialism are absent from Dobson's sources, not to mention the riches in the Public Record Office in London and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives in Paris. Such extensive quarrying is necessary to move beyond the arid historiographical debates that rest on a picked-over and stale array of manuscript sources.

Dobson's treatment of such central topics as the Spanish-American War also reflects a troubling carelessness. Despite the work of Ronald Spector and William R. Braisted on naval war planning, and the findings of John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young in a work that Dobson cites, he repeats the hoary tale of Theodore Roosevelt unilaterally telegraphing George Dewey to attack Manila. The start of the Cuban revolt in 1895, the death of the Spanish politician Antonio Cânovas del Castillo, and the effective launching of William McKinley's policy toward Spain are all misdated. Dobson is equally weak on the *Maine*, on prewar diplomacy where he mistakenly regards Grover Cleveland and McKinley as pursuing similar goals, and on the congressional debates of April 1898 in which he confuses the Teller and Turpie-Foraker amendments.

Difficulties also arise for other issues. The discussion of Hawaiian annexation and the decision to acquire the Philippines contain basic errors. The Senate did not "resoundingly" defeat (p. 153) the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in the spring of 1900; Grover Cleveland's role in the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 is misunderstood; and the process of framing the Platt Amendment in 1901 is so telescoped that it becomes distorted.

America's Ascent falls uneasily between a textbook summary and a monograph. Dobson did enough work in manuscripts to impart an appearance of freshness to his narrative, but he did not explore sufficient archival data in this country and abroad to achieve a true synthesis. For students of imperialism, this book offers little that is new. For the general academic reader, it is not reliable.

LEWIS L. GOULD
University of Texas at Austin

The Process of Government under Jefferson *by Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1978. 487 pp. $20.00.*

Despite an infelicitous title, this is a felicitously written book. Straightforward and clear, it moves from an engaging narrative of the opening weeks of Jefferson's presidency to a broadly analytical account of the cabinet and of Congress in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The portrait that emerges is of an energetic administration filled with pro-

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fessionals who knew what they were doing, took their work seriously, and had an attention to detail that approached artistry.

Noble Cunningham's Jefferson is a workaholic. He handles his own paperwork and most of his correspondence. He reads all his mail, "even anonymously written letters, including some threats on his life, which he dismissed" (p. 34). He keeps his papers in order, segregates the public papers from the private, and makes sure that the public papers are firmly deposited in the appropriate department offices. He had, Jefferson wrote presciently, "no confidence that the office of private secretary of the President of the U.S. will ever be a regular and safe deposit for public papers" (p. 36).

Cunningham's Jefferson is a good colleague. He considers alternatives openly; when he changes his mind, it is because he has permitted himself to be persuaded, not because he waffles. Attorneys General are rehabilitated. Cunningham finds their papers in the files of other offices; he concludes that they commonly advised all the cabinet members and occasionally congressional committees. Gallatin is even more efficient than his reputation, but the "greatest revelation" of the cabinet papers "is the important contribution of Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith," who "played a far more active role in Jefferson's administration than historians have generally recognized" (pp. 80, 76). Smith criticized draft speeches and policy proposals forcefully and sensibly; Jefferson often listened to him and was grateful for his advice.

Drawing on unpublished committee journals, petitions, and correspondence, and subjecting some of what he finds to computer analysis, Cunningham reconstructs the internal dynamics of the Jeffersonian Congresses. There is close relationship with the executive branch; president and members of the cabinet regularly funnel draft legislation to their congressional allies. Once Secretary Smith sent Senator William Branch Giles "a hasty sketch" of his response to a bill before the Senate. "This 'hasty sketch' with its enclosures filled forty-two pages" and Giles immediately entered it in the record (p. 205). On the other hand, congressional independence was respected; Jefferson never used the veto.

Cunningham's careful analysis of the work of congressional committees reminds us how little we had previously understood about them. We learn basic differences in structure between House and Senate committees, the details of their work, and their chairmen and members. There is much new information and many surprises: the range of petitioners to Congress, the names of the newspapers read by members of Congress, and the fact that in this most liberal Republican administration, with Republican majorities in both houses, the acerbic Federalist Uriah Tracy was consistently one of the three men most frequently elected to membership or to the chair of Senate committees. Historians have not normally credited Tracy with much tact or expertise, the qualities that normally get minority members on committees. Uriah Tracy's career deserves more attention than it has been given.

Historians have long understood that the great irony of the early Republic is that men who distrusted political parties built strong and enduring ones. Cunningham's book is an important contribution to our understanding of the gradual acceptance of the legitimacy of party politics. It underlines the continuing hesitancy of Republicans, once in power, to acknowledge the legitimacy of an opposition party, while they themselves were integrating partisan organization into the agencies of national government. Running

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throughout the book is an extended criticism of James Sterling Young's *Washington Community*, particularly for its reliance on the testimony of the sour Federalist William Plumer, for its assumption that boardinghouse groups antedated political identification, and for its conclusion that government was remote and indifferent to the public. Cunningham argues persuasively that it was party affiliation that shaped boardinghouse choices. He also is certain that party was an effective mediator between local public opinion and national policy.

He may overstate this last point. There is a temptation, which Cunningham does not always resist, to romanticize a purer, simpler Washington community that was not confined by protocol and in which government was responsive, responsible, and comprehensible. Cunningham is certain that the government was much better managed than it had been by Jefferson's predecessors, but fully to establish that may require a complementary study of the Federalists.

LINDA K. KERBER
University of Iowa

The Politics of Benevolence: Revival Religion and American Voting Behavior *by John L. Hammond. Norwood, N.J., Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1979. 243 pp. $16.50.*

The religious revivals of the 1820s and 1830s changed the consciousness of those who were converted and made them feel a duty to bring about God's will on earth through acts of benevolence, especially in support of black freedom and abstinence from alcohol. Sociologist John L. Hammond analyzes the tradition—which he calls a political ethos—established by those who carried out that duty. His book, a distinct addition to the study of religious influences in American political history, argues that revivalism's observable, but sporadic, effects on political behavior in New York and Ohio persisted from the 1830s to the 1960s.

Hammond's is a difficult and self-conscious book. He moves back and forth, sometimes awkwardly, between derivative accounts of the political background and sophisticated statistical analyses of revivalism's effects on electoral behavior. While Hammond reserves much of his quantitative methodology for separate articles, he is explicit in stating his assumptions, direct in pointing out his own contributions, and honest in baring his sympathies for the revivalists. The result is a book that repays the reader who survives its hardships.

Using contemporary reports of religious revivals in New York and Ohio from 1825 to 1835, Hammond constructs county-level indices of revivalism and analyzes their long-term relationship to organized benevolence and, especially, to electoral behavior. Revivalism, the author demonstrates, was strongly and positively associated with membership in antislavery organizations and with support for the Liberty and Free Soil parties. To a lesser extent, it helped determine who voted for the new Republican party in the 1850s. After the Civil War, revivalism continued to have a discernable, though irregular, influence on political behavior. In rural New York, where revivalism had

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become a part of the region's cultural heritage, it helped inspire unexpected levels of support for Greeley in 1872, Bryan in 1896, local prohibition candidates in 1926 and 1930, and Lyndon Johnson (the supporter of civil rights) in 1964. In Ohio's Western Reserve, revivalism contributed to a long tradition of loyalty to the Republican party and occasionally produced unusual degrees of support for prohibition.

Hammond repeatedly acknowledges the limitations of the revivalist political ethos and devotes considerable attention to identifying the particular historical circumstances under which it became salient by giving "its adherents a unique interpretation of images and issues" (p. 184). The author thus pursues a single thread in American political history without exaggerating it. Yet his book is not narrow. Covering both an eastern and a midwestern state for 140 years, Hammond's work has a geographic and chronological breadth often missing from such studies. He addresses, as well, several ongoing scholarly disputes. Know-Nothingism, Hammond says, was chiefly an *anti-antislavery* phenomenon, not a nativist one. Ohio experienced no permanent voter realignment in the 1850s, nor did either state in the 1890s.

Yet, as Hammond seems aware, his book will attract particular attention for its disagreements with studies by Benson, Formisano, Kleppner, and Jensen. Unlike these historians, who believe that evangelical religion—both as a value system and a group experience—broadly and continuously helped shape nineteenth-century politics, Hammond uncompromisingly insists that religious *beliefs* alone explain the revivalist political ethos and that its adherents stood well outside the mainstream of the nation's political culture. Hammond scores some points against the ethnocultural school, as others have before, but his failure to acknowledge or explore revivalism's influence on the vote of the mainstream Whig party greatly weakens his position. Benson, Formisano, and, most recently, Paul E. Johnson in his study of revivalism in Rochester, have clearly demonstrated such influence and have shown that revivalism decisively shaped regular party politics. Hammond, in short, overstates the weaknesses of the ethos he describes so well. From the late 1820s on, revival religion exerted a powerful influence on mainstream American politics. The ethos's failure to effect all its benevolent goals should not obscure the remarkable extent to which politics reverberated with the issues and values the revivals inspired.

RICHARD L. MCCORMICK
Rutgers University

The American as Anarchist: Reflections on Indigenous Radicalism *by David Deleon. Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 242 pp. $14.00.*

American "exceptionalism" has long concerned historians and political theorists. Of all the advanced capitalist countries, it is only in the United States that the working class has never succeeded in organizing its own political party. Moreover, in contrast not just to Western Europe but even to Canada and Australia, socialism has had relatively little success as a mass ideology in the United States; and it is only recently that Marxism, still far

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from a significant political force, has emerged slightly from the margins of American intellectual life. David DeLeon's intent in this book is to provide a historical explanation for American exceptionalism and, more generally, to account for the relatively weak impact of contemporary radical movements on American life. His thesis is that American radicals are themselves largely to blame for the failures of American radicalism. Instead of building on Americans' profound hostility to authority, American radicals have imported "statist" and authoritarian ideologies from Europe that, given the anarchist dispositions of Americans, could not possibly thrive "on native grounds." The American national character, DeLeon insists, has always been anarchist; and Americans today are as inclined as ever to revolt against authority. It remains for American radicals to acknowledge this disposition and to act accordingly. Then there may yet be a future for America's radical past.

The text is rich in historical illustrations, ranging from the early colonial period to the present, but the general outline of DeLeon's argument is easily stated. American exceptionalism is explained by the causes that are already familiar from the literature. There is, first of all, radical Protestantism, with its disdain of external authority and its glorification of individual conscience. Then there is the apparently limitless frontier, serving as a safety valve for discontent but also as an arena for triumphant, self-reliant individualism. Finally, there is capitalism itself, continually revolutionizing the existing order, while providing, for many Americans most of the time, the opportunity to exercise individual initiative productively and successfully. The South apart, America has never known any pre- or noncapitalist social order; and so the national character, DeLeon maintains, is relatively free from the authoritarian residues of "traditional society."

These factors together, the argument runs, have produced a society of individuals hostile to any authority and, above all, to the state. Hence the relative success of liberalism which, on DeLeon's account, is, in its better moments at least, a pale anarchism; and hence too the more brilliant, if less successful, careers of the various libertarianisms of both the procapitalist Right and the anticapitalist Left. The success of the New Left and also the New Right in the 1960s can be explained, DeLeon concludes, as a "revival and reformation" of native anarchism; and the decline of the New Left, as an organized political expression, is mainly a consequence, on DeLeon's account, of the importation of authoritarian, European and even Asiatic ideologies.

To make a case for these claims, DeLeon is extremely selective in his choice of data; and his interpretations are often, at best, tendentious. Those who are skeptical of DeLeon's theses will doubtless find his account of the impact of libertarian movements unconvincing. It is worth noting, as DeLeon himself admits, that anarchism has never fared particularly well in America as an organized political force (granting that liberalism, whatever its erstwhile affinities to anarchism, is today anthing but a movement against the state); and that the duration of particular anarchist movements and organizations is significantly less impressive than of many "statist" rivals. Can the political failures of American anarchism be attributed just to the willful wrongheadedness of American radicals?

In any case, DeLeon's position leads him to devalue the differences between Left and Right in favor of the distinction between anarchist and statist. The results are often bizarre. Thus, on DeLeon's view, "anarchists" in Students for a Democratic Society

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(SDS) were more akin to many militants of the right-wing Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) than to "statist" radicals in SDS. Readers familiar with the political struggles of the 1960s will surely find this description surprising. So too will virtually all former militants of SDS and YAF.

Today the religious, geographical, and economic causes DeLeon appeals to hardly continue to pertain. Protestantism has long ago rendered itself benign. The frontier, as DeLeon acknowledges, is long gone. And late capitalism, so far from fostering rugged individualism and contempt for authority, has bequeathed humankind the consumer society with its attendant passivity and conformism. By restating the traditional wisdom, DeLeon may have provided a plausible, though surely partial, answer to the question Werner Sombart posed incisively in 1905: Why is there no socialism in the United States? But it will hardly do in 1979 to answer that question by suggesting that we are all, at heart, still Yankees and cowboys. The call to attend to indigenous traditions and national character is surely well taken. But the account of these traditions and character is not; and neither is what follows from that account—a repudiation of those radical traditions that are not anarchist and that remain, whatever the many defects of the movements and organizations that have arisen under their banner, the best, indeed the only, hope for the radical transformation of American society.

ANDREW LEVINE
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Dimensions of Detente *edited by Della W. Sheldon. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1978. 216 pp. $20.00.*

This slim volume is a collection of eight essays that all have—to one degree or another—something to do with U.S.-Soviet relations. It is not the volume one would end up with had one set out to produce a systematic and comprehensive survey of detente; too much of importance to a thorough examination of detente is absent from these pages. This book is simply a group of papers loosely connected by the broad notion of detente. It is, nevertheless, a concise, readable, and generally useful study.

The first essay in the volume is Della Sheldon's historical study of the Soviet understanding of what they call peaceful coexistence. Sheldon emphasizes the dual and contradictory nature of the Soviet definition of detente: on the one hand, accommodation with the West; on the other hand, continued ideological conflict and, more importantly, continued competition in the Third World. As Sheldon rightly concludes, this definition, "by its very nature, contributes to confusion and distrust" (p. 23). The confusion and distrust within the United States about detente is the subject of Fred Warner Neal's essay, "Detente and U.S. Foreign Policymaking," which examines detente from the American perspective and describes the conflicts it has led to in American politics. Detente, Neal argues, "began to falter almost as soon as it began" (p. 34), in large part because Nixon and Kissinger failed to build the necessary domestic consensus for their detente policy and thus came under telling political attack as the inevitable strains in U.S.-Soviet relations continued.

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These two broader essays serve as an informal introduction to six more topical chapters: Thomas Robinson contributed an essay on the triangular relationship among the U.S., USSR, and China; Robert Freedman wrote on the Middle East as an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations, while Arthur Klinghoffer examined "oil politics" as a factor in U.S.-Soviet interactions in the same region; Alice Gorlin looked at Soviet interest in U.S. management techniques; and the final two essays are on military issues, Elliot Goodman on European defense and Jacob Kipp on the U.S.-Soviet military balance. This is a diverse, if not especially coherent, array of topics to be contained in a single small volume.

Unfortunately, two of the essays are misfits in a volume seeking to cast light on detente. Alice Gorlin's essay, meant to introduce the economic dimension of detente, is too narrowly focused to provide the breadth of coverage one expects in a survey volume of this sort. The question she addresses is an interesting one—will increased Soviet-American economic contact stimulate Soviet interest in Western methods of economic management?—but it is hardly one central to an understanding of the economic aspect of detente. Elliot Goodman, on the other hand, has written a chapter that really has little to do with detente. Author of an impressive study of transatlantic relations, *The Fate of the Atlantic Community*, Goodman here returns to transatlantic concerns to plea for standardization of weapons within NATO; his is a cogent presentation of a sensible position, but it could have been written had detente never entered our political vocabulary. Moreover, his emphasis leaves another gap in the volume's coverage of detente, for the process of political accommodation in Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks are not discussed, indeed, are barely even mentioned. Thus, the volume gives short shrift to the economic and to the European dimensions of detente.

The volume suffers from other sins of omission as well. Klinghoffer's essay on oil politics, for example, examines one interesting slice of the problem but ignores others, such as the growing Soviet role as a supplier of energy to Western Europe, or the prospect that the USSR may, out of necessity, emerge as a major importer of oil in the 1980s. Kipp's chapter on the U.S.-Soviet military balance argues that SALT must be viewed in a broad, political context, and describes some of the diplomacy of SALT, but fails to provide a careful rendering of the agreements, does not even mention the most urgent strategic policy problem (ICBM vulnerability), does not focus on the fact that the United States is at a great turning point in its strategic posture, and does not examine how SALT affects America's range of strategic choice.

It is always rather unfair for a reviewer to criticize what is missing rather than what is present in a book, but when the purpose of a volume is "to analyze the political, military, and economic dimensions of detente" (p. viii), it is to be expected that the major issues at stake will be addressed. Despite drawing together a series of informative essays (Neal's and Freedman's stand out as particularly good), *Dimensions of Detente* fails to deliver on the promise implicit in its title.

STEVEN E. MILLER
Harvard University

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Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory *edited by David Butler and Austin Ranney. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. 250 pp. $4.75.*

Direct democracy devices are increasingly used in Western democracies to pass laws and decide constitutional questions. What have been the consequences for policy, parties, and representative processes? Political scientists know less than they would like to know about these questions.

This timely and thoughtful survey of referendum politics will certainly help renew the study of referendums. Specialists from various countries examine the politics of referendums in nine nations—Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. An excellent special chapter, written by Eugene Lee, analyzes initiative and referendum results in California. The editors provide practical introductory and summary chapters. Detailed nationwide referendum results are found in the appendix.

The editors were primarily interested in the impact of referendums on national politics and parliaments. They asked experts on the countries in which referendums have been frequently used to prepare short topical chapters. These are, for the most part, informative and highly readable. The task of comparative analysis, however, is complicated by the varied use of referendums in the different countries. The United States, of course, has no nationwide referendum process. Some countries, such as Ireland, have held only a handful of them. England has only held one. In other nations, such as Australia and Switzerland, the referendum takes on special significance and is central to an understanding of national politics. Nationwide referendums in the nine countries totaled about 500, but nearly 300 of these have been in Switzerland and approximately 40 in Australia.

The authors point out that Western democratic nations have hardly been eager to exploit the referendum as a routine decision-making instrument. Switzerland stands out as the only nation seemingly addicted to the referendum. Charles DeGaulle may have said that "the best supreme court is the people," but most government officials prefer to keep in their own hands the crucial decisions confronting a nation. "The governments of all politics with optional referendums have chosen to invoke them only infrequently and in special circumstances—for example, when it has seemed to be the best way to resolve a particularly bitter issue without tearing apart the established political structure" (p. 222).

The editors were interested in both the ideological and practical results stemming from referendums. They conclude that neither Left nor Right consistently gain. Rather they believe the referendum is politically neutral and generally a reflection of the current state of public opinion. "In our judgment, the area in which referendums have most clearly been useful is in the settling of boundary issues, perhaps because the old Wilsonian principle of self-determination still strikes most people as the just basis for determining sovereignty over territories and peoples" (p. 225).

Throughout the book both the editors and country specialists offer an evenhanded appraisal of the benefits and liabilities of direct democracy procedures. The classic problem of offering voters only an either/or choice is much discussed. The fact that referendums often set up confrontations rather than encourage compromises is acknowledged. On the other hand, the editors note that sometimes any decision is better than no decision. Also

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the democratic legitimacy often associated with referendum results sometimes permits a government to secure backing for policies that could not have been achieved if decisions had been produced indirectly by elected officials.

The editors, in common with students of initiative, referendum, and recall in the United States, find that direct democracy is neither as bad as critics allege nor as wonderful as the populists once promised. Butler and Ranney conclude their survey with this positive note: "Referendums have often proved to be useful devices for solving or setting aside problems too hot for representative bodies to handle. They have often given legitimacy to new regimes or boundaries or constitutions that they would otherwise have lacked. In short, they have been and can continue to be valuable adjuncts to representative democracy" (p. 226).

THOMAS E. CRONIN
University of Delaware

Elections without Choice *edited by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1978. 250 pp. $14.95.*

This volume, a set of papers from a research committee on political sociology of the international associations of sociologists and political scientists, is based on the observation that, while most scholarly study of elections concerns elections in democratic countries in which voters make choices among candidates, far the larger number of elections occur in undemocratic countries in which voters do not really choose. Since it is conventionally assumed that the reason for allowing citizens to elect rulers is to win the consent of the ruled (that is, to legitimize the regime), enthusiasm for elections even in despotisms appears surprising. So the authors quite sensibly ask what purpose can then be served by elections without choice. As might be expected, the answers range from the assertion that in some partially free societies elections serve as concealed choices and promising leaders are thus coopted into the leadership elite to the assertion that, in the twentieth century, all sorts of despotisms find that with elections they can socialize the subjects with the rationale of the regime and at the same time hoodwink them into legitimizing tyranny and revealing pockets of discontent.

The surprise occasioned by the observation that most elections in the world do not provide choices testifies to the hold that the modern dogmas of democracy have on most political scientists (who, of course, usually live in free societies). But initially (in the ancient world and again in the medieval world) elections were simply convenient devices to choose among several notables. An election thus amounted to determining which notable could marshal the most clients to vote his bidding. While a choice was made, one could hardly call it consent. Our surprise, as well as that of the authors of these papers—who seem unacquainted with the history of elections—is occasioned by the fact that, in the course of equalizing the contest among notables, clients began to take part in the choice, thereby developing those democratic forms that were rationalized in the eighteenth century with the notions of consent and legitimacy. The almost universal approbation of these notions in this century has led most despots to mouth them, thereby obscuring the

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fact that in contemporary despotisms elections are performing about the same functions as they did before democracy was invented.

The authors of these papers are not political theorists, thus, they are probably not aware that contemporary political theory (social choice theory) has revealed that there are arbitrary elements in any election, however democratic it may appear. Hence the contrast between elections in which a popular choice appears to be made and one in which a popular choice is not intended is not nearly so sharp as the authors seem to think. Nevertheless, within the terms set, the coverage is very good, especially in the papers by Linz on Germany, Spain, and Italy; Barkan and Okumu on Kenya; and Pravda on Marxist states.

In any volume with such wide coverage there are bound to be controversies of interpretation, most of which doubtless escape me. But I must call attention to one controversy raised by Richard Rose writing of Northern Ireland and of the United States South, 1870s to 1950s. Rose asserted that in the United States legal rights enforced by courts brought blacks into the system but that, lacking a Bill of Rights, such a solution was not possible in Ireland. In fact, it was the political contest in the mid-1930s for the votes of *northern* blacks that generated the civil rights movement. The subsequent judicial pronouncements were merely an extension of that political contest by politically concerned judges.

WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester

Controlling Future Arms Trade *by Ann Hessing Cahn, Joseph J. Kruzel, Peter M. Dawkins, Jacques Huntzinger. New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1977. 210 pp, $5.95.*

This is one of a series of studies sponsored by the 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, intended to analyze "an issue or set of issues likely to be of international concern during the next ten to twenty years" (p. vii). An important aim of the project is to examine the interrelationship of such issues.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, which covers about half the book, Ann Hessing Cahn and Joseph J. Kruzel provide a useful survey of the main trends in the arms trade over the last three decades and the way in which future arms trade is likely to be affected by changes in perception, changing technology, politico-strategic and economic considerations. Their discussion of the new Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), although inconclusive, is of particular interest. From the point of view of the public debate in Western countries, their assessment of the economic rationale for arms supply should also prove valuable. There is also a very brief section on the demand for arms. They place great emphasis on the growing complexity of the arms trade—the diversification of suppliers, the commercialization of sales, the new forms of transaction (for example, licensed production, coproduction)—and, hence, the uncertainties of prediction.

The second part, by Peter Dawkins, discusses the possibilities for supplier restraints. His proposals, as he himself points out, are necessarily modest and therefore pessimistic. His most ambitious suggestion is the creation of a North Atlantic Defense Common

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Market which, he believes, would help to reduce the economic incentive to export arms for Western producers, who account for over half the arms trade. The idea of focusing on the factors that influence the arms trade rather than the arms trade itself is very attractive. However, closer inspection might well reveal that this particular suggestion is as fraught with difficulty as a direct multilateral agreement to restrain arms supplies.

All the authors seem to agree that regional approaches offer the most hopeful route toward control of the arms trade. In the last part, Jacques Huntzinger offers an ingenious matrix for categorizing different approaches toward regional restraint.

Perhaps the main weakness of the book is the failure to provide a coherent analytical framework. In the introduction, David C. Gompert and Alexander Vershbow, say that the most fruitful approach to the arms trade is to view it both "as a *systematic* phenomenon, in which the implements of war and power are spreading from the industrialized world into the developing world, and as a series of individual transactions or national policies, each with particular *situational* motivations" (p. 3). Yet the book is neither specific enough to describe the situational motivation nor analytic enough to provide a guide through the complexities of the systemic phenomenon. This weakness is particularly apparent as regards the demand for arms. We are told vaguely that the demand for arms is influenced by such factors as regional conflict, international prestige, or internal order. But, in order to be convinced of the case for regional restraint, we would need to know much more about either the situation in particular regions or the more general ways in which patterns of arms acquisition reflect identifiable demand factors and how these factors, in turn, relate to the international system as a whole. In a scholarly series such as the 1980s Project anticipates, it would not be overly optimistic to hope for something more than "judgement, speculation and intuition" (p. 91) on which to base conclusions and recommendations.

MARY KALDOR
University of Sussex

Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America *by Vivien Hart. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 251 pp. $19.95.*

Vivien Hart has written a splendid book about distrust and democracy: it has a number of virtues, theoretical, methodological, and substantive. Indeed, with its knowledgeable and effective use of both modern survey research data and original historical data and analysis, and with its masterly comparison of British and American materials, it should become a model for future political science and political history.

From her close and critical scrutiny of two historical cases (Kansas Populism in 1890s and "rank and file liberalism" in Birmingham, England, at the same time) and from her convincing reexamination of modern survey research data, Hart argues that the "politically distrustful" in America and England are neither "anomic," that is, without democratic norms at all, or "alienated," that is, with antidemocratic norms. The anomic and alienated hypotheses have been frequently offered by political scientists for the explanation of political distrust, especially by the school of what Hart calls the "democratic

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elitist" theorists of the 1950s. Having defined "political distrust" as the correct perception on the part of the public of some discrepancy between the democratic norms they hold and the realities of political behavior by their government politicians and bureaucrats, Hart marshals the historical and survey data as evidence to show that it was and is political distrust in just this sense, not in the sense of anomie or alienation, that the public has felt and feels.

The public is not ignorant, as alleged, but knowledgeable about how the government is causing its troubles. The public is not apathetic and passive, as alleged, but active and looking for government of, by, and for the people. (Lincoln was a hero to the Kansas Populists, and so also was Jefferson for his instruction, in *The Federalist*, of the need to have constant safeguards against and checking of responsible performances in the public interest by public servants.) The public is not against all parties, as alleged, but only against the corruption of the established parties. The public, finally, is not for revolution or apathetic chaos, as alleged, but for constructive reform on specific issues within the basic norms of participatory democracy. This is not to say that the public always knows how to solve all the dilemmas of democratic promise or action, but then, says Hart, usually the elites do not either. And whereas the public, at least in America (in England the more deferential political culture inhibits the public from action more than the radical, democratic political culture in America does), is likely to blame itself in part for public troubles, the elites are less likely to do so.

It can be seen, thus, that Hart's concerns and argument bear on the very fundamentals of democratic political and social theory. She has made distinctions among "radical," "democratic elitist," and "parliamentary" democracy that help to clarify the basic structures and processes of these different types, with their various functions and dysfunctions. She has made other contributions as well. For example, by comparing the differing "political cultures" of Britain and the United States, she has shown how political distrust may have different political and social consequences depending on the particular political culture, or set of defining ideas and meanings, in which the distrust occurs. She has provided an excellent demonstration for the general sociological point that culture or idea systems, in her case both political values and political knowledge, is one important independent variable in determining behavior in social systems. Independent, of course, means also interdependent with other variables, some social structural, others psychological. Or again, by her critical examination of the implicit psychologistic theory behind many recent survey research data, she has demonstrated the necessity of always putting such data in their historical, social structural, and cultural context.

Ms. Hart prepared her book as a dissertation under Professor Samuel Beer at Harvard. It is a gem that reflects great credit on both of them.

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

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America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects *edited by Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz. Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath and Company, 1979. 448 pp. $13.50.*

This book is the result of a conference held in November 1976, under the auspices of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, that was devoted to the problem of finding a harmony of interests and a concerted foreign policy for the industrial democracies. The participants included a number of well-known American and Western European foreign policy analysts who have written often and widely in this field. Among the American participants were Robert Bowie, William Diebold, Jr., William E. Griffith, John J. McCloy, Henry Owen, J. Robert Schaetzel, and Raymond Vernon.

Like most conferences this one had a central theme: can North America and Western Europe coordinate their foreign policies despite the strains of their respective domestic politics and the changing international system? Unfortunately, as most books emerging from such conferences, the central theme is frequently lost in the disparate collection of short papers that form the book. In this case the problem is compounded by the number, brevity, and variety of the papers. Twenty-two selections averaging less than twenty pages apiece are clustered under five different categories: Opinions, Culture and Elite Relations; the Western Economic System; Dimensions of Security; Structural Problems in the West; and Conclusions. Individual papers range from an attempt to evaluate the impact of scholarly exchange programs to an analysis of recent (1977) developments in European socialist and Communist parties. Thus, as one would expect, the book is a wide-ranging, unfocused collection of essays about various dimensions of European-American relations.

This does not necessarily mean the book is of little significance. On the contrary, for the harassed reader with more to read than time to read it (and I suppose that is most of us), the book provides some choice vignettes that briefly but concisely outline the more recent state of affairs between the two regions. Here the only problem, as with any book that attempts to be topical, is that since the pieces have been updated through December 1977, they will be over one and one-half years out-of-date by the time this review is read. In such immediately pressing areas as the developments in Eurocommunism one and one-half years can make an enormous difference. In other fields, though, especially those labeled "culture" and "economics," time is not such a serious problem. European attitudes toward Americans and vice versa, as well as the problems of the multinational corporations, are not subject to the same volatile changes as the more political issues. Therefore, there are many selections in this book that are worthwhile reading despite the passage of time. Incidentally, it should be noted that three articles—one devoted to Canada and two directed to trilateral cooperation with Japan—expand the book slightly beyond its U.S.-West Europe focus.

Perhaps what is most notable about the book, though, is not any single contribution but, rather, that such a distinguished array of influential foreign policy analysts on both sides of the Atlantic are so fully committed to the notion that it is absolutely essential to maintain continued strong ties between West Europe and America. If friendship and

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cooperation between the two regions is enhanced by scholars attempting to promote that phenomenon, then this book clearly serves a useful purpose.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Lloyd George: The People's Champion, 1902–1911 *by John Grigg. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. 391 pp. $25.00.*

"Who shall paint the chameleon?" Keynes once asked rhetorically with reference to the British statesman Lloyd George. John Grigg has come as close as anyone so far. This is the second of a projected four-volume work on "the Welsh Wizard." The first, *The Yound Lloyd George*, followed its protagonist from Llanystumdwy, a tiny village in northwest Wales where Lloyd George spent his childhood, to Westminster, where, as Liberal member of Parliament for Caernarvon Boroughs he became the leader of the Welsh party in the House of Commons, and with the outbreak of the South African war in 1899, a prominent pro-Boer. The second volume picks up the tale in 1902, when Lloyd George had already been a member of Parliament for twelve years, and ends in 1911, Lloyd George's *annus mirabilis* ("year of wonder"), according to Mr. Grigg (p. 352). By that time the member for Caernarvon Boroughs had become the chancellor of the exchequer and, with the possible exception of Asquith, the most important and successful Liberal politician of his day.

Mr. Grigg has produced an admirable account of a crucial nine-year span during Lloyd George's lifetime. It is welcome not least because historians have tended to emphasize the war and postwar years when their hero (or villain, as the case may be) truly had reached the zenith of power and prestige. Making use of the enormous cache of personal letters in the National Library of Wales, the Lloyd George Collection at the House of Lords Record Office, and the private papers of other descendants of Lloyd George to which historians have not had access before, Mr. Grigg has reinterpreted some events and offers hitherto unknown evidence to illuminate others. Thus we learn that Lloyd George opposed Balfour's Education Bill in 1902 not because it offended his Nonconformist conscience as has generally been supposed—"his instincts were more secular than Nonconformist" (p. 29)—but because he wanted to reestablish ties with the Liberal Imperialists (Asquith, Grey, Haldane) who had supported the Boer War; that he preferred Rosebery to Campbell Bannerman for prime minister in 1905 because that would hurt the prospects of Asquith, his rival as Liberal heir presumptive (p. 84); and that he received threatening letters in 1909 appealing for money and charging him with the paternity of an illegitimate child (pp. 186–88).

For the most part, however, this volume attempts to demonstrate that Lloyd George was a "patriotic radical of the Left Centre" (p. 305) "opposed alike to doctrinaire capitalism and doctrinaire socialism" (p. 275). Consequently, Mr. Grigg focuses upon Lloyd George's famous 1909 budget that, to a limited extent, taxed the rich to pay for social reforms, and upon the successful struggle he helped lead against the House of Lords that re-

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jected the budget precisely because many of its members would have to pay the new taxes. For the same reason the author emphasizes Lloyd George's radical scheme in 1910 to form a coalition government of Liberals and Conservatives "to liquidate arrears which, if much longer neglected [might] end in national impoverishment, if not insolvency" (pp. 264–65), and his growing reputation as a subtle and sympathetic arbiter in the sharpening conflict between labor and capital. This is a period of British history that has been well mined (by Bentley Gilbert, Jose Harris, and H. V. Emy among others) and Mr. Grigg's interpretation of Lloyd George does not differ in essentials from those that have come before. Although critical of Lloyd George's lukewarm support for women's suffrage, he concludes that the chancellor of the exchequer "was indeed the people's champion in a Government which, without him, would never have done battle so vigorously on their behalf" (p. 360).

Certain assumptions that underly this conclusion require further scrutiny. The nature of Lloyd George's undoubted radicalism and commitment to social reform, for example, manifested, according to Mr. Grigg, in numerous attacks upon the peerage and landowning class and in statements defending "the poor cottagers." Was Lloyd George equally concerned with the plight of the urban poor? During the period 1902 to 1911 he does not seem to have distinguished between rural and urban poverty; and neither does Mr. Grigg. Then there is the much touted prospective coalition. Was the Tory party as likely a vehicle for social reform as Mr. Grigg suggests? This leads to another matter: Lloyd George's ambition and careerism. At various stages he appeared as an antimilitarist and a jingo; a little Englander and an imperialist; a staunch Liberal and a coalitionist; an agnostic and an upholder of Nonconformity. Mr. Grigg charts these inconsistencies, but his explanation of them will remain unconvincing to some: "Pragmatism . . . should not be regarded as the equivalent of opportunism and cynicism, but as itself a valid principle of political conduct" (p. 111).

For all its ambiguity, or perhaps because of it, Lloyd George's extraordinary career has already inspired more than fifty biographies. Mr. Grigg has disclaimed the attempt to write a definitive one. Despite his tendency at times to accept Lloyd George on his own terms, however, he has produced a distinguished contribution to the literature.

JONATHAN SCHNEER
Boston College

Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival *by Ezra N. Suleiman. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1978. 299 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $9.75.*

The contribution that Professor Suleiman's new book makes to the study of recruitment, training, and working methods of elites in a democratic society is at once serious and seriously flawed. Its systematic reinterpretation of classic elite studies (especially of Pareto, Mosca, and Schumpeter) is brilliant and original. The author analyzes perceptively the findings of most contemporary writings on the French grands corps and views

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them in a comparative perspective. The core of his study presents the results of lengthy interviews with 125 members of the grands corps—those who hold top positions in industry and in the public sector (ministries, nationalized industries, and ministerial cabinets). For all its interest the book shows the limited results that one obtains by submitting structured questionnaires to an elite group (and a French one at that), even when the questions are devised and the answers interpreted by as seasoned an observer of the French scene as Professor Suleiman.

Whence the traditional administrative corps derive their seemingly uncontested legitimacy in a dynamic society is the study's central question. According to the author, past studies of these state-created elites have paid an undue amount of attention to the elites' social background. He therefore refuses to discuss the substantial, if controversial, writings of French authors such as Bourdieu, Passeron, Birnbaum, and Gaxie. To him and to his respondents the foremost reason for the corps' perennially dominant place in France is its organizational structure and its ensuing adaptability. But the study demonstrates once more how much both structure and adaptability owe to an educational system that affords a high premium to knowledge and attitudes derived from elite origin. The author himself ascribes more than once the similarity of views held by corps members in public and private employment to "their common class origin" (p. 274).

Suleiman discusses with great acumen the relationship of structure and function in the corps members' daily activities. But the relationship between their functions and the needs of the society in which they act is similarly close. It is a truism that without a stable and able administrative elite a politically volatile society such as France might have lost all cohesion. The corps survives because it is needed. And if the author makes much of the fact that even when it seemed close to power, the Left had no serious suggestions how to "democratize" elite access and training, this says less about the structure of the corps than about the French Left and about the political system.

There are curious uncertainties about the very characteristics of the corps. Frequently the corps is pictured as a divided elite in a divided society. At one point an instance of decision making by compromise between feuding corps is viewed as a "powerful refutation of the technocratic decision-making thesis" (p. 247). But elsewhere the respondents' assertions of an overriding solidarity are taken at face value, an ideologically motivated rhetoric for reality. Probably a different form of interview would have yielded a more critical self-image. Not all corps members share the delusions (or is it a myth?) about their independence, about their ability to discern always which decisions serve the public interest, about the virtues of leaving public service for private employment, yet still serving society. In my opinion the study pays insufficient attention to the criticism that has come from truly independent observers such as Michel Crozier who has explained why he has lost his earlier confidence in the ability of the corps to "unblock" stalled situations.

The interviews show by which methods the corps members maintain a reasonably high degree of efficiency and how they are able to extend their control into new technological fields. But whether what the study calls correctly a pattern of "monopolistic competition" (p. 184) provides an effective system of problem solving in a modern society, remains an open question. There is little discussion regarding the content of policies. The mere denial by most interviewees that there is any policy orienting the corps' activities might be yet another ideological statement.

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Altogether the concentration on a narrow, if influential, elite results sometimes in a distortion of reality. Certainly French higher education is in crisis. (Which system of higher education is not?) But from the present study one could conclude that universities have lost their raison d'etre and that only the *grandes ecoles* still fulfill a function—which is a caricature of the actual situation. The importance of the corps members in private industry (banking is simply not mentioned), great though it is, appears to be inflated. The data here submitted are insufficient to weigh their overall influence in the private sector as a whole. Even if it is true that many "spokesmen" for business belong to the elite corps (p. 252), not all influentials qualify as spokesmen.

The author agrees with those who, like Stanley Hoffmann, have argued that the most notable changes in the behavior of French elites have occurred outside the civil service. He also knows that the prestige of private (if large) enterprise and of business training, both French and foreign, has grown substantially. Hence the symbiosis of the private and the public sectors no longer insures, if it ever has, that the mentality of the state-created elites will always prevail. Should one conclude that their place in society is not quite as unassailable as this study suggests?

HENRY W. EHRMANN
Dartmouth College

How the Soviet Union is Governed *by Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979. 679 pp. $18.50.*

Merle Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled*, originally published in 1953, was a landmark in sovietology. A second edition appeared in 1963, and Fainsod was working on another revision at the time of his death in 1972. Now Jerry Hough has published, under a reworded title, something like a third edition.

This large work, mostly new, presents much useful information, such as the excellent description of the Central Committee departments. Some interpretations in the first, historical sections are dubious; for example, Hough insists at some length that Lenin did not want a party of professional revolutionaries, contradicting not only the opinion of historians but several explicit statements of Lenin. The treatment of the politics of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras is stronger, probably because the author has devoted more attention to them.

As coauthor, Hough claims broadly to be following the master. However, he concedes in the preface that his views and emphases are different from Fainsod's; and Hough is less opposed to the Soviet interpretation from the title onward. Fainsod often used the words "totalitarian" and "dictatorship"; to Hough they are abhorrent. Fainsod stressed the aspects of control and regimentation; Hough stresses the sharing of the power.

Rebutting Fainsod on occasion, Hough repeatedly chides Western sovietologists. A much repeated mode is "Some [or many] western observers contend that . . . yet one must consider . . ." as he proceeds to offer an interpretation less offensive to the Soviet system. Lenin is sympathetically portrayed. The fact that his party received only 25 percent of the votes in the elections for the Constituent Assembly is seen as evidence of freedom, despite the fact that the Bolsheviks did what they could to manage the elections.

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Lenin's closure of the freely elected Assembly is discussed by citing Lenin's justification. Even Stalin was not so much of an ogre, or was an ineffective ogre. The number of lives lost in the purges is guessed in the low hundred thousands, a tenth or less of commonly accepted figures. Khrushchev's statement that Stalin needed his drinking companions is adduced as evidence for the collegiality of decision making (p. 184). During the worst of Stalinist censorship, according to Hough, "the suppression of deviation among the intellectuals was a gradual process and by no means a thoroughgoing one" (p. 181).

Since Stalin, and especially since Khrushchev, the Soviet state seems, in the eyes of Hough, to have become a fairly mild authoritarianism. There is much popular participation in low-level decision making, which is, after all, of immediate concern to people. Citizens can speak and write rather freely so long as they touch nothing sensitive. Citing as evidence a Soviet source, Hough contends that "newspapers and journals carry to the leadership the interests and initiatives of the broad masses" (p. 286). Soviet workers may have rights equal to those of Yugoslavs under "workers' control" (p. 361). Leaders consult broadly and take into account views of experts and needs of the groups constituting Soviet society. In short, in Hough's view the Soviet state is much less different from Western pluralistic societies than we have been misled to believe.

Sometimes Hough allows his facts to contradict his theses. For example, having spoken of the "growing openness of the Soviet political system" (p. vii), he several times laments the secrecy that shrouds almost everything really political. He notes that Central Committee meetings have become fewer and shorter since 1968, a fact contrary to his theme. He sees some problems, for example, that of regulating the succession, as a remedy for which he proposes a limited tenure for the general secretary, like the Mexican president. Formerly skeptical of the aging of the Soviet leadership, he documents it well, concedes a growing sluggishness of leadership, and perceives the dilemma of fear of younger colleagues. Generally, however, problems are ignored or treated lightly. The structure of the Academy of Sciences is detailed, but nothing is said of the politically caused difficulties of Soviet science. The nationality question is called "the most important in the Soviet Union," but it receives only two and one-half pages. Growing crime rate, alcoholism, black markets, economic slow down, and so forth, are left unmentioned.

It would seem, in Hough's view, that the settled government is fairly democratic because of practical needs of interactions of rulers and ruled; and liberalization advances as the party and its leaders act merely as brokers among the various social forces. True, social transformation is past and the messianic impulse that justified party supremacy is worn out; but can weariness and exhaustion of inspiration properly be called liberalization? Hough seems unaware of the urge of the self-selected party elite to maintain its position and privileges, and he gives no hint of sympathy for Soviet dissidents. He also has little perception of the difference between open and closed societies; in a very recent book he wrote of "the bias of the intellectual in favor of intellectual freedom" (*The Soviet Union and Social Science*, pp. 222–23). In stark contrast to Fainsod, Hough seems virtually unconcerned with values of freedom. Instead of joining Fainsod's name to his, Hough perhaps should have frankly written his own book.

ROBERT WESSON
University of California, Santa Barbara

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Soviet Perceptions of the United States *by Morton Schwartz. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 216 pp. $12.50.*

A more appropriate title for this book would be "The USA Institute's Perceptions of the United States," since it focuses on the writings of the *Institut Soyedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki i Kanada* (Institute of the United States of America and Canada), a Soviet research institute established in 1967 to study the United States (and, later, Canada). On the basis of his examination of the many books and articles produced by the USA Institute, the author concludes that "the analyses of Moscow's Americanists, especially in the past few years, have been significantly better informed and more sophisticated than any previously published in the USSR" (p. 3). In place of the "vulgar Marxism of the Stalin era, with its crude economic determinism" (p. 152), the institute offers an interpretation of American behavior that recognizes the importance of "a medley of influences—political, bureaucratic, historical, even psychological—as well as the once-dominant 'class interests' of the 'ruling circles' " (p. 154).

Schwartz devotes most of his attention to institute views of the American economy, American politics, and American foreign policy. Soviet scholars, he finds, have seriously modified the orthodox Marxist assumption of the indivisibility of economics and politics. What they discovered during the Vietnam War were sharp divisions in the ranks of "monopoly-capitalism" between the "military-industrial complex," which has a vested interest in the arms race and an aggressive foreign policy, and the majority of American corporations, which regard defense spending and international tension as antithetical to their interests. Having abandoned the notion of a monolithic American business community governed by immutable economic laws, Soviet analysts are now free to see the American political system as a force unto itself. Unfortunately, Schwartz makes clear, their analyses of American political institutions, though more perceptive than previous Soviet analyses, are limited by their preoccupation with the question, "is it good for the Soviet Union" (p. 50)? Thus, American politics becomes a continuous dialectical struggle between a "bellicose aggressive tendency" (p. 130) hostile to the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and a "sober moderate tendency" (p. 132) sympathetic to "detente," on the other. The "enemies of detente" include the "military-industrial complex," the U.S. State Department, academic Sovietologists—those who contributed to and benefited from the cold war; the "forces of moderation" include the American president (especially Nixon), Congress, most corporations, the "Arms Control Community," and American public opinion—those responsible for a "new realism" in U.S. foreign policy (p. 108). Since 1975, the "enemies of detente" have been reasserting themselves.

According to Schwartz, the Soviet Union also has its "aggressive" and "moderate" tendencies (p. 164). The USA Institute manifests the latter tendency. Convinced that detente strengthens the forces of moderation in the United States, institute scholars have become Moscow's "salesmen of detente" (p. 161). Since the institute actively promotes improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Schwartz advises American policymakers to act in ways likely to bolster the institute's political position. In the end, the author himself becomes an advocate of detente.

The weakness of this study is its limited focus. Not only do we learn nothing about Moscow's "aggressive" tendency, Schwartz never adequately explores the relationship

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between the perceptions of the USA Institute and those of high Soviet officials. If the institute has "access to the top echelons of power" (p. 163), as he asserts, we would like to know why its writings "often differ considerably from the accounts on the same subject appearing in the Soviet media" (p. 6). Schwartz raises the question of the extent of the institute's influence on Soviet policy but does not really answer it.

C. BEN WRIGHT
Minneapolis, Minn.

In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt *by Leonard Binder. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1978. 437 pp. $22.50.*

Both liberals and Marxists in recent years have had to reassess their earlier expectations that rapid social and economic development in a predictable direction would follow the national awakening of the new states of Africa and Asia. In the Middle East, the collapse of Lebanon has removed the liberals' primary model of democratic development in that region, while the "new middle class" has often conformed more closely to the stagnant and parasitic national bourgeoisie condemned by Fanon than to the standard-bearer of modernization in which writers like Manfred Halpern placed their hopes. At the same time, a strong proletariat has failed to develop, and the gap between the national and social revolutions, which Nasser described in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, remains as wide as ever.

Leonard Binder's new book on Egypt is a significant academic response both to the vagueness of earlier formulations of tradition, modernity, and the new middle class, and to the realization that development is neither unidirectional nor necessarily very rapid. Drawing on Gaetano Mosca's theory of the "second stratum," Binder demonstrates convincingly that there has been, for over a century, a relatively quiescent and pliable mediating class in Egypt without which the rulers have not been able to rule. This impressive agent of continuity, comprising about 3 percent of the total population of Egypt, or between 700,000 and 1 million people, is the rural middle class. By analyzing nearly 30,000 names in the register of Nasser's mass party, the National Union, Binder establishes significant ancestral links between the contemporary rural middle class and an earlier prerevolutionary agrarian notability whose members were represented in elected assemblies as far back as 1866 under Isma'il Khedive. He further shows that this rural elite has maintained its position and political influence throughout the country through successive reorganizations of the Arab Socialist Union to the present day.

Binder's argument, however, is not that nothing has changed. The bulk of his book is devoted to a rigorous internal analysis of the geographic, occupational, and political characteristics of the second stratum and a series of detailed statistical correlations with indices of modernization, agrarian development, and land ownership. From this data it emerges that the rural elite is most prevalent in the more industrially developed districts of the western Delta and that its most influential families are engaged in both "modern" and "traditional" occupations. These findings are somewhat modified by the greater con-

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centration of power that remains in the hands of the less numerous rural elite in upper Egypt. But overall, the correlation with the more highly capitalized agricultural sector and the apparent shift by some segments of the class to more urban settings are reminiscent of Barrington Moore's description of the English aristocracy that gradually "committed decorous suicide" in transforming its economic base.

Binder's important study opens up several new directions for students of Egypt and of the Third World. Historically, he has thrown new light on traditional interpretations of episodes such as the triangular conflict between the Wafd, the monarchy, and the British between the world wars. By showing that the Wafd and the king both needed support from the rural middle class and in fact successively elected many of the same people to parliament, Binder draws attention to a relatively consensual second layer of the political elite that is missed by an exclusive focus on the top leadership. The test of continuity must now be extended to Sadat's latest reorganization of the mass party which, while superficially dramatic, may have produced no greater change of personnel than earlier such reorganizations and changes of name.

Another direction suggested by Binder's work is a close examination of the relationships between the rural elite and other classes such as the landless peasants and the urban bourgeoisie. Although Binder indicates that the mediating task of the rural middle class is performed by its integration into the peasant culture of the village, these links must be empirically verified. And despite Binder's conclusion that there is "a significant hiatus between the urban and rural political arenas" (p. 404), the economic and social boundary between the urbanized elements of the rural middle class and the urban bourgeoisie remains unclear. Similarly, Binder's discussion of the infighting among the top leadership before and after Nasser's death, while fascinating in itself, remains rather detached from the earlier empirical evidence on the rural elite. It is the lack of adequate linkage with other classes that makes the demonstration of a Marxist "moment of enthusiasm," which gives the book its title, somewhat problematical. But that is a task for another book.

Meanwhile, the subtitle of this book, which better reflects its content, indicates a third major direction to be pursued. Binder's historical and statistical analysis of one significant class, not necessarily the most obvious at first sight, and his detailed internal differentiation of the various segments of that class, suggest a focus and a methodology of great importance for comparative analysis. Similar studies in countries like Algeria and India will not only help "to break the epistemological barrier between area studies and behavioral science" (p. xvii), toward which Binder aspires, but will also add an important dimension to studies of modernization and development that could shed new light on many puzzling aspects of Third World revolutions.

RONALD COLMAN
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Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat *by Raymond William Baker. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978. 290 pp. $16.00.*

Baker's work is exceptionally helpful for understanding Egypt's development during the last quarter-century. A splendid sense of problem and scholarly judgment have produced a volume that is filled with vivid and decisive facts and with analyses of turning points; yet Baker presents it all with impressive brevity, depth, and lucidity. The book's material is based primarily on Arabic sources gathered during prolonged field study.

The story Baker tells is that of two leaders who have both based their power on the military and the security police. A docile technocratic caste, composed in largest plurality of engineers, benefited under both regimes. Under Sadat, middlemen and entrepreneurs also profit. But a new political community has not been created. Baker draws upon Egyptian independent leftists, and at times on the independent-minded and very able Soviet scholar G. I. Mirsky, to make some of his most telling points. He sums up one Egyptian critic this way: A genuinely new community "could not be realized by elite manipulation, no matter how bold. Such a revolution could only mean the self-transformation of a people. Such a self-transformation in turn necessitated supportive institutional and intellectual structures. Judged by this standard, the rule of Anwar es-Sadat so far has been as disappointing as that of his predecessor" (pp. 239–240). I share this judgment. Giving it such space in this review, however, is a bit misleading. The greatest virtue of this book stems from its more specific analysis of the complexities and underlying reasons for this failure in the history of the original military conspirators, the Egyptian bureaucracy, the political organization, the agricultural cooperatives, rural health care, and the regime's orientation to foreign policy. The barriers to transformation are shown to have become deeper, in part because power has become both more personalized and more bureaucratized.

Baker is right in illuminating for us a group of military conspirators moving toward Nasser's coup of 1952 who were more united by personal ties than by explicit ideological positions; more pushed by contingencies than by their own historical decisions. Other scholars (including myself) had not been able to ascertain these characteristics as clearly in the early 1960s. He shows that these attributes have continued to mark the Egyptian top elite's style right to the present. This elite has also remained far more solicitous for and dependent upon the army and secret police than on the rest of its people. Its greatest payoffs and losses, even for its domestic development, have come from its investment in a succession of foreign policies.

This elite was correspondingly wary of creating a revolutionary vanguard. For people generally, therefore, "the primary motives for joining the mass parties [created by Nasser] were the nonideological—even conservative—ones of protecting existing rights, maintaining social prestige, securing redress of specific grievances, and possibly attaining minimal qualifications for cooption into the higher echelons of the state" (p. 99). As a result, the economy is bankrupt, but in Sadat's days the new wealth of "the survivors of the old liberal bourgeoisie, the inherited state bourgeoisie, and the newly emergent parasitic bourgeoisie . . . has angered the mass of the Egyptian people" (p. 151). Sadat has thus reinforced "pressures, especially class pressures, that one day may in fact bring more fundamental changes" (p. 169).

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There is, as yet, no reason to suppose that the fundamentally new society to come in Egypt will also be fundamentally better. Baker's book informs us incisively why Egypt's revolution has been not merely "uncertain," but certainly partial and halting at best. He does not tell us what a transforming revolution requires. Nobody tells us that these days. Most of us write about problems of improving order or overcoming disorder or even more carefully on the relatively smaller problems of orientations and decision making. We modestly wait for modern revolutionaries to provide us with empirical data about revolutionary practice. But these leaders are of very little help. They may take a few steps, but they do concentrate from the first day on consolidating the revolution. If there is ever to be a genuinely transforming revolution somewhere, it will gain its first critical and creative consciousness as it has always: someone will write a book. And the revolution will persist unless someone, once again, consolidates the book.

MANFRED HALPERN
Princeton University

Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology *by Gail M. Gerhart. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 364 pp. $14.50.*

Since his death in police custody during September 1977, Steven Biko has become an international hero, perhaps the most widely known South African black leader since Albert Lutuli won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961. As Gail Gerhart's impressive history of black power politics in South Africa makes clear, it is insufficient to focus on Biko as a courageous and compelling individual who sparked a new generation's revolt against an intolerable system. Biko, and others whose names have not made the press, can best be understood as the continuers and developers of one line of resistance to white domination, a line deeply rooted in South African black society.

This line of resistance, which Gerhart calls "black power" or "orthodox African nationalism," has until the Soweto revolt commanded less attention than the "liberal" or "multiracist" line espoused by Lutuli and the African National Congress (ANC). A hallmark of the ANC has been its "realist" perspective on action within a social and political order dominated by a powerful white minority. From its beginning the ANC has welcomed alliance with sympathetic whites (and Asians and Coloureds), so as to be able to draw on their economic and organizational resources, and no doubt also on a certain amount of protection from official and unofficial harassment. Inevitably, it has stressed the liberal goal of a South Africa in which race would be a simple irrelevancy. Christianity has provided one powerful ideological underpinning for multiracialism; Marxism-Leninism has provided another. As the South African government has forced the ANC into clandestine and exile operations and closed off most hope for peaceful change toward a multiracial society, the organizational, financial, and ideological resources of the world's Marxist-Leninists have become increasingly relevant.

Black power has appealed not to the "realists" of South Africa, but to its "rebels," those concerned less with the need for protection and less with the long-term goals for society, and more with the means for bringing about a revolt of the African majority. For Anton

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Lembede, who in the 1940s first articulated a coherent body of Africanist thought within the ANC, the majority had above all to rid itself of its "inferiority complex, a feeling of frustration, the worship and idolization of whitemen" (p. 58). It had to look back to African history and forward to African triumphs, and this it could only do alone. Help from even the best intentioned and most compliant white ally would only assist the system in robbing the African of his initiative and the right to set his own course. Not surprisingly, Lembede's ideas were influenced by the example of Afrikaner self-help and cultural promotion that underlay their political organization, as well as by Mazzini and other European nationalists whose lessons he applied to his own people. It was not until 1958 that the Africanist rebels broke away from the ANC and under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe founded the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). For Sobukwe, a "militant egalitarian" with strong rural roots, "organizational structures, tactics, and techniques of struggle, all were secondary compared to the problem of getting the masses to 'think nationalist' " (p. 188). For inspiration the PAC turned to the examples of African nationalism further north and for the first time linked the South African struggle to that of Nkrumah, Banda, and Nyerere. George Padmore's *Pan Africanism or Communism?* was perhaps the most influential book.

The PAC faced a more determined opponent than had the nationalists in colonial Africa; Sharpeville and the repressions that followed ushered in an era of public political quiescence that the world at large interpreted as representing something of a normal state of affairs in South Africa. This facile view was shattered by the rising of the students in Soweto, a rising that had intellectually been prepared by their elders in the black consciousness movement, of which Steve Biko was the central figure. Like its predecessors, black consciousness borrowed and adapted foreign ideas in order to influence mass thinking. This time American black writers like Cleaver, Malcolm X, and James Cone provided the catalyst for the reinterpretation by the young rebels of the South Africa Students Organization of their own experience. Among the important differences from the previous Africanist efforts, the black consciousness movement reached out (not without some hesitation) to include Asians and Coloureds in their ranks as fellow victims of the system. (As "black" became the rallying identity, the old negative identification "nonwhite" became the new equivalent of "Uncle Tom.") The uprising of 1976 was followed by the repression and wholesale bannings and arrests of 1977, but black consciousness was not so easily extirpated. At the very least the movement succeeded in shifting the black political scene toward greater radicalization. Today a Gatsha Buthelezi, who had used his position to build a semilegal alliance of Africans, Asians, and Coloureds against the white government, has to be viewed as a moderate in the political spectrum. Gerhart realistically views black consciousness as primarily a "transitional philosophy" and sees Biko's successors turning toward a greater emphasis on organization, together with increasing convergence between the approaches of the realists and the rebels.

Gail Gerhart is to be commended for an admirable contribution to the study of South African politics and the study of nationalism more broadly. The book is solidly based on interviews and extensive primary documentation; it shows how much a dedicated and resourceful scholar can learn about illegal politics in a repressive system. Work of this excellence cannot be done alone; it has been made possible by the prior compilation and

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sharing of documentary collections such as those of Gwendolen Carter and Thomas Karis and of Benjamin Pogrund, and by the careful library work of the Cooperative Africana Microform Project. "Ironically," as Gerhart notes, "access to these invaluable primary sources is today much easier for foreigners than for South Africans, for whom possession of such banned documents is a criminal offense" (p. viii). It is to be hoped that other scholars can exploit this wealth of material with some of the skill and insight that Gail Gerhart has used.

WILLIAM J. FOLTZ
Yale University

Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949 *by Suzanne Pepper. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 472 pp. $18.50.*

This long-awaited book is the most thorough account to date of political developments in China between 1945 and 1949, the period of the final struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists. It is not meant to be a complete history of the Chinese civil war or to answer all the questions surrounding the Communists' victory. It does, however, look closely at one factor behind the Chinese Communists' success—how they gained legitimacy and political support. "Did the Chinese Communists win a genuine mandate to rule, or were they primarily the beneficiaries of KMT [Nationalist] mistakes and Japanese excesses (p. 6)? This is the major question Dr. Pepper's study attempts to answer.

Drawing in a rich array of source materials, Dr. Pepper compares the policies of the Nationalists and the Communists for winning support during the civil war years in both urban and rural areas. She finds that the Nationalists indeed suffered a "default of authority" during their final years in power because they failed to make essential changes and reforms. She documents their record as one of continued mismanagement of the economy, fueled by a disastrous policy of inflationary finance, rampant corruption, and labor unrest. Such measures, coupled with the Nationalists' disregard of the widespread public opposition to continued fighting, alienated large segments of the urban population. Workers, students, businessmen, civil servants, and intellectuals thereby lost confidence in the Nationalists' ability to govern and withheld their cooperation and support.

Dr. Pepper's account of Communist policies for the urban areas shows these problems were not easy to solve. Many people continued to harbor "doubts and fears and misgivings" about Communist rule (p. 427). Nevertheless, the Communists made sufficient gains in stabilizing wages and prices and in administrative reforms to win a broad coalition of urban support.

The section of Dr. Pepper's book that will undoubtedly attract the most interest is the treatment of what took place during the civil war years in the Chinese countryside. This subject lies at the heart of a long-standing debate among China scholars concerning the mechanisms of peasant mobilization and the sources of the Communists' victory. Dr. Pepper's account of "The Return to Land Reform" in North China is the most detailed in

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Western language scholarship. Given the dearth of source materials for this aspect of the civil war, this is no small achievement.

In other respects, however, the section is unsatisfying. Much of the chapter consists of summaries of Chinese Communist policy directives and work reports. While replete with fascinating details about conditions in the rural areas, they are piled up to a point where they obscure the line of argument.

Moreover, questions can be raised about the line of argument itself. Dr. Pepper's analysis of the Chinese Communists' efforts to build support among the peasants rests essentially on a "grievance" theory—in other words, the Communists won the hearts of the peasants by distributing wealth and property to those who were oppressed and short of land. The author suggests that the peasants rallied to the Communist cause in North China, where rates of tenancy were relatively low, because the Communists' agrarian reforms encompassed a wide range of issues—abuses of power by rural elites, unpaid labor, and indebtedness. In redressing these grievances and appealing to the peasants' sense of social justice, Chinese Communist rural policies won a wide following.

However, alternative explanations for the Communists' success in North China have been offered. Studies by Tetsuya Kataoka, Steven Levine, and other scholars have attributed the Communists' expansion in this area to the fact that counterrevolutionary forces—both regular Nationalist forces and local armed groups for self-defense—were fragmented and relatively weak. Such scholarship does not discount the appeal of land reform but suggests that the key to building strength in the rural areas came from the Communists' organizational resources—their superior military presence, the leadership skills of their cadres, and their ability to overwhelm and absorb all forms of local opposition. Dr. Pepper's analysis of land reform during the civil war briefly touches on these issues but largely fails to take them—or the research supporting conflicting interpretations—into account.

Civil War in China does succeed in showing how the Chinese Communists won enough support from urban and rural groups to speed the transfer of a popular allegiance to their new government. Readers of this book will gain a clearer understanding of why the Communist takeover of China's cities occurred so rapidly. And thanks to Dr. Pepper's contribution, any lingering doubts that the Communist victory in 1949 was an illegitimate usurpation of power can be finally laid to rest.

JANE L. PRICE
Columbia University

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Congressional Roll Call 1978 *prepared by Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Washington, D. C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1979. 369 pp. $10.50.*

Congressional Voting Records, 95th Congress, 2nd Session *prepared by the Democratic Campaign Committee. Washington, D. C., Democratic Campaign Committee, 1979. 726 pp. $35.00.*

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Finances of County Governments *prepared by the Finance Branch, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 319 pp. $3.25.*

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The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 29:1913–1914 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 592 pp. $25.00.*

The Scottish Government Yearbook, 1979 *edited by N. Drucker and H. M. Drucker. Totowa, N. J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1979. 269 pp. $27.50.*

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Correspondence

Marshall Plan Summer

To the Editor:

John Gimbel, in his generally friendly review of my *Marshall Plan Summer* (*PSQ*, Winter 1978–79) accuses me of assorted sins that I did not commit. The reviewer to the contrary, I actually went to Europe with an assignment, as I say, to find out anything I could that would help me in my subsequent teaching for a semester at the National War College (pp. vii, 4). On returning, I gave a special lecture on my trip, and to this I refer at some length (pp. 224–225), although Gimbel says flatly that I did not mention such a lecture. Also contrary to what my critic implies, I interviewed a surprising number of Communists or other left-wingers, notably Harold Laski (pp. 211–216). The reviewer quotes me incorrectly as saying that I sought out people who would tell me about "the awful Russians and their ominous intentions" (p. viii). He finds something sinister in my having canceled a projected side trip to Warsaw because there, as I record, I could not learn much "about secret Soviet designs" (p. 183). My critic omits the fact that I also give two other and better reasons for this by-passing: unreliable transportation and uncertain hotel accommodations. And why at this stage of the cold war would a diplomatic historian go to battered Warsaw for any other reason than to check on the state of Poland's takeover by the Soviets?

Finally, Gimbel finds it "incredible" that I should have spent so much time in Germany "without ever recording a criticism of French policies and actions there." My sharp criticisms of French policy actually appear on pages 49–50 and 108, although the French Zone was not on my official itinerary. On page 49 I say bluntly that "there were periods [during the postwar years] when Washington encountered more difficulty with the French than with the Soviets."

Thomas A. Bailey
Stanford University

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Mr. Gimbel replies:

Professor Bailey protests too much. I did not quote him incorrectly when I said he recorded having heard about the awful Russians and their ominous intentions. Those were my words, not his, and I used no quotation marks. Neither did I find "something sinister" in his having canceled the trip to Warsaw. I concluded that his remark about not being able to learn much there about secret Soviet designs is *significant*, because it says something about what he was on the lookout for in the places he did visit. In this context, I might note that the book's subtitle is "An Eyewitness Report on Europe and the Russians in 1947."

Professor Bailey gave three lectures at the War College. He described two of them as "formal lectures" on subjects in his specialty, and a third as "an evening affair, to which the wives of the officers were also invited, . . . a kind of a general report on my recent observations and experiences in Europe" (pp. 224–25). Perhaps I dismissed the latter too cavalierly when I wondered what Professor Bailey had done in return for the War College's generosity.

One of the "periods when Washington encountered more difficulty with the French than with the Soviets" coincided with Professor Bailey's visit to Germany. How he got away from there without apparently having heard anything about the battle raging in Berlin, Washington, London, and Paris over the bizonal level of industry and Germany's reparations is still a mystery to me.

JOHN GIMBEL
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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